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ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims to challenge a popular contemporary Traditionalist trend of intra-Muslim 
theological disengagement and isolation, which is justified by a conception of a puritan 
Traditionalist theology entirely hypothetically based on scripture and a utopian monolithic 
understanding of the first three generations of Islam (the Salaf). One of the many inevitable 
consequences of such a popular trend is one of intolerance and hence sectarianism. Intra-Muslim 
theological disengagement amongst modern Traditionalists and the problems therein will be 
challenged by proving that the theology of the Traditionalist scholar, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 
751/1350), whose work is a main reference for contemporary Traditionalists, is much indebted to 
his critical engagement and intra-Muslim dialogue with fellow non-Traditionalist theologians 
and philosophers. This will be evident in my analysis of Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions on topics 
related to divine determination, which is a fundamental doctrine to Muslims. In fact, Ibn al-
Qayyim successfully develops a compatibilist position of dual agency on the problem of free will 
and determinism, a traditionalist rational objectivism position in the debate on meta-ethics and a 
four-fold theodicy of optimism on the problem of evil. Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological 
developments evidently defy contemporary intra-Muslim theological disengagement and the 
conception of a puritan Traditionalist theology. At the core of this thesis is an implication which 
seeks to promote dialogue amongst contemporary Muslims and Traditionalist Islam.          
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INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
This research aims to explore and evaluate five inter-relating concepts that are all relevant to 
contemporary Muslim theological authority.  
 Firstly, I explore the concept of a puritan Traditionalist theology that is purportedly based 
entirely on scripture and the understanding of the Salaf (early Muslims from the first three 
generations of Islam). This theology upholds that the knowledge of the Salaf is far more accurate 
than the developed knowledge that came thereafter. Hence, salvation is only attained by 
reference to the early generations with regard to the epistemology of Islamic sciences, theology 
in particular. This concept is typically employed by contemporary Traditionalists to justify their 
tendency towards theological isolation as opposed to intra-Muslim dialogue or critical 
engagement. The implication of this concept is that there is no need to engage with ‘the other’ on 
theological issues because the authoritative source is scripture and the understanding of the Salaf.   
 Secondly, this study seeks to challenge the Traditionalists’ prohibition of kalām (rational 
theology), which predominately involves reading and engaging with the works of the 
Mutakillimūn (rational theologians). This prohibition is another factor that prevents intra-Muslim 
dialogue and critical engagement vis-à-vis theology. Consequently, this leads to the widespread 
practice of taqlīd (uncritical religious imitation) and the inevitable suppression of critical 
thinking. The reason being is that according to contemporary Traditionalists, salvation is only 
attained by strict adherence to scripture and the understanding of the Salaf – even if this means 
restricting oneself to blindly following opinions.  
 As such, it is probable that taqlīd tendencies amongst contemporary Traditionalists 
promoted disengagement and the repetition of theological knowledge which may be regarded by 
non-Traditionalists as irrelevant doctrines enshrouded in the pretext of universal applicability.  
 Similarly, in the context of radicalisation, we witness the exploitation of transmogrified 
medieval opinions in order to propagate modern political agendas. And as such, it is these 
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scattered and undeveloped opinions which are frequently vulnerable to being exploited for 
indoctrination, control, disunity, intolerance and sectarian violent.   
 Thirdly, another aspect of my thesis seeks to investigate a potential Traditionalist 
philosophical theology which, in many aspects, is similar to rational theology in that it engages 
and develops philosophical issues such as: human agency, free will, meta-ethics, causality, evil 
and theodicy. Hence, I will investigate whether there is a Traditionalist stance on the 
philosophical issues above, despite the purported Traditionalist prohibition on engaging with 
philosophy or rational theology.  
 This aspect of Traditionalist philosophical theology will be apparent throughout my 
thesis given that it was my main motivation and rationale for this research. I had two inquiries 
that I wanted to study in detail. Firstly, how does the doctrine of qadar (divine determination) 
reconcile with the concept of divine justice? By this I mean, how is God’s justice justified with 
the Traditionalists’ view that some people will be destined to hell even though their acts were 
determined by God? Secondly, what is the Traditionalist view – if there is any - on the problem 
of evil, given that it is perhaps the strongest argument against theism in our modern age? 
 With the intention of answering these two questions, I read various Traditionalists works 
– both classical and contemporary – and found them to be mainly a systematic citation of 
scripture and opinions of the early religious authority and therefore very limited in critical 
analysis.   
 Nonetheless, I did come across very interesting critical analysis on the above two 
questions in the works of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim. Since there was no existing 
PhD research on Ibn al-Qayyim on the same two questions above - despite his importance to 
contemporary Traditionalism and him having a corpus dedicated entirely on the same topic - I 
decided to focus on him.       
 Subsequently, the fourth aspect of my thesis seeks to explore an alternative depiction of 
Ibn al-Qayyim, which contrasts with the relatively common depiction of him held by 
contemporary Traditionalists as a polemical and negativist “disengager”.  Again, this kind of 
depiction is used to justify the contemporary Traditionalist tendency towards theological 
isolation and hence the opposition to intra-Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and theological 
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development. I seek to reveal Ibn al-Qayyim as a positivist engager who critically engaged in 
intra-Muslim dialogue and thus contributed to the development of various theological issues.  
 This point of theological development leads to the last aspect of my thesis, which is to 
explore what exactly Ibn al-Qayyim’s project was. That is, what exactly was he doing and why? 
I will demonstrate that Ibn al-Qayyim’s project involved the development of Traditionalist 
theology. I will show that he achieves this by harmonising, synthesising, developing, 
‘Traditionalising’ and systematising the positions of his predecessors from amongst the 
Mutakillimūn. And as such, his critical engagement with the Mutakillimūn on theological issues 
was crucial in aiding this project.  
 So a central implication of this research is to encourage intra-Muslim dialogue, critical 
engagement and development amongst Muslims - in particular contemporary Traditionalists – 
given that one of the most important Islamic disciplines, namely theology, went through this 
process. That is, many aspects and positions of medieval Islamic theology were the result of 
critical engagement and development.  So the theological doctrine of qadar (divine 
determination), despite its complexities, is a fundamental doctrine to every Muslim and Ibn al-
Qayyim’s critical engagements regarding this doctrine will be of vital importance to 
contemporary Traditionalists.  
 
Aims and Objectives of Research 
 
This research aims to critically explore and examine the role of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical 
engagement in the development of Traditionalist theological issues on qadar. The first part will 
make up the core knowledge to the main study of my thesis and will trace and analyse intra-
Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and development throughout the early period of Islam up 
until the era of Ibn al-Qayyim. The second part will make up my main research and will consist 
of a detailed study of five practiced thematic issues, articulations of qadar. As such, I will trace 
and analyse the intra-Muslim dialogue, critical engagement and development in regards to these 
five thematic issues.  
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 The first thematic issue discussed will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate on 
free will and determinism, and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on this debate. 
The questions that I will investigate and analyse are: does man have free will - and if so - how is 
this will reconciled with the doctrine of divine determination? If man is divinely determined, 
then how is divine determination harmonised with human moral responsibility? Likewise, if man 
has agency then what are the properties that make up such agency?    
 The second thematic issue studied will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate 
on meta-ethics and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on this debate. The 
questions that I will investigate and analyse are: what exactly is a moral value, and where do 
moral values come from—what is the source of moral value? Is morality absolute in that it 
applies to all people at all times, or is morality relative in that it varies from person to person, or 
context to context? And how does morality affect the psychology of human agents? This debate 
will respond to such questions by examining the ontology of moral properties, and the 
epistemology of how we come to know moral values.   
 The third thematic issue considered will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate 
on causation and the nature of divine acts, and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance 
on this debate. The question that I will investigate and analyse is: what is the nature of divine 
acts – does God act for a cause – and if so, what is the nature of such cause?   
 The fourth thematic issue addressed will be Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the debate 
on evil vis-à-vis divine determination and how he manages to develop a Traditionalist stance on 
such debate. The question that I will investigate and analyse is: what is the nature of evil and 
how does it come into existence - is evil divinely determined?   
 The last thematic issue will be a construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with the 
debate on the nature of divine justice in relation to the existence of evil and how he manages to 
develop a Traditionalist theodicy. The question that I will investigate and analyse is: how can 
God’s justice be reconciled with the existence of evil?  
 
 
5 
 
 
Method and Methodology 
 
I will employ a purely qualitative method that will make use of textual and discourse analysis 
and also a hermeneutical approach. The textual and discourse analysis nature of my research will 
involve locating and analysing relevant debates through the employment of key-word search 
engines, such as al-Shamila. Additionally, I will also search, manually, the content pages and 
indexes of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological works in order to compensate for the inevitable loss of 
context in key-word search engine results.  
 Subsequently, this will enable me to trace the various non-Traditionalist persons and 
sources with which Ibn al-Qayyim engages. As such, I will also be able to develop a table in my 
first chapter which includes information about the non-Traditionalist persons and sources which 
Ibn al-Qayyim utilises and the number of times he cites a particular person. For example, Ibn al-
Qayyim uses over one hundred and twenty references in his most original theological work, 
Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl. Thirty of the one hundred and twenty belong to the non-Traditionalist schools; 
specifically twenty Ashʿarite works, seven Muʿtazilite works and three works of philosophers. 
Similarly, the Ashʿarite, al-Rāzī, is cited six times by name in the Shifāʾ, while the Muʿtazilite, 
Abu al-Husayn al-Baṣrī, is cited three times and the peripatetic philosopher, Ibn Sīnā, only twice.  
 So, given that the vast majority of Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion on divine determination 
occurs in his Shifāʾ, these tables will give me an indication of who and what sources Ibn al-
Qayyim engaged with; and will also help me trace Ibn al-Qayyim’s unreferenced arguments to 
their original primary sources. Furthermore, it is very likely that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with 
multiple persons and sources within each school. Nonetheless, the evidence of multiple 
engagements will support my primary thesis: the Traditionalist Ibn al-Qayyim critically engaged 
with non-Traditionalists, as opposed to undertaking the modern Traditionalist methodology of 
theological isolation. Ibn al-Qayyim’s positivist engagement helped him with his project of 
theological development, which is contrary to the tendency towards uncritical religious imitation 
of early opinions. 
 Likewise, the discourse analysis nature of my research will be apparent when I reveal the 
context and intellectual history of Ibn al-Qayyim’s thought. This will entail a historical and 
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descriptive approach in the study of Ibn al-Qayyim’s society, which allows us to appreciate the 
context in which he was writing.   
 Similarly, the discourse analysis aspect will also be evident when I trace and study the 
early theological developments of each school. Again, this will highlight the fact that such 
developments were an inevitable and natural phenomena that took place in the early history of 
Islam. Thus it is not necessarily essential that this natural process of theological development 
should cease and be substituted with the uncritical practise of taqlīd.  
 Lastly, the hermeneutical nature and both the textual and discourse analysis of this study 
will all be manifested in my detailed study of the relevant texts of each debate.  The 
hermeneutical aspect will require me to analyse the implications of the philosophical arguments 
and conceptions. Subsequently, through such a methodological approach we can appreciate how 
Ibn al-Qayyim positioned himself distinctly from his interlocutors; and also understand how and 
why he reached such positions. Only then can we fully appreciate the nature of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
project of theological development.       
 
An Overview of the Research 
 
My first chapter contextualises Ibn al-Qayyim and his project of theological development. This 
project was made possible by the scholarly environment of Damascus, a centre for intellectual 
engagement and the development of knowledge in Ibn al-Qayyim’s era. An investigation into the 
various madrasas (schools), circles and scholars demonstrates that scholars did engage with one 
another despite their different theological affiliations. I also elucidate that Ibn al-Qayyim had 
studied non-Traditionalist texts under non-Traditionalist scholars, which probably indicates that 
he identified as an Ashʿarite at some point in his early studies. Additionally, a construction of Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s library on works of theology enables me to trace the many sources and persons 
whom he engages with in his own works of theology. This is occasionally further supplemented 
by his own citation of sources and persons. Lastly, I develop a chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
works using dates, citations and thematic discussions - all of which are relevant to his theological 
scholarship.      
7 
 
 
My second chapter is an overview of the theological developments within the early 
schools and the formation of early Traditionalism. I examine the contemporary Traditionalist 
concept of a monolithic understanding of the Salaf - which theoretically leaves no room for 
differences of opinion regarding theological issues. As such, an elucidation on the various 
theological issues in which the Salaf differed will challenge this concept. Furthermore, I trace the 
early discussions on qadar and analyse its subsequent developments within each school. I also 
explore early theological diversity – including the multiple founding fathers of Traditionalism, 
such as Ibn Kullāb and Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal.   
The debate of human agency and responsibility in the works of Ibn al-Qayyim is the topic 
of chapter three, which also traces the discussions to their original sources in each school so as to 
verify the accuracy of Ibn al-Qayyim’s depiction of the debate. This comparative textual 
analytical approach will also be employed in the remaining chapters of this research along with 
an emphasis on Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with both the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites. Chapter 
three also explores how Ibn al-Qayyim utilises and alters the concepts of his interlocutors in 
order to develop his own position in the debate. For example, Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a 
compatibilist position of dual agency which entails that man’s causative ability allows him to be 
a free and responsible agent on a micro-level while God’s agency is justified by His creative 
ability which determines matters on a macro-level. As such, man acts according to God’s general 
will, which implies more freedom and responsibility for man than the limitations implicit in 
God’s specific will. Likewise, I illustrate how Ibn al-Qayyim introduces new terms into the 
debate such as: ‘conditions’, ‘partially causative’ and ‘general will’, and also argues that moral 
acts are attributed to both man’s causative ability and God’s general will, in an attempt to 
harmonise and synthesise the opposing views.   
Chapter four explores Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual developments on the debate of Islamic 
meta-ethics and illustrates how he engages with non-Traditionalists in an attempt to develop a 
middle way Traditionalist stance on the debate. Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Muʿtazilites that 
some acts have essential and attributable characteristics of good and evil, which are inherent and 
known by reason. But he also upholds that the ontological and epistemological values of some 
acts are derived from scripture. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the Ashʿarites that religious 
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duty and accountability are only justified by revelation and God is not obliged by the human 
criteria of moral judgement. Lastly, I expound on how Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a double-sided 
approach in this debate. Firstly, his employment of rationalistic ad hominem arguments which 
are very Rāzian in style; secondly, his introduction of Sufi aspects, such as rational morality 
being a legal conveyance and piety a strengthening tool of one’s rational morality. 
  The debate on the causation and nature of divine acts is the topic of chapter five. Ibn al-
Qayyim adopts a similar position to the Muʿtazilites, supporting that wise purpose and causation 
are inherent to the nature of divine acts. This position is contrary to the Ashʿarites, who hold that 
God acts by pure divine volition, a concept which Ibn al-Qayyim refutes extensively by 
employing both rational and linguistic arguments. Although Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with the 
Muʿtazilites on this debate, he does differ with them in terms of their belief in the extrinsic 
nature of divine attributes, such as divine wise purpose, and also on their employment of non-
scriptural terminologies.   
Chapter six analyses Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological constructions concerning the concept of 
divine determination and its philosophical complexities. Ibn al-Qayyim critically engages with 
the theodicean writings of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī and opposes them by adopting the view that 
divine determination transcends evil. Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim grapples with the positions of 
both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, in order to harmonise the inconsistency of some divine 
attributes in relation to the existence of evil. As a result of his critical engagement, he manages to 
introduce new distinctions, such as divine acts and the objects of divine acts, both of which 
helped him develop his position on the transcendency of divine determination over evil. 
My last chapter is a construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicies on the debate on 
evil. Again, Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī; he adds 
to their categorisations of evil and employs demonstrative arguments which are potentially 
original contributions to the debate at hand. As a result, such a Qayyimian approach of critical 
engagement and development in the discipline of theology clearly challenges the contemporary 
Traditionalist methodology of theological disengagement, a utopian conception of theological 
sources and a puritan conception of Traditionalist theology. Additionally, his conclusions, which 
contain elements that could be traced back to Aristotle and Plotinus, namely evil as privation, 
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further distinguish his approach from that of the contemporary Traditionalists, as he does not 
limit himself entirely to scripture or the understanding of the Salaf. As Ibn al-Qayyim did engage 
in intra-Muslim dialogue he was able to successfully develop a four-fold theodicy of optimism, 
namely the theodicy of: relative evil, divine names and attributes, necessary opposites and divine 
wise purpose; which all ultimately argue for the relativity of evil and the optimism in creation; 
and thus the worthiness of God’s praise.      
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1-IBN AL-QAYYIM’S INTELLECTUAL MILIEU IN DAMASCUS 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will show how Damascus during Ibn al-Qayyim’s era was a safe haven for 
intellectual engagement despite the crises which came before this period.  I will also elaborate on 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual characteristics, which were essential for his transmission and 
development of knowledge - this includes his critical engagements and conversion to 
Traditionalism. This will be illuminated by the influence of Ibn al-Qayyim’s non-Traditionalist 
teachers, the non-Traditionalist texts which he studied and the extensive library that he possessed 
which included numerous non-Traditionalist sources with which he engaged.  
 
The Damascus Crises 
 
There were three major crises which occurred just before the birth of Ibn al-Qayyim, all of which 
had an impact on society in Damascus. Firstly, there was the two hundred years crusade conflict 
in the Levant.1 This included the 492/1098 crusade conquest of Jerusalem2 and many other cities 
and ports in the surrounding region.3 It also included the battle of Ḥaṭṭīn in 583/1187, which 
resulted in the recapture of Jerusalem by Ṣalāḥ Dīn.4 Lastly, the recapture of all occupied cities 
and ports in 790/1388 and the final withdrawal of the crusaders.5   
                                                          
1
 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidayā wa al-Nihāya, Nashr Maktaba al-Maʿārif, Beirut, 1978, vol. 13, pp. 319-321; Ibn al-
ʾAthīr, al-Kāmil, Nashr Dār Ṣādir wa Dār Bayrūt, Beirut, 1368AH, vol. 10, p. 272. 
2 Ibn al-ʾAthīr, op. cit., vol. 10, pp. 283-284. 
3 ibid 
4 Ibn al-ʾAthīr, op. cit., vol. 37, pp. 101. 
5 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 12, p. 323; Ibn al-ʾAthīr, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 546. 
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 Secondly, there were numerous attacks made by the Mongols on Damascus and the 
surrounding regions, which lasted nearly sixty years.6 The Mongols first appeared in 615/1218, 
resulting in the invasion of Būkhārā, Samraqand7 and then Baghdād in 656/1258.8 It is reported 
that the killings in Baghdād at the hands of the Mongols lasted for a period of forty days, 
resulting in the destruction of Baghdād’s intellectual civilization.9 Shortly after, in 658/1260, 
Syria suffered a similarly swift invasion by the Mongols. The continuous struggle between the 
Mongols and the Mamlūk dynasty lasted up until the last battle of Shaqḥab, (702/1303), in which 
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya famously participated.10  
  Thirdly, there was the ongoing internal power struggle between the Mamlūk rulers11, 
which perhaps resulted in the prevalent unrest amongst the Syrian people and the constant fear of 
foreign forces. These three major crises were responsible for various levels of social instability 
such as mass migration, unemployment, inflation and widespread hunger and corruption.12   
  
Intellectual Engagement in Damascus 
 
Despite the crises, during the twelfth and thirteenth century Damascus became a central way-
station in an interchange of scholars and ideas traveling East and West.13 As a result, Damascus 
became one of a few centres of knowledge in the Muslim world that witnessed the engagement 
and production of knowledge by partisans of numerous theological, legal and Sufi schools. These 
                                                          
6 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 13, pp. 201-203. 
7 al-Siyūṭī, Tārīkh al-Kulafāʾ, ed. Muḥammad Muḥī al-Dīn Abd al-Ḥadīm, Maktabat al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, 
Cairo, 1327AH, p. 470. 
8 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 13, pp. 201-203. 
9 ibid 
10 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 14, pp. 23-26, 89; al-Siyūṭī, op. cit., p. 484.  
11 Amalia Levanoni, A Turing Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn 
Qalāwūn (1310-1341), Brill, 1995, p. 81-85, 
12Amalia Levanoni, op. cit., p. 101-114. For more on the political, economic, and social crisis see, ibid., p. 
81-196. 
13 Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, The ʿUlamāʾ of Medieval Damascus and the International World of Islamic 
Scholarship, University of California, Berkeley, PhD, 1977, p. 119.  
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included Hadīth Scholars, Shāfiʿī Ash’arites, Hanbalī Traditionalists, Hanafīs, Shi’ites, 
philosophers and even a partisan of Ibn al-Rawandī14 - all of whom critically engaged with one 
another whether within a positivist or negativist framework. Consequently, during this period, 
Damascus witnessed the establishment of large numbers of madrasas (schools) which continued 
the transmission and development of the knowledge process.15 For example, Ibn Kathīr mentions 
thirty eight madrasas that were in operation during Ibn al-Qayyim’s lifetime.16  
 These thriving madrasas produced profound scholars who have made important 
contributions to the vast body of Islamic literature. For example, the Ḥanbalī legalist, Ibn al-
Qudāma al-Maqdasī, the Shafiʿī legalist, Imām al-Subkī, the Traditionalist theologian Ibn 
Taymiyya and his students: al-Dhahabī and al-Mizzī, both hadīth scholars17, Ibn Khathīr and al-
Ṣafadī, both historians, and not to forget Ibn al-Qayyim, the polymath.18 
 During this period, these madrasas also promoted continuous theological competition 
between the minority Ḥanblite Traditionalists19 and the majority Shafiʿī Ashʿarites.20  In the 
course of these theological competitions, it was the Ḥabalite Traditionalists who often suffered 
                                                          
14 Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190-1350, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, p. 167-8. 
15 Michael Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 90. 
16 According to Dr. Aḥmad al-Ṣamʿānī, these thirty eight madrasas do not include the following ten: 
Madrasa al-Ẓāhiriyya, Madrasa al-Jawziyya, Madrasa al-Ṣudariyya, Madrasa al-Ādiliyya al-Kubrā, Dār al-
Ḥadīth al-Ashrafiyya, Al-Iqbāliyya, Al-Khātūniyya al-Jawāniyya, Al-Khātūniyya al-Barāniyya, Al-
Jawhariyya, and Al-Qumayriyya. Furthermore, Dr. Aḥmad al-Ṣamʿānī, argues that there were more than 
forty eight madrasas in Damascus during Ibn al-Qayyim’s era, see Shifāʾ al-Alīl, ed. al-Ṣamʿānī and al-
Ajlān, Dār al-Ṣamīʿī, Riyad, 2008, vol. 1, p. 35.  
17 The famous Historian, Ibn ʿAsākir, also lived during this period but he was not a student of Ibn 
Taymiyya, rather he was a partisan of the Shafiʿī Ashʿarite madrasas. cf. Elisséeff, N. "Ibn ʿAsākir." 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van 
Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. 
18 For more detail on the scholars of medieval Damascus, see, Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, op. cit., p. 23- 58. 
19  The Ḥanbalite Traditionlist were mainly third, second and first generation migrants, with the 
exception of Ibn al-Qayyim, who was native to Damascus. See, Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, op. cit., p. 94- 95, 
115, 153- 162. 
20 The Shafiʿī Ashʿarites were mostly natives to Damascus. See ibid; Michael Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 169- 
172.  
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imprisonment, and even nearly execution21, at the hands of the authorities who favoured the 
Shafiʿī Ashʿarites.22  
 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Background and Characteristics 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s full name is Muḥammad Ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Ayūb and his epithet, Abū ʿAbd 
Allah and Shams al-Dīn, but he is most famously known as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (the son of 
the superintendent of the al-Jawziyya School).23  
                                                          
21 Ibn al-Qayyim was nearly executed for his sermons in the cities of Quds and Nābulus; see, Muḥammad 
ʿAzīr Shams and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-ʿUmrānī, al-Jāmiʿ li-Sīrat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya Khilāl Sabʿa 
Qurūn, , Dār ʿAlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekkah, 1427AH, pp. 183- 184.  
22 For example, see the Fitna of 595/ 1199 which involved the Ḥanbalī Traditionalist, Abd al-Ghanī Ibn 
Qudāma and the Shafiʿī Ashʿarites, see, Joan Elizabeth Gilbert, op. cit., p. 117. Also the multiple trials of 
Ibn Taymiyya; see, Sherman, A. Jackson, ‘Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus’, Journal of Semitic Studies, 
39, no. 1, 1994, pp. 41- 85; Donald P. Little, ‘The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the 
Detention of Ibn Taymiyya’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, Jul., 1973, pp. 
311-327; Hasan Qasim Murad, ‘Ibn Taymiyya on Trial: A Narrative Account of his Miḥan’, Islamic Studies, 
18, no. 1, 1979, 1-32. 
23 For the primary sources on Ibn al-Qayyim’s biography, refer to: Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, al-Muʿjam al-
Mukhtaṣ bi al-Muḥaddithīn, ed. Dr. Muḥammad al-Ḥabīb al-Hayla, Maktaba al-Ṣaddīq, Ṭāʾif, 1988, p. 
269; Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi al-Wafayāt, Istanbul, n.d., vol. 2, p. 270; Abū al-Fidāʾ Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidaya wa al-Nihāya, Beirut, n.d., vol 14, p. 202; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Rajab, Kitāb al-Dhayl ʿalā Ṭabaqāt 
al-Ḥanābila, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī, Cairo, 1953, vol. 2, p. 447; Shihāb al-Dīn Ibn Ḥajar, al-Durar 
al-Kāmina fī ʾAyān al-Miʾat al-Thāmina, ed. Muḥammad Rāshid Jād al-Ḥaqq, Cairo, 1966, vol. 4, p. 21; 
Ibn Jamāl al-Dīn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 1929, vol. 10, p. 249; 
Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Kitāb Bughyat al-Wuʿāt fī Ṭabaqāt al-Lughawiyīn wa al-Nuḥā, ed. Muḥammad 
Amīn al-Khānjī, Cairo, 1326AH, vol. 1, p. 62; Muḥammad al-Dāwudī, Ṭabaqāt al-Mufassarīn, Maṭbaʿa al-
Istiqlāl, Egypt, 1392AH, vol. 2, p. 93; ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Ibn al-ʿImād, Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man 
Dhahab, al-Maktab al-Tijārī, Beirut, n.d. vol. 6, p. 168; Muḥammad al-Sawkānī, al-Badr al-Ṭāliʿbi-Maḥāsin 
man baʿd al-Qurn al-Sābiʿ,Maṭbaʿa al-Saʿāda, Egypt, 1348AH, vol. 2, p. 143; Sadīq Khān al-Khanūjī, al-Tāj 
al-Mukalal, al-Maṭbaʿa al-Hindiyya al-ʿIlmiyya, 2nd ed., 1382, p. 419; Khayr al-Dīn al-Zarkalī: al-ʿAlām, 3rd 
ed. Beirut, 1389, vol. 6, p. 56. Similarly, the following is a list of recent academic research done on the 
biography of Ibn Qayyim: ʿIwaḍ ʾAllah Ḥijāzī, Ibn al-Qayyim wa Muwqifahu min al-Tafkīr al-ʾIslāmī , 2nd 
ed., Cairo, 1972; Muḥammad al-Ghunaymī, Ḥayāt al-Imām Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 
2nd ed., 1981; Dr. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Sharf al-Dīn, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: ʿAṣrahu, Manhajahu wa ʾArāʾahu fī 
al-Fiqh wa al-ʿaqīda wa al-Taṣṣawwaf, Dār al-Qalam, 3rd ed., 1984; Aḥmad al-Baqarī, Ibn al-Qayyim min 
ʾAthārihi al-ʿIlmiya, Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, Beirut, 1984; Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: 
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 Ibn al-Qayyim was born on 29 January 1292 (7 Safar 691AH)24 into a household 
renowned for their dedication in mastering and transmitting knowledge. Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
relatives are commonly described as possessing intellectual characteristics combined with piety 
and humility. Ibn al-Qayyim’s father, who was his first teacher25, is described by Ibn Kathīr as,  
 
…a righteous and honest man, who was persistent in worship.  He learnt Prophetic Traditions 
from al-Rashīd al-Āmirī; he was befallen with a sudden death on a Sunday night on the 
nineteenth of Dhī al-Ḥija at the al-Jawziyya School. His funeral prayer was after the Ẓuhur prayer 
in the al-Jāmiʿ after which he was then buried in the Bāb al-Ṣaghīr [cemetery]. His funeral was 
attended by a great number of people who praised him much; may God have mercy upon him. He 
was the father of the great scholar Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the author 
of many great beneficial works.26  
 
Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim’s brother, Zayn al-Dīn, was a well-learned scholar who had nurtured 
outstanding students such as Ibn Rajab and his own son, ʿImād al-Dīn.27 Also Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
son, Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd Allah Ibn Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, possessed an extraordinary intellect 
and memory; it is stated that he memorised the seventh chapter (Surat al-ʿArāf) in two days. 
When he was nine years of age, he led the prayer in which he recited the entire Quran. Jamāl al-
Dīn ʿAbd Allah took charge of the al-Ṣadriyya School after his father Ibn al-Qayyim’s death.28  
 Additionally, another of Ibn al-Qayyim’s sons, Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ibn Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad, was renowned for his knowledge of grammar and jurisprudence. He gave legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ḥayātu ʾAthārahu Mawāridahu, Dār al-ʿĀṣima, Riyadh, 2nd ed., 1423AH; For English secondary sources, 
see, Birgit Krawietz, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyyah: His Life and Works’, in Mamluk Studies Review, vol. 10, 
no. 2, 2006, Online; Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman, A Scholar in the Shadow: Essays in the Legal and 
Theological Thought of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Oriente Moderno, 1, 2010.   
24 al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 271.  
25 Ibn al-Qayyim studied the laws of inheritance (al-Farāʾid) under his father. See, al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 
271  
26 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 95. 
27 It is ʿImād al-Dīn, who obtained most of his uncle- Ibn al-Qayyim’s library. See, ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Ibn al-
ʿImād, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 358; Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 63.   
28 Ibn al-Qayyim taught at both madrasa al-Jawziyya and madrasa al-Ṣadriyya. See, Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. 
cit., pp. 65- 67. 
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verdicts and taught in the al-Ṣadriyya school. He has two famous works: an explanation of the 
grammatical poem of Ibn Mālik entitled Irsād al-Sālik ilā Ḥil Alfiyyat ibn Mālik29 and a long 
treatise on the opinions of Ibn Taymiyya entitled al-Masāʾil al-Fiqhiyya min Ikhtiyārāt Shayk al-
Islām Ibn Taymiyya.30 Ibn Ḥajar records a dispute in which Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm supposedly 
took a disliking to Ibn Kathīr because he was an Ashʿarite; however, Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm did 
not believe this claim on the basis that Ibn Kathīr’s teacher was Ibn Taymiyya, an Ashʿarite 
critic.31   
 It is also debated whether Ibn al-Qayyim himself was once an Ashʿarite32 and, though 
this may remain unclear, it is known that he had Ashʿarite teachers,33 students34 and that he even 
studied Ashʿarite theological texts, namely those of al-Rāzī’s al-Muḥaṣṣal and al-Arbaʿīn.35   
 Ibn al-Qayyim is typically described as a Ḥanbalī,36 however he was far from a bigoted 
Ḥanbalī, as he was outspoken against any form of taqlīd37 (uncritical religious imitation). He was 
                                                          
29 Ed. Dr. Muḥammad al-Suhlī, Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, Riyadh, 2002. 
30 Edited by Aḥmad Mawāfī, Dār Ibn al-Qayyim wa Dār Ibn ʿAﬀān, Riyadh, 2007. 
31 Ibn Ḥajar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 60. Ibn Kathīr’s Tafsīr seems to promote Traditionalist doctrines in 
relations to divine attribute hence; this contradicts the claim that Ibn Kathīr was an Ashʿarite. See the 
verses dealing with divine attributes in Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr. 
32 As may be deduced from in his al-Kāfiyya al-Shafiyya, see, Aḥmad Ibn ʿIsā, Sharḥ Qaṣīda al-Imām Ibn 
al-Qayyim, al-Maktab al-Islāmī, Damascus, 1382, vol. 2, pp. 68- 74. 
33 For example, Ibn al-Qayyim studied legal theories (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) and theology (Uṣūl al-Dīn) under Ṣafī 
al-Dīn al-Hindī, one of Ibn Taymiyya’s main Ashʿarite opponents. Cf. Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 271. Similarly, 
another Ashʿarite cri7c of Ibn Taymiyya who Ibn al-Qayyim studied under was, Muḥammad Abū al-
Maʿālī al-Zamlakānī, see, ʿIwaḍ Allah al-Hijāzī, op. cit., p. 43. 
34 Ibn Ḥajar mentions Ibn al-Qayyim as one of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī’s teachers. See al-Durar al-Kāmina fī 
ʾAyān al-Miʾat al-Thāmina. Vol. 2, p. 134. However, Livant Holtzman disagrees that Ibn al-Qayyim was 
one of al-Subkī’s teachers, see Livnat Holtzman, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’, in Essays in Arabic Literary 
Biography 1350-1850, eds. Joseph Lowry and Devin Stewart, Wiesbaden, 2009, p.210.  al-Subkī was later 
to become one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s main Ashʿarite cri7cs and wrote refuta7ons against his former 
‘teacher’. See Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, al-Sayf al-Ṣaqīl fī al-Rad ʿalā Ibn al-Zafīl, Maṭbaʿa al-Sāʿida bi-Maṣr, 
1356AH. Although, the authenticity in attributing this refutation to al-Subkī, is somewhat debated. See, 
Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 31-33.  
35 cf. Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 271. 
36 A follower of the Ḥanbalī School of legal thought which is ascribed to as the founder Aḥmad Ibn 
Ḥanbal. 
37 See, ʿAbdul-Rahman Mustafa, On Taqlid, Ibn al-Qayyim’s Critique of Authority in Islamic Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2013; ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Sharf al-Dīn, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya: ʿAṣrahu, Manhajahu wa 
ʾArāʾahu, Dār al-Qalam, 1984, p. 108-115.  
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an analytical scholar who developed his own positions and arguments which could ideally 
comply with his epistemological framework, which consists of: scripture, consensus of the Salaf, 
sound rationality (al-ʿaql al-saḥīḥ) and the natural disposition (al-fiṭra al-salīma).38 But if there 
was no conclusive scriptural proof on a certain theological issue, Ibn al-Qayyim commonly 
engages, harmonises and synthesises the views of various theological schools in order to develop 
his Traditionalist positions. Hence, in this regard, he was open-minded with a positivist outlook 
on previous scholar’s opinions - regardless of their theological or philosophical orientations. This 
is also evident in the numerous differences between himself and his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya39, and 
not to mention his strong inclination toward Sufism.40 Ibn al-Qayyim states that, to know the 
merits of the classical scholars of Islam, their prestigious knowledge and works for Islam, does 
not necessarily oblige us to accept everything they say.41  Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim states 
regarding uncritical religious imitation (taqlīd): 
 
The jurist who fears his position in front of his Lord must be cautious not to give a legal verdict 
according to his school of legal thought (madhhab) in which he religiously imitates (yuqalidahu) 
while he knows clearly that another school is more correct on the issue than his school and is 
more correct in regards to the evidence.42 
 
                                                          
38 For more on fiṭra as an epistemological reference, see, Livnat Holtzman, ‘Human Choice, Divine 
Guidance and the fiṭra Tradition: The Use of Ḥadīth in Theological Treatises by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya’, in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, eds. Y. Rapoport and S. Ahmed, Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 163- 188; M. Sait Özetvari, ‘Divine Wisdom, Human Agency and the fiṭra in 
Ibn Taymiyya’s Thought’, in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law, eds. Birgit Krawietz and George 
Tamer, De Gruyer, Berlin, 2013, pp. 37-60; Frank Grieffel, “al-Ghazālī’s Use of the ‘Original Human 
Disposition’ (fiṭra) and its Background in the Teachings of al-Farābī and Avicenna”, in The Muslim World, 
vol. 102, January 2012, pp. 1-32.   
39 In his book The Soul (al-Rūḥ), he differed with his master on the exegesis of the Quranic verse, (39:42); 
similarly, the waiting period of a divorced girl, (al-ʿIdda) and also the reasons for the prohibition of 
interest, (ʿillat al-Ribā) alongside many more issues. 
40 cf. Ibn al-Qayyim’s Madārij al-Sālikīn; Henri Loaoust, ‘Ibn ḳayyim al-Djawziyya’, The Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, 2nd ed., vol.3, p. 822. 
41 Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Muwwaqiʿīn, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1997, vol. 3, pp. 295-297. 
42 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 177.  
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Thus, it was foreseeable that he would differ from the mainstream views of his time. In fact, he 
was imprisoned on several occasions43 - and nearly faced execution44- due to his unconventional 
legal and theological opinions.45 
 Ibn al-Qayyim is also described with pietistic and intellectual characteristics by his 
contemporaries. His student Ibn Kathīr describes him as possessing fine recitation and manners. 
Ibn Kathīr goes on to describe Ibn al-Qayyim as very kind indeed; he never envied, harmed, 
belittled nor mocked anyone. He was instead well known for his piety and honourable 
character.46 Ibn al-Qayyim’s prayers were so lengthy, that many of his associates criticised him; 
however, this did not impede him.47 Similarly, another student, Ibn Rajab, portrays Ibn al-
Qayyim as follows: 
 
May God have mercy upon his soul; he was devoted to worship, night prayers, and had extremely 
long prayers. He was very fond of the Remembrance of God [dhikr] in which he exalted much. 
He venerated the love and obedience of God, seeking forgiveness and the sole dependence on 
Him alone. He was a very humbling person, indeed….. I have never witnessed nor seen the like 
of him. I have never seen a scholar who possesses profound knowledge or knows the deep 
meanings of the Quran and Sunna - and the realities of faith like him. That is not to say that he is 
infallible but rather I have never seen the likes of him.48 
 
Ibn Ḥajar explains that Ibn al-Qayyim would routinely sit in the same place in the mosque after 
the fajar prayer, while remembering God (dhkir) until sunrise; he would say that ‘this is my 
sustenance, if I do not do this then I will have no strength’.49  
 In addition to Ibn al-Qayyim’s pietistic characteristics, he also possessed such intellectual 
qualities that he had mastered many fields of Islamic knowledge from a very young age, 
                                                          
43 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya, Vol. 14, p. 202; Ibn Ḥajar, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 23; Ibn Rajab, op. cit., 
vol. 2, p. 448.   
44 See, Muḥammad ʿAzīr Shams and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-ʿUmrānī, op. cit., pp. 183-184.  
45 See, Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman, op. cit., p. 22- 26.  
46 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 202. 
47 ibid 
48 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 450. 
49 Ibn Ḥajar, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 21-22.  
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including major references of Arabic language which he had mastered by the age of nineteen.50 
According to Ibn Rajab, Ibn al-Qayyim had reached competence in many subjects such as 
jurisprudence (fiqh), Quranic exegesis (tafsīr), theology (Uṣūl al-Dīn), Traditions (ḥadīth), legal 
theory (Uṣūl al-fiqh), Arabic, and rational theology (Kalām). Equally, he possessed profound 
knowledge of mannerism (sulūk) and Sufism (taṣwwaf).51 Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual 
proficiency has also been described by Ibn Taghrī Bardī: 
 
…he was proficient in many sciences, from exegesis, jurisprudence, Arabic language, grammar, 
Traditions, and both the fundamentals (Usūl) [Uṣūl al-Fiqh and Uṣūl al-Dīn] and the subdivisions 
(farū’). He studied under Ibn Taymiyya after the latter had returned from Cairo, 712 /1312, and 
took from him [Ibn Taymiyya] plenty of knowledge until he became a major figure during his 
time and many benefitted from him.52 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim is commonly conveyed as being greatly passionate about collecting rare books53, 
which would have been fundamental in the development of his intellectual qualities and which 
also explains how he managed to engage with distinguished figures such as Ibn Sīnā, the 
Peripatetic philosopher and al-Rāzī, the Ashʿarite philosophical theologian. Likewise, his passion 
for books also explains how he managed to produce a copious amount of authorship; hence, he 
was likely a workaholic bookish man who preferred pious scientific endeavours to confrontation 
of any kind.54 Furthermore, evidence that Ibn al-Qayyim possessed a huge medieval library55 is 
recorded in his extensive lists of references made in many of his writings. For example, in his 
book Ijtimāʿ al-Juyush al-Islamiya, which is one hundred and thirty five pages long, Ibn al-
Qayyim makes reference to more than one hundred books in one section alone - namely Divine 
                                                          
50 Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 50. 
51 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 448. 
52 Ibn Taghrībardī, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 249. 
53 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 449; Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol 14, p. 202. 
54 Birgit Krawietz, op. cit., p. 1.  
55 Ibn Ḥajar states that after Ibn al-Qayyim’s death, his children were selling their father’s books which 
lasted a very long time (dahr ṭawīl)- except for what they keep for themselves. See al-Durar al-Kāmina fī 
ʾAyān al-Miʾat al-Thāmina, vol. 4, p 22. 
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Ascending (al-istiwāʾ).56 In his Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl, he makes reference to over one hundred and 
twenty books. His student Ibn Rajab emphasises ‘he very much loved his books, research, 
authoring and obtaining books that were rare.’57 
 
Table 1: A Construction of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Theological Library58 
Asha’rites  Books  Mu’tazilites  Books  Philosophers  Books  
al-Ashʿarī Maqālāt  
Al-Muṣṣalīn  
Maqālāt ghayr al-
Islāmiyyīn 
Maqālāt al-Kabīr 
Maqālāt al-Matīn 
Al-Ibāna 
Al-Mawjiz  
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd  
Risāla ilā Ahl al-
Amānī 
Risāla al-Ḥurra  
Ithbāt al-Ṣifāt  
Al-ʿUmd fī al-
Ruʾya 
al-Zamakhsharī 
 
Al-Kashshāf 
 
Aristotle  Al-Ḥayawān  
Al-Samaʿ  
Al-Ṭabīʿī 
 
Ibn Fūrak 
 
Tajrīd 
Maqālāt  Ibn 
Kullāb 
Abū al-Ḥusayn 
 
Al-Muʿtamad 
 
Ikhwān Ṣafa Rasāʾil  
al-Bāqillānī 
 
al-Tamhīd  
al-Ibāna  
al-Daqāʾiq  
Tamhīd al-Awāʾil  
  Ibn Sīnā 
 
al-Ishārāt  
Shifāʾ 
al-Risāla  
al-Najāt 
                                                          
56 Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 61. 
57 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 449. 
58 This construction will help give us an idea with whom and what sources Ibn al-Qayyim was engaging 
with.  
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al-Taqrīb 
al-Juwaynī 
 
al-Shāmil  
al-Irshād  
al-Naẓẓāmiyya 
  Ibn Rushd  Manāhij  
Muqaddima 
Tahāfut 
al-Iṣfarāyīnī 
 
al-Muktaṣir  
al-Tabṣira  
al-Lumaʿ 
Sharḥ al-Lumaʿ 
  Ibn Sabʿīn 
 
 Naẓm  
Yad al-ʿĀrif 
 
al-Ghazālī 
 
Iḥyāʾ 
Tahāfut  
al-Maḍnūn  
al-Basīṭ 
  Ibn ʿArabī 
 
 al-Futūḥāt  
Fusūs 
 
al-Rāzī 
 
al-Mabāḥith  
al-Nihāya  
al-Maṭālib  
Aqsām al-Lladhāt  
Tafsīr  
al-Muḥaṣṣal  
al-Maḥṣūl  
Manāqib 
Al-Sirr al-Maktūm 
  al-Suhrawardī 
 
ʿAwārif al-Maʿānī 
 
al-Āmadī Abkār     
al-Sharastānī al-Milal     
al-Qushayrī al-Risāla  
al-Shikāya 
    
Ibn ʿAsākir Tibyīn     
[Ibn Ḥazm]59 
 
al-Faṣl fī al-Milal  
al-Iḥkām  
Marātib  
    
                                                          
59
 There is difference of opinion as to whether Ibn Ḥazm was an Ashʿarite. See discussion on page 65, 
note 196 and page 171, note 128. 
21 
 
 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim seemed to have integrated learning and teaching into his life from a very early 
stage, given that he was an imām in the madrasa al-Jawziyya, a teacher in the madrasa al-
Ṣudriya,60 an author of many books and one who gave legal verdicts as a jurist (faqīh).61 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Education and Legacy 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim studied under many teachers of various theological and legal orientations. By far 
the most influential teacher on Ibn al-Qayyim’s life was Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Din Aḥmad Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥanbalī (d. 728/1328). Ibn al-Qayyim took Ibn Taymiyya as his 
dearest teacher sometime after the year 712/1312, in which Ibn Taymiyya arrived in Damascus.62 
Ibn al-Qayyim became a devoted student of Ibn Taymiyya until the latter’s death in 728/1328. 
Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim studied with Ibn Taymiyya for approximately seventeen years.  
 Al-Shihāb al-ʿĀbir Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Nābulsī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 697/1298) was 
one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s first teachers63, under whom he studied dream interpretation (al-taʿbīr); 
however, due to Ibn al-Qayyim being so young, perhaps six or seven years of age, and the 
Shaykh, al-Shihāb al-ʿĀbir, being so old, he was unable to complete this discipline.64 Another 
early teacher of Ibn al-Qayyim was his father Abū Bakr Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 700/1300) with 
whom he studied the laws of inherence (al-farāʾiḍ) - given that he was very competent in this 
discipline.65 The famous linguist, Abū al-Fatḥ al-Baʿlabkī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 709/1309) was another 
teacher with whom Ibn al-Qayyim studied texts of Arabic grammar such as: the al-Mulakhkhaṣ 
                                                          
60 Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 66. It is also likely that Ibn al-Qayyim taught elsewhere since al-Sakhāwī 
states that many prominent scholars befitted from him as he taught in various places. See, Ṣadīq Khān, 
al-Tāj al-Mukallal, p. 419.   
61 Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 65. 
62 ibid., p. 163. 
63 Al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270. 
64 See Ibn al-Qayyim, Zād al-Maʿād fī Hadi Khayr al-ʿIbād, Muʾssassat al-Risāla, Beirut, 1994, vol. 3, pp. 
537- 538; Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 167-8. 
65 Al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270. 
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of Abū al-Baqāʾ, al-Jumal of al-Jurjānī, al-Fiyya of Ibn Mālik, most of the al-Kāfiyya al-
Shāfiyya and some of the al-Tashīl, both of Ibn Mālik.66 Amongst Ibn al-Qayyim’s Ḥadīth 
teachers is the female Traditionist (muḥadditha), al-Fāṭima Umm Muḥammad bint Shaykh 
Ibrāhīm Ibn Jawhar (d. 711/1311).67 Ibn al-Qayyim also studied under one of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
teachers, named Zayn al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd al-Dāʾim (d. 718/1318).68   
 Interestingly, Ibn al-Qayyim studied quite extensively under a few of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
critics. The Ashʿarite Muḥammad Ṣafī al-Din ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Hindī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 
715/1315)69, for example, with whom Ibn al-Qayyim studied both disciples of legal theories and 
theology - including al-Rāzī’s al-Arbaʿīn and al-Muḥḥaṣṣal.70 Additionally, another two 
interesting Ashʿarite scholars - both of whom commonly go unnoticed - whom Ibn al-Qayyim 
studied under were: Muḥammad Abū al-Maʿālī Kamāl al-Dīn al-Zamlakānī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 
727/1327)71 and Muḥammad al-Qāḍī Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa al-Shāfiʿī (d. 733/1332).72 Kamāl 
al-Dīn al-Zamlakānī, who was the Judge of Aleppo, was a celebrated critic of Ibn Taymiyya’s 
theological opinions.73 Similarly, Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿa74 was a staunch Ashʿarite who 
authored many works and held numerous positions as judge and teacher throughout the Levant 
and Egypt. It is not quite clear whether he was also a critic of Ibn Taymiyya, though it is very 
much likely given his apologetic Ashʿarite works. It is not quite clear when Ibn al-Qayyim 
studied with these Ashʿarite scholars - but it is likely that it was before the year 712/1312 when 
he met Ibn Taymiyya and took the latter as his teacher. However, the fact that Ibn al-Qayyim had 
apologetic Ashʿarite teachers and studied main Ashʿarite texts strongly implies that he was an 
Ashʿarite in some early stage of his learning. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim mentions in his al-
                                                          
66 ibid 
67 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 448. 
68 ibid; al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270. 
69 al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270. 
70 ibid 
71 ʿIwaḍ allah Ḥijāzī, op. cit., p. 43; Ibn ʿImād, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 79. 
72 al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., 2/ 270. 
73 See, Muḥammad ʿAzīr Shams and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-ʿUmrānī, op. cit., pp. 173- 175, 441, 504- 505, 
514, 534; Nonetheless, Kamāl al-Dīn al-Zamlakānī, did complement on Ibn Taymiyya’s profound 
knowledge of multiple disciplines, see, ibid., pp. 251- 252, 319. 
74 For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s teachers, see, Muḥammad Muslim al-Ghunaymī, op. cit., p. 102; ʿAbd al-
ʿAẓīm Sharf al-Dīn, op. cit., p. 73; Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 161- 178.   
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Nūniyya75 that he had previously held similar views to the Ashaʿarīs regarding the allegorical 
interpretation (taʾwīl) of divine attributes - something he later repented from. However, it was his 
Lord who relieved him from such doubts (shubuhāt), when a man from the land of al-Ḥayrān- 
Ibn Tayymiyya took him by the hand and showed him what he believed to be the true way.76 Ibn 
al-Qayyim states that neither his actions nor tongue could ever thank Ibn Taymiyya as he truly 
deserves; for verily, he invokes God to bless him with grace, paradise and to be pleased with him 
for he is worthy of such pleasure.77 
  In the poem, Ibn al-Qayyim begins with sincere advice from a sympathetic and 
compassionate brother who intends to help the people (al-qawm) and then mentions his 
experience, as he puts it, as ‘what he fell into’ and then was saved from.78 Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim 
was not foreign to rational theology (ʿilm Kalām) and the rational theologians (al-mutakalimūn), 
in particular the Ashʿarites. Nonetheless, this did not stop Ibn al-Qayyim from engaging with 
Ashʿarite texts, which helped him further develop doctrines he believed to inform correct 
Traditionalist positions, as we shall see in coming chapters.   
 Ibn al-Qayyim nurtured students who became scholars of outstanding calibre. These 
include: Ismāʿīl ʿImād al-Dīn Ibn Kathīr (d. 773/1371), the author of Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr and al-
Bidāya wa al-Nihāya;79 and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Rajab al-Ḥanbalī (d. 795/1393), 
the author of Tabaqāt al-Hanābila and Sharḥ Saḥiḥ al-Bukhārī.80  
 Interestingly, the prominent Ashʿarite scholar of Damascus, Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī al-
Shafiʿī (d. 756/1355), was also a student of Ibn al-Qayyim81 and a popular critic of Ibn Taymiyya 
                                                          
75 An extensive poem on theology also known as: al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya, or otherwise, al-Nūniyya li Ibn 
al-Qayyim. See, al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya fī Intiṣār li-al-Firqat al-Nājiyya, eds. M. A. al-ʿArifī, N. Y. al-Junaybī, 
A. A. al-Hudhaylī, F. A. al-Masāʿid, Dār ʿAlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1428AH.   
76
 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 570- 571.   
77 ibid  
78 ibid., vol. 2, pp. 570. 
79 Ibn Kathīr states regarding Ibn Qayyim that, ‘I was of the closest people to him and the most beloved’. 
cf. al-Bidāya wa al-Niyāha, vol. 14, p. 202.   
80 Ibn Rajab states regarding Ibn Qayyim that he studied with him his poem Nuwniyya on Islamic 
theology and other books too.’ Cf. Dhayl Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanabila, vol. 2, pp. 447-450.  
81 Ibn Ḥajar has states that al-Subkī studied Prophetic Traditions (Aḥādīth) under various scholars of 
whom include Ibn al-Qayyim. See, al-Durar al-Kāmina, vol. 3, p. 134. 
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then later Ibn al-Qayyim.82 Al-Subkī has many important works which include his biographical 
encyclopaedia of Shafi’ite scholars, his famous fatāwā and his classical legal theory text, Jamʿ 
al-Jawāmiʿ, which synthesised the multiple methodologies on legal theories, namely the method 
of the jurists and the method of the rational theologians. Additionally, al-Subkī authored various 
epistles which refute Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim on various theological doctrines.83   
  Another outstanding student of Ibn al-Qayyim is the Traditionist (muḥaddith) and 
historian, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ʿUthmān al-Dhahabī al-Shāfiʿī (d. 748/1347)84, who was 
at times also critical of Ibn Taymiyya.85 Al-Dhahabī has many classical works that are of great 
importance in Ḥadīth scholarship.86 Muḥammad Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allah Ibn Aḥmad Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Hādī (d. 744/1343)87 is another famous Traditionist scholar who studied under Ibn al-
Qayyim88 and is the author of numerous important works.89 Lastly, al-Shawkānī states that the 
famous linguist Muḥammad Ibn Yaʿqūb Ibn Muḥammad al-Fayrūz ʾābādī (d. 817/1414) was also 
a student of Ibn al-Qayyim.90 
                                                          
82 Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd denies the authenticity of al-Subkī’s epistle: al-Sayf al-Ṣaqīl fī al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Zafīl, 
which refutes Ibn al-Qayyim’s al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya. Ibn Abī Zayd argues that this epistle was forged by 
Zāhid al-Kawtharī, the editor of the original manuscript. Ibn Abī Zayd uses statement to support his claim 
from: al-Muʿalamī al-Yamānī, Aḥmad Ibn Sadīq al-Ghumārī and Ibn Abī Zayd’s teacher, ʿAbd Allah Ibn 
Sadīq al-Ghumārī- the brother of Aḥmad- all of whom were scholars of acquaintance to Zāhid al-
Kawtharī. See, Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 31-33. Cf. Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman, op. cit., p. 22-
26. 
83 See, Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, al-Rasāʾil al-Subkiyya fī al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Taymiyya wa Tilmidhihi Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya, ed. Kamāl Abū al-Munā, ʿĀlim al-Kutub, 1983.  
84This is based on Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd’s discovery in a manuscript of Al-Dhahabī’s al-Muʿjam al-Mukhtaṣṣ, 
which is located in the Islamic University of Madinah. See Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. cit., p. 181.  
85 Caterina Bori, ‘A New Source for the Biography of Ibn Taymiyya’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 67, 2004, pp 321-348.   
86 See, Ben Cheneb, Moh.; Somogyi, J. de. "al-Ḏh̲ahabī", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Eds. P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online. 
87 He is the author of many famous works in Ḥadīth and History.  
88 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 450.  
89 See, Leder, S. "Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Hādī", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Eds. P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online. 
90 The author of the famous dictionary, Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ. See, al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-Ṭāliʿ, 2/ 280. 
However, Livnat Holtzman disagrees that al-Fayrūz ʾābādī was a student of Ibn al-Qayyim; see her 
article, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’, in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography 1350-1850, eds. Joseph Lowry 
and Devin Stewart, 2009, Wiesbaden, p. 210.  
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 Despite the political and social difficulties during and around Ibn al-Qayyim’s era, it was 
necessary for him to engage in intellectual discourse in order to further develop and systematise91 
‘Traditionalist theology’, as it was a time and place where the Traditionalists and the Ashʿarites 
were in an intellectual battle to claim title as the sole inheritors of orthodoxy and thereby make 
their mark on Islamic society globally. For this reason we find Ibn al-Qayyim, like his 
contemporaries, authoring numerous works on various topics, all of which contributed to the 
development of knowledge.92 Therefore, in addition to the many important students and works of 
Ibn al-Qayyim, perhaps his most distinct legacy was his development93 and systematisation of 
Traditionalist theology, incorporating debates in philosophical theology which were relative to 
his time. As we shall see in the coming chapters, Ibn al-Qayyim manages to further develop the 
positions of the Traditionalist school by engaging with various theological schools and 
intellectuals who then allowed him to synthesise, harmonise and, at times, introduce new 
concepts in order to avoid the difficulties faced by his predecessors.94 Such philosophical 
discussions are then presented under well organised headings within works dedicated to specific 
issues of philosophical theology.95      
  
                                                          
91 I would like to thank Jon Hoover for pointing this out to me, namely Ibn al-Qayyim systematising his 
theology- perhaps a pivotal difference between him and Ibn Taymiyya.  
92 For a detailed list of Ibn al-Qayyim’s works, refer to: ʿIwaḍ ʾAllah Ḥijāzī, op. cit., p. 46-50; Muḥammad 
al-Ghunaymī, op. cit., p. 111-117; Dr. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Sharf al-Dīn, op. cit., p. 74-76; Bakr Ibn Abī Zayd, op. 
cit., p. 199-309, 1423AH; Birgit Krawietz, op. cit., p. 28-60.  
93 Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual development is evident in two of his methodological employment: firstly, 
his synthesis and harmonization of existing views so that his end result will usually avoid problematic 
implications and will tend to conform to his Traditionalist epistemology. Secondly, his 
‘Traditionalistization’ of various disciplines which witnessed non-engagement by the Traditionalists prior 
to Ibn al-Qayyim; for example, the ‘Traditionalistization’ of philosophical theology in his Shifāʾ and the 
‘Traditionalistization’ of Sufism in his Madārij. The second methodology also encompasses the first.    
94 This approach will be evident in chapter three to chapter seven. 
95 See the sub-headings and chapter outline of Ibn al-Qayyim’s philosophical theology works and 
compared it to that of Ibn Taymiyya’s.   
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Ibn al-Qayyim’s Works Related to Divine Determination 
 
Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī masāʾil al-Qadāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl96 is the largest known 
work dedicated to the concept of divine determination and the interrelated issues therein such as 
human agency, meta-ethics, divine causality and evil. It is in this work that Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
original contributions in philosophical theology can be appreciated most as he seems to engage 
with various schools and figures; as a result, he experiments with ideas and develops his own 
positions. 
 Similarly, the organisation of chapters in the Shifāʾ is one of many examples of Ibn al-
Qayyim’s systematisation of Traditionalist theology, categorising discussions on a given topic 
under one given chapter. This is unlike Ibn Taymiyya, whose discussions on a given topic are 
scattered throughout his many works.97 For example, the chapter outline of Shifāʾ is as follows: 
Introduction ; Chapter One: Measuring the Divine Determining (Taqdīr al-Maqādīr) before the 
creation of the Heavens and Earth; Chapter Two: The Divine Determining of Misery, Happiness, 
Sustenance, Lifespan and Actions of the Slaves before their Creation; Chapter Three: The 
Dialogue between Adam and Moses and the Prophet’s Reaction; Chapter Four: The Divine 
Determination of the Foetus in the Womb and Harmonising the Conflicting Traditions 
Concerning it; Chapter Five: The Night of Divine Determining, (laylat al-qadar); Chapter Six: 
The Daily Divine Determining; Chapter Seven: Divine Determination Does Not Equate to 
Complusionism; Chapter Eight: An Exegesis of (21: 101) of the Quran; Chapter Nine: An 
                                                          
96 See, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʾlīl, eds. Aḥmed al-Samʿānī and 
Alī al-Ajlānī, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008. This edition is based on a complete manuscript that includes 
both the introduction and chapter twenty two- found in Yūsif Āghā Library, Konya, Turkey, No. 5440. 
97 For example, see Ibn Taymiyya’s discussions on the origin of evil which are scattered in the following 
works: Majmūʿ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya, eds. ʿAbd al-Raḥman Ibn Qāsim and 
Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad, Dār al-Raḥma, Cairo, n.d., vol. 14, pp. 4-36, 229-425; vol. 8, pp. 81-158, 
386-404, 448-515, 437-447; Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wa al-Masāʾil, ed. Muḥammad Rāshid Riḍā, al-Manār, 
Cairo, 1922-30, vol. 5, pp. 113-170; Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil al-Kubrā, Maṭbaʿa al-ʿĀmira al-Sharafiyya, Cairo, 
1905, vol. 1, pp. 318-386; Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī naqḍ kalām al-Shīʿa al-Qadariyya, ed. 
Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1986, vol. 3, pp. 
102, 142-145; vol. 2, pp. 25-26; vol. 5, pp. 408-411.   
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Exegesis of (54: 49) of the Quran; Chapter Ten: The Levels of Divine Decree and Determination 
(Divine Knowledge); Chapter Eleven: Divine Writing (al-Kitāba); Chapter Twelfth: The Divine 
Volition (al-Mashīʾa); Chapter Thirteen: Divine Creation (al-Khalq); Chapter Fourteen: On 
Guidance and Misguidance: its Levels, its Determining and Non-determining for the Creation; 
Chapter Fifteen: The Ability of Good Deeds and the Inability of Good Deeds; Chapter Sixteen: 
The Creation of Man’s Actions in The Traditions; Chapter Seventeen: On Acquisition (Kasb) and 
Compulsionism (Jabr); Chapter Eighteen: On Action (fiʿil), More Efficacious (afʿal) and 
Passivity (infiʿāl); Chapter Ninteen: A Dialogue between a Compulsionist (jabrī) and a Sunnī; 
Chapter Twenty: A Dialogue between a Qadarite and a Sunnī; Chapter Twenty One: The 
Exclusion of Evil from the Divine Decree and Determination; Chapter Twenty Two: The 
Affirmation of Divine Wisdom behind the Creation; Chapter Twenty Three: Refutations on the 
Denial of Divine Wisdom; Chapter Twenty Four: The Explanation of the Salaf regarding Good 
and Evil in Divine Determination; Chapter Twenty Five: On Evil and God’s Actions; Chapter 
Twenty Six: An Exegesis of a Traditional Supplication (1); Chapter Twenty Seven: An Exegesis 
of a Traditional Supplication (2); Chapter Twenty Eight: On the Contentment of Divine 
Determination and the Differences of Opinion; Chapter Twenty Nine: On the Division of Divine 
Decree: Universal and Legislative; Chapter Thirty: On the Natural Disposition (fiṭra). 
 
Table 2: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Shifāʾ98 
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Mu’tazilites  No.  Books  Philosophers  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 14  Maqālāt  al-ʿAllāf 2   Ibn Sīnā 1 al-Ishārāt  
Shifāʾ 
Ibn Fūrak 1  Tajrīd al-Naẓẓām 2      
al-
Bāqillānī 
8  al-Tamhīd  
  
al-Jāḥiẓ 
 
2      
al-Juwaynī 
 
4  al-
Naẓẓāmiyya 
Abū ʿAlī 
 
2      
                                                          
98 This table illustrates whom and what sources Ibn al-Qayyim was engaging with and how many times 
he referred to a particular individual.    
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al-
Iṣfarāyīnī 
5  al-Muktaṣir  
 
Abū Hāshim 
 
6      
al-Rāzī 
 
11 al-
Mabāḥith 
al-Nihāya 
al-Maṭālib 
al-
Zamakhsharī 
 
2  Al-
Kashshāf 
 
   
   ʿAbd al-
Jabbār 
     
   Abū al-
Ḥusayn 
8      
 
Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda wa Manshūr wilaya al-ʿilm wa al-irāda99 is one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s early 
works which discusses the human attributes of knowledge and will, both as means of attaining 
happiness and success. As important is Ibn al-Qayyim’s comprehensive discussion on meta-
ethics, which is directly relevant to my study given that he engages with various schools and 
figures in order to develop his positions on meta-ethical problems related to divine 
determination.  
Table 3: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Miftāḥ 
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Mu’tazilites  No.  Books  Philosophers  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 3  Maqālāt  Abū ʿAlī 
 
4   Aristotle  6  Al-
Ḥayawān  
Al-Samaʿ 
al-Ṭabīʿī 
al-
Bāqillānī 
3   Abū Hāshim 
 
1   al-Fārābī 6   
Ibn Ḥazm 
 
1  Al-Faṣl fī 
al-Milal  
al-
Zamakhsharī 
1  Al-
Kashshāf 
Ibn Sīnā 
 
5  Shifāʾ 
al-Najāt 
al-Juwaynī 4   ʿAbd al- 1      
                                                          
99 See ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Ḥassan Ibn Qāʾid’s edi7on, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1432AH.  
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 Jabbār 
al-Ghazālī 
 
3   Abū ʿīsā al-
Rumānī 
1      
al-Rāzī 
 
9  Al-Lladhāt 
Tafsīr   
Manāqib  
      
 
Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn wa Bāb al-Saʿādatayn100 is an early work which discusses the significance of 
worshiping God alone and spiritually imitating the Prophet in the spiritual journey towards God. 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion on the origins and nature of evil and its relationship to divine 
determination is again directly relevant to my study.  
Table 4: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Ṭarīq  
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Mu’tazilites  No.  Books  Philosophers  No.  
al-Ashʿarī 4  Maqālāt  Abū ʿAlī 1   Ibn Sīnā 1  
Ibn Ḥazm 
 
1   al-
Zamakhsharī 
2  Al-Kashshāf 
 
  
al-Bāqillānī 1        
al-Qushayrī 3        
al-Rāzī 3  Al-Mabāḥith      
 
Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid101 is a compendium which consists of essays on diverse topics such as 
grammar, Arabic language, law and theology. The exegesis of chapter one hundred and 
thirteenth of the Quran - The Twilight (al-falaq) - illuminates Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions on 
evil, which is also relevant to my study due to its connectedness with divine determination. 
                                                          
100 See Muḥammad Ajmal al-Iṣlāḥī’s edition, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1429AH.  
101 See Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-ʿUmrān’s edition, n.d.  
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Table 5: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Badāʾiʿ 
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Mu’tazilites  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 4  Maqālāt  al-Jāḥiẓ 1   
Ibn Ḥazm 4  Marātib al-Zamakhsharī 7  Al-Kashshāf 
al-Juwaynī 3  Al-Naẓẓāmiyya    
al-Rāzī 
 
1  Al-Sirr al-
Maktūm 
   
 
Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn Manāzil iyāk naʿbud wa iyāk nastaʿīn102 is one of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
largest works on moral theology. It is the exposition of Imām al-Harawī’s Manāzil al-Sāʾirīn, 
which discusses the various spiritual stations in the journey towards God.103 
Table 6: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Madārij 
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Philosophers  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 3  Maqālāt Aristole  1   
al-Juwaynī 
 
 Al-Shāmil  
Al-Irshād  
Al-Naẓẓāmiyya 
Ibn Sīnā 
 
1   
al-Qushayrī 3  Al-Risāla  Ibn ʿArabī 1  Fusūs 
al-Ghazālī 
 
1  Iḥyāʾ 
Al-Basīṭ 
al-Suhrawardī 
 
1  ʿAwārif al-
Maʿānī 
 
                                                          
102 See the joint edition by Dr. Nāṣir al-Saʿwī, Dr. Alī al-Qarʿāwī, Dr. Ṣaliḥ al-Tawayjrī, Dr. Khālid al-
Ghunaym and Dr. Muḥammad al-Khudaryrī, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2011.  
103 For a study of Madārij al-Sālikīn, see Ovamir Anjum, ‘Sufism without Mysticism? Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyyah’s Objectives in Madārij al-Sālikīn’, in A Scholar in the Shadow: Essays in the Legal and 
Theological Thought of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, ed. Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman, Oriente 
Moderno, Rome, 2010, pp. 161-188.  
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Ijtimāʿ al-Juyūsh al-Islāmiyya ʿalā al-Muʿaṭṭila wa al-Jahmiyya104 is a work dedicated to the 
doctrine of God’s transcendence above His creation; within it Ibn al-Qayyim engages with 
philosophers and theologians.  
Table 7: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Ijtima’   
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Philosophers  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 8  Maqālāt  
Al-Ibāna 
Al-Mawjiz 
al-Amānī  
Risāla al-Ḥurra  
Ithbāt al-Ṣifāt  
Al-ʿUmd fī al-
Ruʾya 
Aristotle  1   
Ibn Fūrak 
 
2  Al-Mujarrad 
(Tajrīd) 
Ibn Sīnā 
 
2   
al-Bāqillānī 
 
5  Al-Tamhīd  
Risāla   
Ibn Rushd 
 
1  Manāhij  
 (al-Kashf) 
al-Juwaynī 
 
3  Al-Irshād  
Al-Naẓẓāmiyya 
   
al-Iṣfarāyīnī 2      
al-Qushayrī 1      
al-Rāzī 
 
3  Aqsām al-
Lladhāt  
   
Ibn ʿAsākir 1  Tibyīn     
 
Ḥādī al-Arwāḥ ilā Bilād al-Afrāḥ105 is dedicated largely to a description of Paradise but it also 
contains a discussion on the duration of Hell.106 
                                                          
104 See Zāʾid Ibn Aḥmad al-Nushayrī’s edition, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1431AH.  
105 See Zāʾid Ibn Aḥmad al-Nushayrī’s edition, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1428AH. 
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Table 8: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in Ḥādī 
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Mu’tazilites  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 2  Maqālāt al-ʿAllāf 2   
al-Rāzī 2  Tafsīr  al-Jubbāʾī 1   
al-Qushayrī 3  Al-Risāla  al-Zamakhsharī 2  Al-Kashshāf 
 
(Mukhtaṣir)107 al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala ʿalā al-Jahmiyya wa al-Muʿaṭṭila108 is one of Ibn al-
Qayyim’s last works. It discusses the methodological allegorical interpretation employed by 
theologians and philosophers regarding divine attributes.109   
Table 9: Schools, Persons and Sources of Engagement in al-Ṣawāʿiq (Mukhtasar)   
Asha’rites  No.  Books  Mu’tazilites  No.  Books  Philosophers  No.  Books  
al-Ashʿarī 6  Maqālāt al-
Muṣṣalīn 
Maqālāt ghayr 
al-Islāmiyyīn 
Maqālāt al-
Kabīr 
Maqālāt al-
al-ʿAllāf 
 
2 
(4)110  
 Pythagoras  1   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
106 For a study of this work, see Jon Hoover, ‘Islamic Universalism: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Salafī 
Deliberations on the Duration of Hell-Fire’, The Muslim World, 99.1, Jan. 2009, pp. 181-201; and also 
see, idem, ‘Against Islamic Universalism: ʿAlī al-Ḥarbi’s 1990 Attempt to Prove that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya Affirm the Eternity of Hell-Fire’, in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating 
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer, De Gruyter, Berlin, 
2013, pp. 377-399. 
107 See Dr. al-Ḥassan al-ʿAlawī’s edition, Aḍwāʾ al-Salaf, Riyadh, 2004. 
108 See Dr. ʿAlī al-Dakhīl Allah’s edition, Dār al-ʿĀṣima, Riyadh, 1408AH.  
109 For a study of this work, see Yasir Qadhi, ‘The Unleashed Thunderbolts’ of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah: 
An Introductory Essay’, in A Scholar in the Shadow: Essays in the Legal and Theological Thought of Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, ed. Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman, Oriente Moderno, Rome, 2010, pp. 135-
149. 
110
 The numbers in parenthesis represent the number of citations in the Mukhtaṣir. 
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Matīn 
Al-Ibāna 
Al-Mawjiz  
Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd  
Risāla 
Ibn Fūrak 
 
(4)  Tajrīd 
Maqālāt 
al-Naẓẓām 
 
2 (4)   Ptolemy  1   
al-Bāqillānī 3 (4)  Al-Tamhīd  
Al-Ibāna  
Al-Daqāʾiq  
Tamhīd al-
Awāʾil  
Al-Taqrīb 
al-Khayyāṭ 
 
2   Socrates  1   
Ibn Ḥazm 
 
4  Al-Iḥkām  
 
ʿAbbād Ibn 
Sulaymān 
1   Plato  1   
al-Sharastānī 2  Al-Milal al-Shaḥḥām 1   Aristotle  1 (3)   
al-Juwaynī 
 
3  Al-Irshād  
Al-Naẓẓāmiyya 
Abū ʿAlī 
 
1   Ikhwān Ṣafāʾ 
 
1  Rasāʾil 
 
al-Iṣfarāyīnī 
 
2  Al-Tabṣira  
Al-Lumaʿ 
Sharḥ al-
Lumaʿ 
Abū Hāshim 
 
2   al-Fārābī 
 
1 (3)   
al-Qushayrī 
 
1  Al-Risāla  
Al-Shikāya 
al-Zamakhsharī 
 
1   Abū Bakr al-
Rāzī 
1   
al-Ghazālī 
 
3  Iḥyāʾ 
Tahāfut  
Al-Maḍnūn  
Abū al-Qāsim 
al-Balkhī 
 
1   Ibn Sīnā 
 
2 (7)  Al-Ishārāt  
Shifāʾ 
Al-Risāla  
al-Rāzī 
 
3  Al-Nihāya  
Aqsām al-
Lladhāt  
Tafsīr  
Al-Muḥaṣṣal  
ʿAbd Allāh Ibn 
Muḥammad al-
Nāshī al-
Muʿtazilī 
 
1   Ibn Rushd  3  Al-Kashf  
Muqaddima 
Tahāfut 
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Al-Maḥṣūl  
al-Āmadī 
 
2  Abkār 
 
ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
 
2  Ibn Sabʿīn 
 
1  Naẓm  
Yad al-ʿĀrif 
   Abū al-Ḥusayn 2 Al-
Muʿtamad 
Ibn ʿArabī 
 
1  Al-Futūḥāt  
Fusūs 
 
al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya fī al-intiṣār li-al-Firqa al-Nājiyya,111 also known as al-Qaṣīda al-
Nuniyya112, is a theological poem which summarises most of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theological works 
in a six thousand line ode ending in the letter nūn.113 
 
                                                          
111 See the joint edition by Muḥammad al-ʿArīfī, Nāṣir al-Ḥunaynī, ʿAbd Allah al-Hudhayl and Fahd al-
Masāʿid, 1428AH. 
112 Ode rhyming in the letter ‘nūn’ at the end of each stanza.  
113 For a study of this work, see, Livnat Holtsman, ‘Insult, Fury, and Frustration: The Martyrological 
Narrative of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah’s al-Kafiyah al-Shafiyah’, in Mamluk Studies Review, 17, 2013, pp. 
155-198; idem, ‘Accused of Anthropomorphism: Ibn Taymiyya’s Mihan as Reflected in Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya’s al-Kāfiya al-Shāfiya’, in Egypt and Syria under Mamluk Rule: Political, Social and Cultural 
Aspects, ed. A. Levanoni, (forthcoming). 
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A Chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Works 
Tahdhīb (732) al-Rūḥ wa al-Nafs
Miftāḥ al-Wābil (After 742)
Ṭarīq
Shifāʾ IjNmāʿ
al-Fawāʾid Ḥādī (745)
al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Rūḥ (After 749)
al-Nawniyya al-Madārij Jalāʾ al-Afhām
Badāʾiʿ Zād al-Maʿād
al-Samāʿ
Ighātha
 
Table 10: A Chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Works 
The chronological order starts from top to bottom. The solid arrows indicate that the work is cited whereas the 
broken arrows denote a lack of citation but contain similar themes.    
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The early works of Ibn al-Qayyim include: Tahdhīb Sunan Abī Dāwūd (732/1331), Maʿrifat al-
Rūḥ wa al-Nafs, Miftāḥ dār al-Saʿāda and Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn.114 The middle period of Ibn al-
Qayyim’s works include Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl, Ijtimāʿ al-Juyūsh and Ḥādī al-Arwāḥ (745/1344). The 
last six years of Ibn al-Qayyim’s life encompasses his last period of work in which he produced: 
al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala, Madārij al-Sālikīn, al-Nawniyya (al-Kāfiyya al-Shāfiyya)115, Kitāb al-
Rūḥ116, Jalāʾ al-Afhām, Zād al-Maʿād117, Badāʿi al-Fawāʾid, Masʾala al-Samāʿ and Ighātha al-
Lluhfān.  
 Eventually, Ibn al-Qayyim died on a Thursday night, the thirteenth of Rajab (751/1350), 
at the age of sixty. His funeral prayer took place the next day, after the ẓhur prayer, in the 
Umayyid Mosque and then in the Jarrāḥ mosque - which is beside his place of rest in the Bāb al-
Ṣaghīr cemetery, Damascus. Ibn Kathīr states that his funeral was full: many attended amongst 
the Judges, the Notables and the Scholars. People swarmed and rivaled to carry his coffin.118 Ibn 
Rajab reports a dream of Ibn al-Qayyim, just before his death, wherein Ibn al-Qayyim asked Ibn 
Taymiyya about his level in Paradise - the latter responded by pointing to the top, above some 
                                                          
114 Both Joseph Bell and Livnat Holtzman, state that Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn is a later work; however, it has 
been cited in Ijtimāʿ al-Juyūsh and also discusses similar topics found in Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl. Hence, if it was 
after Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl then Ibn al-Qayyim would have most probably referred to it during the similar 
discussions- as is very common of him. Cf. Joseph, N. Bell, Love Theory in Later Hanbailite Thought, State 
University of New York Press, 1979, pp. 97-98, 102; Livant Holtzman, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’, in Essays 
in Arabic Literary Biography 1350-1850, eds. Joseph Lowry and Devin Stewart, 2009, Wiesbaden, pp. 
202-203, 218-219.   
115 Livnat Holtzman includes this in Ibn al-Qayyim’s middle works while Joseph Bell includes it in the 
early works. Both seem to be inconsistence with the fact that it cites al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala, which was 
written after Ḥādī al-Awrāḥ (745/1344) - six years before Ibn al-Qayyim’s death. Cf. Joseph Bell, op. cit., 
pp. 95, 102; Livant Holtzman, op. cit., pp. 202-203, 215.     
116 This is the smaller work on Rūḥ (the soul) and not the now lost Maʿrifat al-Rūḥ wa al-Nafs which is 
cited in Kitāb al-Rūḥ, ed. Muḥammad al-Iṣlāḥī, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1432AH, p. 108. Similarly, 
two manuscripts of Kitāb al-Rūḥ, contain the phrase raḥimahu allah, after the citation of al-Qāḍī Nūr al-
Dīn Ibn al-Ṣāʾigh who died 749/1348; hence it is likely that Kitāb al-Rūḥ was summarised after this year, 
unless the phrase was inserted by a scribe. 
117 Ayedh al-Dosari states that Zād al-Maʿād is an early work; but this does not seem to be consistent 
with its citation in Madārij al-Sālikīn. Cf. Ayedh al-Dosari, Minhaj Ibn al-Qayyim fī Taqrīr Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ 
wa al-Qadar min Khilāl Kitābihi Shifāʾ al-ʾAlīl, MA Thesis, King Saʿūd University, Riyadh, 2002-2003, p. 
632.  
118 Ibn Kathīr, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 202. 
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major scholars. Then Ibn Taymiyya said to Ibn al-Qayyim: you nearly caught up to us but you 
are now on the same level as Ibn Khuzayma (a Traditionist of the tenth century).119  
 Lastly, al-Ṣafadī states that he used to hear Ibn al-Qayyim recite the following poem, 
which resonates with the idea of a humble scholar:  
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, whose sins are numerous. 
 Hence the one who decries him is not to be blamed [for doing so]! 
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who is ignorant of himself. 
 He is also ignorant of the Divine Command, and why should he have   
knowledge of it at all? 
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who has taken the front seat for himself, 
 So he disseminates knowledge, while he himself has none.  
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who aspires to a communion with the Sublime, 
 While sins are his main interest and occupation.  
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who wishes to ascend to the Heavenly Garden of Retreat,  
 Although he has no determination to do so.  
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who sees the benefit in things that are bound to become extinct 
and perish. 
 Those [are the] things in whose abandonment is actually the greatest prize of all. 
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who is bound to fail in his efforts, 
 Since he has no share in doing good deeds. 
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr, who is, as his Creator says,  
 ‘Fretful’ and ‘ungrateful’. He is described as sinful and foolish.  
This is the little boy of Abū Bakr and his like became those who lead the creatures 
 By issuing their fatāwā [formal legal opinions]. 
However, they have no ability when it comes to real knowledge, piety and asceticism. 
 Their main concern is worldly things. 
I do declare, had the Prophet’s companions seen the most meritorious amongst the little boy of 
Abū Bakr and his like,  
 They surely would have said: They are ‘deaf and dumb’.120    
                                                          
119 Ibn Rajab, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 450. 
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  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illuminated how Damascus during Ibn al-Qayyim’s era was a centre for 
intellectual engagement and the development of knowledge. Similarly, I have elaborated upon 
those of Ibn al-Qayyim’s intellectual characteristics which were essential for his transmission 
and development of knowledge, including his critical engagements and his likely conversion 
from Ashʿarism to Traditionalism. Lastly, I have also elucidated the fact that Ibn al-Qayyim had 
studied non-Traditionalist texts under non-Traditionalist scholars and also that he possessed an 
extensive library which included an abundance of non-Traditionalist sources, all of which he had 
engaged with on his project of theological development. In the next chapter, I shall investigate 
the extent to which contemporary Traditionalist conception bases its puritan theology on a 
utopian monolithic first three generation of Islam that apparently never differed on theological 
issues. In addition, I shall also explore early critical engagements and theological developments 
in the various schools of theology.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
120 The translation is taken from Livant Holtzman, ‘Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’, in Essays in Arabic Literary 
Biography 1350-1850, eds. Joseph Lowry and Devin Stewart, 2009, Wiesbaden, pp. 210-211.  
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2- EARLY CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS AND THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS: 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
What I intend to show in this chapter is that the early Muslim generations also engaged with each 
other and differed in their opinions on theological concepts, which promoted developments over 
the centuries by both individual theologians and collective schools of theology. As such, the 
answers to the problematic implications of some theological concepts were not always found in 
scripture or a utopian monolithic first three generations of Islam.  
Early Theological Differences amongst the Companions: Monolithic or 
Pluralistic? 
One factor that contributes to the theological intra-dialogue of disengagement in contemporary 
Traditionalists and their isolation from non-Traditionalists schools is the presence of 
authoritative statements which completely deny any form of theological differences between the 
Companions.1 As such, these statements imply that a Traditionalist puritan theology is based on 
the monolithic theology of the Companions2. However, this concept of a monolithic theology 
                                                          
1 For contemporary religious authorities who advocate this statement, see, ʿAbd Allah Ibn Muḥammad 
al-Ghulayfī, ʿIlām al-Muʾminīn bi-ann al-Ṣaḥāba lam yakhtilifū fī al-ʿAqīda wa Uṣūl al-Dīn, Khalīfa, 
Mekkah, n.d. These statements go on further to claim that the Salaf (first three generations) never 
differed on theological issues. On the contrary, we find that there were theological differences amongst 
the Salaf- whether it be fundament or subsidiary theological issues- such as: ruling by other than 
revelation, excommunication of the Kharijites, duration of Hell-Fire, description of general divine 
nearness, description of ḥad (limit) for God, description of divine descending, does divine descending 
consist of movement?, does the divine throne become empty of God?, the creation of Adam in His 
image, does God have a soul?, utilizing the status of the Prophet in invocations, the permissibility of 
swearing oath by the Prophet, etc.   
2 Likewise is the case with the implication that a Traditionalist puritan theology is based on a monolithic 
theology of the first three generation of Islam, namely the Salaf, whom never differed on matters 
concerning theology.  
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amongst the Companions is not entirely correct.3 For example, the wife of the Prophet, ʿĀʾisha 
differed with the companion Ibn ʿAbbās on whether the Prophet saw his Lord during his 
heavenly ascension (al-miʿrāj). ʿAʾisha denied such vision whilst Ibn ʿAbbās affirmed it.4 
Additionally, ʿAʾisha also differed with ʿUmar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb on whether the dead are punished 
as a result of people wailing over them5 and also whether the dead can hear those who talk over 
their graves.6 In both instances, she stated that ʿUmar was mistaken in believing that the dead get 
punished for other peoples’ sins, such as wailing, and that the dead can hear the living. Unlike 
ʿUmar, ʿĀʾisha found support in the Quran: Each soul earns only on its own account, nor does 
any laden bear another’s load.7 Truly you cannot cause the Dead to listen...8 But you cannot 
make those to hear who are (buried) in graves.9  
 In another instance, we find that ʿĀʾisha, ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿAmr, Ibn Masʿūd, and Ibn 
ʿAbbās, all differed on whether it was permissible to wear amulets which contain scriptural 
inscriptions, since such practice could be a form of associationism (shirk) as one may believe 
that something other than God, namely the amulet, is capable of protection. ʿĀʾisha was of the 
opinion that it was permissible to wear such things but only after a tribulation to prevent the 
belief that the amulet gives protection.10 ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿAmr Ibn al-ʿĀṣ held that it was 
permissible at all times to wear it, regardless of the timing of any tribulations.11 Standing in 
                                                          
3 The following theological differences amongst the Companions is not a comprehensive attempt, 
bearing in mind that political and legal issues are not included. 
4 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Dār Ṭūq al-Najāt, 1422AH, vol. 9, p. 116, no. 7380; Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān 
Tablīs al-Jahmiyya fī Taʾsīs bidaʿihim al-Kalāmiyya, Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahad, Madina, 1426AH, vol. 7, pp. 
158- 361.  
5 Muslim, Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim, Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī, Beirut, n.d., vol. 2, p. 643, no. 932; Ibn Taymiyya, al-
Fatāwā al-Kubrā li Ibn Taymiyya, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 1987, vol. 3, p. 65.  
6 Muslim, ibid. 
7 Quran 6: 164. Also see, Quran 17: 15; 35: 18; 39: 7; and 53: 38. 
8 ibid., 27: 80. 
9 ibid., 35: 22. 
10 al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Manʿānī al-Āthār, ed. Muḥammad S. Jād al-Ḥaq, Maṭbaʿa al-Anwār al-
Muḥammadiyya, Cairo, n.d., vol. 4, p. 325. 
11 al-Baghawī, Sharḥ al-Sunna, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ, al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1390AH, vol. 12, p. 158. 
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opposition to these two opinions were Ibn Masʿūd and Ibn ʿAbbās, who believed that wearing an 
amulet with scriptural inscriptions was completely forbidden.12 
 Similarly, Ibn Masʿūd differed with Ibn ʿAbbās on the interpretation of the ‘Shin’ in the 
verse: the Day when the Shin shall be laid bare and they shall be called to prostrate, but they 
shall not be able to do so.13 Ibn Masʿūd took the literal meaning that the Shin was the Shin of 
God;14 whereas Ibn ʿAbbās opted for a allegorical interpretation wherein the Shin stood for the 
Severity (al-shidda)15 of the Day of Judgment. 
 Lastly, we find that ʿUmar also differed with Abū Bakr on his view of the 
excommunication of the Arab tribes who had refused to pay the zakāt (alms tax).16 ʿUmar held 
that the fact these tribes upheld the testimony of faith (al-Shahāda) was a clear indication that 
they were still Muslims, whereas Abū Bakr held that whoever differentiates between prayer and 
alms tax, provides evidence enough of their apostasy.17  
 
Early Debates on Divine Determination 
The early debate on qadar (divine determination) which involved Maʿbad al-Juhanī (d. c. 
80/699) is another clear indication that theological differences, engagement, and development 
                                                          
12 ibid. 
13 Quran 68: 42.  
14 Abū Yaʿlā al-Farāʾ, Ibṭāl al-Taʾwīlāt li-Akhbār al-Ṣifāt, ed. Abū ʿAbd al-Allah Muḥammad al-Najdī, Dār 
Iīlāf al-Dawliyya, Kuwait, n.d., p. 160. 
15 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn 
Qāsim, Maṭābiʿ Riyādh, Riyadh, 1381AH, vol. 6, pp. 394- 395; Ibn al-Qayyim, Mukhtasr al-Ṣawāʿiq al-
Mursala fī al-Rudd ʿalā al-Jahmiyya wa al-Muʿaṭṭila, Maktaba al-Riyāh al-Ḥadītha, Riyadh, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 
33- 34.   
16 Bukhārī, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 15, no. 6924. 
17 There is an opinion which states that the differences here was regarding whether it was permissible 
for Abū Bakr to go to war with these tribes rather than whether or not these tribes were Muslims. 
However, Ibn Taymiyya states, that this opinion is incorrect and that the differences here is whether 
these tribes have apostatised. See, Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī Naqḍ Kalām al-Shīʿa 
al-Qadariyya, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 
1986, vol. 4, p. 501; idem, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 28, pp. 518- 519, 548. Also see, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, Dār 
al-Maʿrifa, Beirut, 1990, vol. 4, p. 277; al-Baghawī, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 489.    
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did occur amongst the Salaf. In fact, most heresiographers18 state that Maʿbad al-Juhanī initiated 
the debate on qadar, that is, the debate on whether or not human acts are caused by divine 
determination or by man’s free will.19 The affirmers of the latter were known as the Qadarites20, 
represented by Ma’bad and his followers. The upholders of the former were known as the 
‘Affirmers’ (Ahlu Ithbāt) of divine determination and were mainly Traditionalists. 
 There is an alternative opinion which states that the first to initiate the debate on qadar 
were a group of people from Ḥijāz, rather than the Qadarites. However, not much is mentioned 
about these people other than what is recorded in Ikmāl al-Muʿlim,21 that while Ibn Zubayr was 
stranded in Mekkah, the Kaʿba caught fire. Some said that the cause was attributable to divine 
determination (qadar-Allah) while others denied this and attributed it to man’s will. This is one 
of many recorded debates on the problematic implications of qadar, which along with others will 
later give rise to the development of theological schools engaging with issues pertaining to 
qadar.22 
 The debate was likely born from political context23, given that the Umayyid rulers were 
reported to have exploited the doctrine of qadar in order to legitimise their authority.24 In the 
                                                          
18 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Muʾassassa al-Ḥalabī, n.d., vol. 1, p. 28; al-Baghdādī, al-Firaq bayn 
al-Firaq wa bayān al-Firqat al-Nājiyya, Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, Beirut, 1977, p. 14.  
19
 For a thorough study of this question, see, William, M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early 
Islam, Cruzon, London, 1948; idem, ‘Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam’, The Muslim World, vol. 
36, Issue 2, April 1946, pp. 124–152.  
20 The Traditionalist labelled them qadariyya, since they ascribe qadar to man rather than God. Likewise, 
this label fits the description given in a famous Prophetic tradition and as a result the masses would 
abstain from them. The tradition reads: ‘The qadariyya are the Manicheans (Majūs) of this nation 
(umma) [see, Abū Dāwd, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Muḥammad Muḥī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, al-Maktaba al-
ʿAṣriyya, Beirut, n.d., vol. 4, p. 222, no. 4691]. This is because the Persian Manicheans worshipped two 
Gods, the God of good and the God of evil. As such, some scholars argued that the qadariyya held a 
similar concept, as the creator of good being God and the creator of evil being man.  
21 See, al-Qāḍi ʿAyāḍ, Ikmāl al-Muʿlim bi Fawāʾid Muslim, ed. Dr. Yaḥyā Ismāʿīl, Dār al-Wafāʾ, Egypt, 1998, 
vol. 1, p. 212; al-Ubayy al-Sanūsī, Ikmāl al-Ikmāl al-Muʾlim, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿilmiyya, Beirut, 1328AH, vol. 
1, p. 51. 
22 There is a third opinion which states that the first to deny divine determination was a man by the 
name of ʿAmr al-Muqsūs. See, Dr. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Ṣ. al-Maḥmūd, al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar fī Ḍawʾ al-Kitāb 
wa al-Sunna wa Madhāhib al-Nās fīhi. 2nd ed., Dār al-Waṭan, Riyadh, 1997, pp. 166-167. 
23 There are some scholars who argue for a foreign (Hellenic and Christian) influence on the debate. See, 
William, M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Aldine Transaction, USA, 2009, pp. 37-90; Joseph 
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same sense that every Muslim holds dear to the belief that God determines things in their 
everyday life, the Umayyids argued that God has also determined their leadership and hence 
every Muslim should be pleased with what God has determined. This exploitation was met with 
a critical reaction by scholars who advocated that humans – including rulers - have free will and 
are responsible for their own acts. For example, Maʿbad is reported to have said to al-Ḥasan al-
Baṣrī25:  
O Abī Saʿīd, verily those kings shed blood of the Muslims and take their money. They do such 
and say, ‘verily our actions are but from the determination of God!’  (al-Ḥasan) said: the enemies 
of God have lied.26   
 
In addition to the political context of the debate, the ambiguity of scripture must be influential, 
since in order to support any given theological position in Islam one must resort to scripture for 
support. Consequently, one can find Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions which support both 
sides of the debate on qadar between the upholders of divine determination and the advocators 
of human free will.27 For example, the following passage may be employed in support of divine 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Schacht, ‘New Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology’, Studia Islamica, no. 1, 1953, pp. 23-
42; Morris Seale, Muslim Theology: A Study of Origins with Reference to the Church Fathers, London, 
1964; Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Critical Study, Cambridge, 1981. 
24 See, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fi ʾabwāb al-Tawhīd wa al-ʿadal, eds. Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusayn and Dr. 
Ibrāhīm Madkūr, Maṭbaʿa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 1960- 1968., vol. 8, p.4.This form of exploitation is known as 
iḥtijāj bi al-qadar (using divine determination as a justification for sins). 
25al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s epistle on qadar also seems to be of a similar orientation in refuting those who 
exploit the concept of qadar to justify their sins. See, Julian Obermann, ‘Political Theology in Early Islam: 
Ḥasan Al-Baṣrī's Treatise on Qadar’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 55, No. 2, Jun., 1935, 
pp. 138-162; Michael Schwarz, ‘The Letter of al-Hasan al-Baṣrī’, Oriens, vol. 20, 1967, pp. 15-30; 
Abdullah Sliti, ‘A Translation of Al-Hasan Al-Basrī's Treatise on Free Will and Divine Determination’, The 
Islamic Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 4, 2012, pp. 375-391.  
26 Abū Jaʿfar al-ʿUqaylī, al-Ḍuʾafāʿ al-Kabīr, ed. ʿAbd al-Muʿṭī Amīn Qalʿajī, Dār al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, 
Beirut, 1984, vol.3, p. 403, no. 1441. 
27 Although these two labels have been commonly employed by scholars such as William M. Watt, they 
are not entirely accurate, as those who have been typically labelled as advocators of free will also 
uphold hold divine determining when referring to God’s omniscience. Similarly, those who have been 
labelled as upholders of divine determination also advocate some sort of free will which is usually 
interpreted as kasb, as we shall see shortly in the next chapter.  
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determination: Say, nothing will happen to us except what God has decreed for us. He is our 
Protector and in God let the believers put their trust.28 Similarly, a Prophetic tradition reads:  
 
Adam refuted Mūsā whereby Mūsā said: O Adam, you are our father; you prevented and expelled 
us from paradise. Adam replied: You are Mūsā whom God honoured with His speech and wrote 
for you the Torah with His own hands. Do you blame me for what God had determined (qaddara) 
for me forty years before I was created? The Prophet then said: Adam refuted Mūsā, Adam 
refuted Mūsā.’29 
 
Conversely, the following scriptural passages may be read to advocate human free will: Say, that 
truth has come from your Lord, Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, disbelieve.30 
Likewise, God is never unjust in the least degree31; this could be interpreted as meaning that 
divine determination of human acts is a form of injustice since he is accountable for acts which 
he has no agency. A similar Prophetic tradition reads:  
 
God says: O my servants, I have forbidden injustice for myself and have made it forbidden 
amongst you, so do not treat each other unjustly. O my servants, it is your deeds for which I will 
call you to account. So whoever receives prosperity should thank God and whoever misfortune 
befalls should blame none but himself.32  
 
Additionally, some scholars33 have argued that the doctrine of qadar originated from Greek and 
Christian thought. It would be hard to deny any influence as early Muslims did accuse Maʿbad 
                                                          
28 Quran 9:51. 
29 al-Bukhārī, op. cit., vol.4, p.158, no. 3409. 
30 Quran 18:29. 
31 ibid., 4:40. 
32 Muslim, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 1994, no.2577. 
33 For example see, Joseph Schacht, ‘New Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology’, Studia 
Islamica, no. 1, 1953, pp. 23-42; Morris Seale, Muslim Theology: A Study of Origins with Reference to the 
Church Fathers, London, 1964; William, M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Aldine Transaction, 
USA, 2009, pp. 37-90; Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Critical Study, Cambridge, 1981.  
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al-Juhanī of having similar views to the Christians.34 Likewise, Maʿbad’s teacher, Sūsan, was a 
Christian and Maʿbad’s student, Ghaylān was of Coptic descent.35 On the other hand, the first 
ancient Greek text translated into Arabic was the dīwān during the caliph Hishām Ibn ʿAbd al-
Malik’s reign (724-743) as is mentioned by Ibn Nadīm.36 Additionally, texts on philosophy were 
translated during the reign of the caliph al-Maʾmūn (813-33).37 As such, Maʿbad was alive 
before both of these reigns as he was executed during the reign of the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn 
Marwān (699). Therefore, this potentially rules out any possibility of Greek influence on the 
debate of qadar.    
 Nonetheless, Watt says: ...suggesting that Islam is nothing but a revision of Christian or 
Jewish or Hellenistic ideas, is misleading and a belittling of the uniqueness and originality of 
Islam.38 Similarly, Julian Obermann stated: 
 
...the qadar (divine determination) ideology was the direct and inevitable out-growth of the deed 
of Muhammed; and that, accordingly, the theory of its foreign origin, vaguely repeated ever since 
the time of Alfred von Kremer should be abandon once for all.39 
 
 
                                                          
34 See Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa Wafayāt al-Mashāhir wa al-ʿAlām, ed. Dr. Bashshār 
ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003, vol.2, p.1006. 
35 Steven Judd argues that most of these reports can be traced to al-Awzāʿī, the leading anti-qadarite 
figure in late Umayyad Damascus, see, ‘Ghaylan al-Dimashqi: The Isolation of a Heretic in Islamic 
Historiography’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31, 1999, p. 165.   
36 Abū al-Faraj Ibn Nadīm, Fihrist, ed. Ibrāhīm Ramaḍan, Dār al-Maʿrifa, Beirut, 1997, vol. 1, p. 301; also 
see, Roshid Rashed, ‘Greek into Arabic: Transmission and Translation’ in Arabic Theology, Arabic 
Philosophy: From Many to One, Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank, e.d. James E. Mongomery, 
Peeters, 2006, p. 161. For a study on this topic, see, Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The 
Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdād and Early Abbāsid Society (2nd-4th/ 8th-10th Centuries), 
Routledge, London- New York, 1998.    
37 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 3rd ed., Columbia University Press, New York, 2004, pp. 
4, 7; William M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Aldine Transaction, USA, 2009, pp. 41- 48. 
38 William M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey, Edinburgh University Press, 
1985, p. 30. 
39 Julian Obermann, op. cit., p. 158. 
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Maʿbad	al-Juhanī		
 
Ma’bad al-Juhanī (d. c. 80/699) was originally from the Ḥijāzī tribe of Juhayna,40 located around 
the outskirts of Madinah. He resided in Madinah, Makkah, Basra, and Damascus throughout his 
lifetime. But it was in Basra, where Ma’bad studied, that he became famously known as the 
originator of the doctrine of qadar. During Ma’bad’s time in Baṣra, people were sinning openly, 
to the extent that the apparent religious duties began to diminish over time.41 In fact, it was 
common practice to employ the concept of divine determination (qadar) in order to justify sins, 
as people could argue that had God not determined their sins then they would not have sinned.42 
This fatalistic justification is known as iḥtijāj bi-al-qadar (using qadar to justify ones’ short-
comings). As such, this led Maʿbad to openly argue that there is no divine determination (lā 
qadar) which strips man of free choice.43 This could be interpreted as an attempt on Maʿbad’s 
behalf of trying to restore religious duty.44      
 Maʿbad is considered to be a Successor (tābiʿī), defined by Sunnī Muslims as: everyone 
who saw the Companions of the Prophet and died as Muslims.45 In other words, they were the 
second generation after the Prophet. Yet, many historians have it that Maʿbad lived during the 
time of the Prophet but never saw him. If such is the case, then Maʿbad would be categorised as 
a mukhḍram, who are defined as all those who lived during the Prophet’s lifetime but never saw 
him and also died as Muslims.46  
 Maʿbad was certainly not foreign to Islam and the early generation of Muslims, as he 
learnt Prophetic traditions directly from major Companions of the Prophet. Maʿbad is reported to 
have narrated from the following Companions: ʿUmar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Ḥudhayfa Ibn al-Yamān, 
al-Ḥasan Ibn ʿAli, al-Ḥārim Ibn ʿAbd Allah al-Zubaydī, Ḥamrān Ibn Abān, al-Shuʿab Ibn 
                                                          
40 Abū al-Qāsim Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīk Dimashq, ed. ʿAmr al-ʿUmarī, Dār al-Fikr, 1995, vol. 59, pp. 316, 318. 
41 ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, Nashʾat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām, 2nd ed., Manshaʾat al-Maʿārif, al-
Iskandariyya, 1962, vol. 1, pp. 121- 122.  
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, Fatḥ al-Mughīth bi Sharḥ al-Fiyya al-Ḥadīth li-al-ʿIrāqī, ed. ʿAlī Ḥasan ʿAlī, 
Maktaba al-Sunna, Miṣr, 2003, vol. 4, p. 145.  
46 ibid., vol. 4, p. 157. 
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Jathāma, ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿAbbas, ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿUmar, Uthmān Ibn ʿAffān, ʿImrān Ibn 
Ḥuṣayn, Muʿāwiya Ibn Abī Sufiyān, and Yazīd Ibn ʿUmayra al-Zubaydī.47  
 Another teacher of Maʿbad was supposedly a Christian scholar by the name of Sūsan, 
who converted to Islam and then later allegedly reverted back to Christianity. The two resided in 
Baṣra and in many narrations Maʿbad is accused to have been influenced by Sūsan:48 
 
The first to have spoken about qadar was a man from Iraq by the name of Sūsan. He was 
a Christian who converted to Islam then after reverted back to Christianity. Maʿbad al-
Juhanī took this doctrine from him then after Ghaylān from Maʿbad.49 
 
Similarly, there were major early Muslim figures who narrated Prophetic traditions from Maʿbad 
such as: Qatāda, Mālik Ibn Dīnār, ʿAwf al-ʿArābī, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Zayd Ibn Rafīʿ Al-Jazarī, 
Saʿad Ibn Ibrāhīm, ʿAbd Allah Ibn Fayrūz al-Dānāj, Muʿāwiya Ibn Qūra.50 As a result, we can 
clearly see that there were early figures in Islam who took their knowledge directly from figures 
who are historically considered as ‘unorthodox’ such as Maʿbad and his followers; hence, the 
conception of a utopian monolithic first three generations can be somewhat challenged.   
 Despite Maʿbad’s ‘unorthodox’ position, he was still portrayed as a pious and active 
figure who was concerned with the betterment of his society - whether in his active transmission 
of knowledge51 or his keenness for competent caliphs.52 People referred to him, to the extent that 
                                                          
47 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-Kamāl fī Asmāʾ al-Rijāl, ed. Dr. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Muʾassassat 
al-Risāla, Beirut, 1980, vol. 28, p. 244. 
48 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, op. cit., vol. 28, p. 245. Additionally, Maʿbad’s teacher, Yūnis al-Aswārī, (also 
known as Sībawayh, Abū Yūnis Sistawayh, Sīsūh) was also reported to have been the first to advocate 
the doctrine of qadar alongside Sūsan and ʿAṭāʾ Ibn Abī Maymūna. See, ibid., vol. 16, p. 136; Abū Jaʿfar 
al-ʿUqaylī, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 403; idem, vol. 4, p. 217; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Lisān al-Mizān, ed. Dāʾira al-
Muʿarraf al-Niẓāmiyya, Muʾssassat al-ʿAlamī, Beirut, 1971, vol. 3, p. 131; idem, vol. 6, p. 335.   
49 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, op. cit., vol. 28, p. 245. 
50 ibid. 
51 He was also a transmitter of Prophetic traditions. See Abū Nuʾaym al-Aṣbahānī, Maʾrifat al-Ṣaḥāba, ed. 
ʿĀdil Ibn Yūsif al-ʿAzāzī, Dār al-Waṭan, Riyadh, 1998, vol.1, p.73, no. 283; ibid., vol. 6, p. 3170, ibid., vol. 6, 
p. 3170, no. 7296; ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn Athīr, Asad al-Ghāba fī Maʿrifat al-Ṣaḥāba, eds. ʿAlī Muḥammad 
Muʿwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd, Dār al-Kutub alʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 1994, vol.1, p. 619, no. 911; 
ibid., vol. 6, p. 434, no. 6674; furthermore, the Traditionists, Yaḥyā Ibn Maʾīn, and Abū Zurʿa al-Rāzī, both 
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he played some sort of mediatory role during a conflict between some Companions of the 
Prophet.53  
 Abū Isḥāq al-Jawzajānī (d.259/873) speaks of Maʿbad’s competence and piety: 
There were people who advocated the doctrine of qadar others took from them because 
of their religious exertion (ijtihād), honesty and faithfulness. They were never thought of 
as liars- even though they had wrong views. Amongst them were Qatāda and Maʿbad al-
Juhanī, who was the head.54  
 
On the one hand, Maʿbad seemed to have had good relationships with the rulers of his time. The 
caliph ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Marwān (d.86/705) in Damascus appointing Maʿbad as a teacher for 
his son Saʿīd Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik,55 is evidence of this. However, his pious concerns nevertheless 
seem to have paved the way to his fatal execution, which was not punishment for his heretical 
views, rather for his active revolt against the injustice of the rulers during his time.56 Though, 
some narrations do state that it was his doctrine on qadar that led to his execution as it was a 
heresy which caused many controversies between the masses, causing some scholars to warn 
against him.  
 al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī was one such scholar who warned against Maʿbad’s ideology,57 
although he initially shared similar tendencies on qadar58, it is claimed he later changed his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
accepted his narrations; see, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 225; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Siyar 
al-Aʾlām al-Nubalāʿ, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ, Muʾssassat al-Risāla, 3rd ed., 1985, vol. 4, p. 186. 
52 Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa Wafayāt al-Mashāhir wa al-ʿAlām, ed. Dr. Bashshār 
ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003,vol.2, p. 1006. 
53 See Maʿbad’s involvement in the poli7cal negotiation between Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī and ʿAmr Ibn al-
ʿĀṣ at Dawmat al-Jandal after the Battle of Ṣiffīn, in Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, op. cit., vol.2, p. 1006. 
However, Josef van Ess claims that this is a fictitious report; see, Ess, J. van. "Maʿbad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. 
ʿUkaym al-D̲ju̲hanī." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online. 
54 Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, ibid. 
55 Josef van Ess, ibid. 
56 Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Siyar al-Aʾlām al-Nubalāʿ, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ, Muʾssassat al-Risāla, 3rd ed., 
1985, vol. 4, p. 187.  
57 al-Ḥasan is reported to have said: ‘Beware of Maʿbad for verily, he is misguided and misguides others’, 
see, Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, ibid. 
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views. Maʿbad, on the other hand, was persistent on his views until he was reported to have 
regretted not listening to al-Ḥasan, just before he was executed:  
 
Maʿbad al-Juhanī was the first to talk about qadar in Basra and it was as if Aṭaʾ Ibn Abī 
Maymūna’s tongue was magic. They both [Maʿbad and ʿAṭaʾ] held the doctrine of qadar 
and approached al-Ḥasan saying: ‘O Abī Saʿīd, verily those kings shed blood of the 
Muslims and take their money. They do such and say, ‘verily our actions are but from the 
determination of God!’  (al-Ḥasan) said: the enemies of God have lied. [The narrator] 
said: ‘they [Maʿbad and ʿAṭaʾ] cling on to doubtful matters like these and then say al-
Ḥasan is of those who adhere to the doctrine of qadar’.59 
 
The student of Maʿbad, Mālik Ibn Dīnār (d. 130/747-8), states,  
 
I met Maʿbad al-Juhanī in Makkah after Ibn al-Ashʿth [after his crisis], Maʿbad was 
wounded because he was fighting against al-Ḥajjāj. He said, [regrettably] ‘I came across 
many scholars and jurists, none were the like of al-Ḥasan, O woe to me, only if I had 
listened to him.60   
 
As a result, the last stage of Maʿbad’s life was one of solitude and loneliness:   
  
 We were sitting in the mosque of Benī ʿUday, and with us was Abū al-Sawārī al-Adawī. 
Then entered Maʿbad al-Juhanī upon which Abū al-Sawārī said: I will not allow this 
person to enter our mosque; do not let him sit with us.61 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
58 al-Ḥasan is a very interesting figure, many schools claimed that he belong to them. The Muʿtazilites 
claimed he was an advocator of free will while the Traditionalists claimed he was in favour of divine 
determining. See, Sulaimān ʻAlī Murād, Early Islam between Myth and History: Al-Ḥaṣan Al-Baṣrī (d. 
110H/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship, Brill, 2006; Abdullah Sliti, 
ibid.  
59 Abū Jaʿfar al-ʿUqaylī , op. cit., vol. 3, p. 403, no. 1441. 
60 Abū al-Qāsim Ibn ʿAsākir, op. cit., vol.59, p. 324. Sulaimān ʻAlī Murād argues that this report is 
historically unlikely because Mālik Ibn Dīnār was still very young; see, Sulaimān ʻAlī Murād, op. cit., p. 34-
5.  
61 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Mizzī, op. cit., vol.28, pp.246- 247. 
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Similarly, 
Abū Zubayr al-Makkī and Ṭāwūs passed by Maʿbad al-Juhanī who was sitting alone in 
the mosque. Abū Zubayr said to Ṭāwūs: Is this the person that speaks of qadar? So 
Ṭāwūs approached him, he stood erectly in front of him and said: Are you the one who 
lies about God with no knowledge? Maʿbad replied: It is lies attributed to me! Abū 
Zubayr said: We then went to Ibn ʿAbbās and informed him about those who speak of 
qadar, upon which he said: Woe unto you, show me them!’ We said: what do you intend 
to do? He replied: By Him in whose hand my soul is in, if you show me one of them I 
will surely place my hand on his head and strike his neck!62  
 
In conclusion, there are two conflicting trends within narratives of Maʿbad’s death. The first 
states that the Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik crucified him in Damascus during the 80th year- due to his 
heretical position on qadar. The second states that the General Yūsif Ibn al-Ḥajjāj killed him 
after relentless torture, during the year eighty or before the year ninety, due to Maʿbad’s 
attempted revolt. However, the latter seems to be the most common narrative and is cited in the 
vast majority of historical references.63 It may be plausible that Maʿbad did not die from 
crucifixion but rather he was released after which he was executed by Yūsif Ibn al-Ḥajjāj, as al-
Dhahabī reports, that al-Ḥajjāj tortured Maʿbad severely, although he did not fright nor plead for 
help, after which he was then killed.64 
 Lastly, there is not much detail given on Maʿbad’s opinions;65 nevertheless, his Qadarī 
views influenced the prominent leader of the Qadarī movement in Damascus, Ghaylān al-
                                                          
62 Abū al-Qāsim Ibn ʿAsākir, ibid.  
63 Josef van Ess also argues that Maʿbad was executed for his involvement in Ibn al-Ashʿath’s revolt (699-
702). cf. Josef. van Ess, ‘Maʿbad al-Juhanī’, in Islamwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen Fritz Meier Zum 
Sechzigsten Geburtstag, e.d. Richard Gramlich, Franz Steiner, Wiesbanden, 1974, pp. 67, 75-77; Also, 
idem, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. Und 3. Jahrhunder Hidschra, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999, vol. 
1, pp. 72-73.   
64 Abū al-Qāsim Ibn ʿAsākir, op. cit., vol. 59, p. 325; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām wa Wafayāt 
al-Mashāhir wa al-ʿAlām, vol. 2, p. 1006. 
65 He has a refutation against those who use divine determining to justify sins; see, Muḥammad Abū 
Zahra, Tārīkh al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyya fī al-Siyāsa, wa al-ʿAqāʾid, wa Tārīkh al-Madhāhib al-Fiqhiyya, 
Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, Cairo, n.d., p.106. 
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Dimashqī, who will further elaborate the Qadarī views. For this reason, Ghaylān is perhaps the 
true founder of the Qadarite movement. 
 
 
Ghaylān al-Dimashqī  
 
The Damascene Qadarite Ghaylān al-Dimashqī (d. 122/740) managed to further elaborate on the 
doctrine of qadar and to write them down freely, evidenced by his many works on theology and 
numerous followers, to the extent that they were amongst the first true followers of the qadariyya 
and were labelled the Ghaylāniyya, a namesake from their teacher Ghaylān.  
 Ghaylān engaged frequently with the most prominent legal and theological figures of late 
Umayyad times, including ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Makḥūl al-Shāmī, 
Maymūn Ibn Mihrān, and al-Awzāʿī.66 Furthermore, in addition to Maʿbad al-Juhanī, Makḥūl al-
Shāmī was another major Qadarite teacher of Ghaylān.67 
 Ibn al-Nadīm in his Fihrist, states that Ghaylān compiled letters that reach up to two 
thousand pages in length68, but none of it survives. Yet, the limited synopses which portray 
Ghaylān’s beliefs are contained in a sermon given by Ghaylān and recorded in Ibn Qutayba’s 
ayūn al-akhbār69 and three recorded debates, found in Abū Nuʿaym’s Ḥilyat al-Awliyat.70 In the 
first debate, which was with al-Awzāʿī, it is evident that Ghaylān is not given much opportunity 
to defend himself; the debate concluded in the justification of Ghaylan’s execution (122/740) in 
                                                          
66 Steven Judd, op. cit., p. 164.  
67 Josef van Ess, Anfänge muslimischer Theologie: Zwei antiqadaritische Traktate aus dem ersten 
Jahrhundert der Hiǧra, Orient-Institut, Beirut 1977, 217- 220; idem, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 
3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, De Gruyter, Berlin, 
1991–1997, 1/ 83- 102.  
68 Abū al-Faraj Ibn Nadīm, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 149.  
69 Dr. Fuʾād Sazkīn, Tārīkh al-Adab al-ʿArabī, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammah Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 
1991, vol. 4, p. 17. 
70 Abū Nuʿaym al-Aṣbahānī, Ḥilyyat al-Awliyyāt wa Ṭabaqāt al-Aṣfiyyāʾ, al-Saʿāda, Miṣr, 1974, vol. 3, pp. 
92, 260; ibid., vol. 6, p. 72; also see, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Maniyya wa al-Amal, eds. Dr. Sāmī al-
Nashshār and Dr. ʿIṣām al-Dīn Muḥammad, Dār al-Maṭbūʿāt al-Jāmiʿiyya, al-Iskandariyya, 1972, vol. 1, pp. 
30- 32; al-Imām Muḥammad Abū Zahra, op. cit., pp. 107- 110.  
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the presence of the Caliph, Hishām Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 105-25/724-43). In the second debate, 
which was with Dāwūd Ibn Abī Hind, there is not much information given on the nature of the 
arguments except short questions and answers on the epistemological position of the intellect 
(ʿaql); Ghaylān’s side of the debate is not even given. Likewise, the last debate, which was with 
Rabīʿ Ibn Abī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, is another very short question and answer discussion on sins. 
Despite the short description of the latter two debates, Ghaylān is portrayed as the instigator and 
seems very confident and active, unlike in the first.71  
 Additionally, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, in his al-Maniya wal ʾamal, has two works of Ghaylān. 
The first is a letter to the caliph ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, in which much information is given on 
Ghaylān’s arguments on qadar, evil, and the fatalistic justification of sins, namely those that 
invoke God’s determination to justify their disobedience.72 The second is a debate with ʿUmar 
Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, which supposedly resulted in Ghaylān repenting from his views on qadar.73 
However, many historical accounts report that Ghaylān had reverted back to his qadarī views 
after the death of ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.  
 Lastly, two of the oldest recorded books on the doctrine of the Qadarite movement are 
Kitāb al-Qadar and Kitāb al-Ḥikma, both by Wahb Ibn Muniba (d. 110/728).74  
 
Early Schools and Their Theological Developments 
The Muʿtazilites 
 
The legacy of the Qadarite movement is recognisable in the early Muʿtazilites who adopted the 
doctrine of qadar and further developed it, as is evident in their discussions and engagement with 
concepts and arguments related to human agency and divine determination.  
                                                          
71 ibid. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. For more on Ghaylān’s works see, Dr. Fuʾād Sazkīn, ibid. 
74 Dr. Fuʾād Sazkīn, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 4, 463, 513. 
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 Wāṣil Ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 131/748-9), who was born in Madinah (80/699-700) and later lived in 
Basra, founded the Muʿtazilite School after he disassociated himself from his teacher al-Ḥasan 
al-Baṣrī. Wāṣil left the circles of al-Ḥasan to form his own school, because of their differences 
with regards to one who commits a grave sin, whether he is to be considered a believer or a 
disbeliever. Unlike al-Ḥasan, Wāṣil held that the grave sinner is neither a believer nor disbeliever 
but rather in a state between the two (manzila bayn al-manzilatayn). After this, ʿAmr Ibn ʿUbayd 
(d. c.144/761) also left al-Ḥasan’s circles for Wāṣil, after which they together became the fore-
runners of the Muʿtazilite School in Basra.75   
 Ibn al-Nadīm wrote in his Fihrist, an extensive survey of Wāṣil’s works that would have 
been of great importance to the early theological discussion of the Muʿtazilites. However, much 
of these works are lost76 - other than a sermon which he gave in the presence of ʿAbd Allah Ibn 
ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 132/749–50) in Iraq.77 Nonetheless, accounts of Wāṣil’s theological 
discussions on divine attributes, divine determination and the status of a sinner are available; all 
of which were not fully developed.78 It is clear that Wāṣil engaged with people such as al-Ḥasan 
al-Baṣrī and the Jabrites who argue for divine determination in order to justify their short 
comings. He also quite possibly engaged with the Kharijites.79  
 We find a more elaborate, developed account by Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d.227/842), 
an indirect disciple of Wāṣil. Abū Hudhayl discusses and further develops the philosophical 
issues which are intertwined with divine determination. Abū al-Hudhayl argues that man acts on 
                                                          
75 For more on Wāṣil Ibn ʿAṭāʾsee, Dr. Fuʾād Sazkīn, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 18- 19; Ess, J. van. "Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ." 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van 
Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online; Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert 
Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1991–1997, vol. 2, 
(1992), pp. 234-80, 310-21, vol. 4 (1997), pp. 259-64, 780, vol. 5, (1993), pp. 136-64. 
76 Ess, J. van. "Wāṣil b. ʿAṭāʾ." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online. 
77 Dr. Fuʾād Sazkīn, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 18- 19.  
78 See al-Baghdādī, al-Firaq bayn al-Firaq, ed. Muḥammad Muḥī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba Dār al-
Turāth, Cairo, n.d., pp. 131-137; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milāl wa al-Niḥal, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad, Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 2007, vol. 1, pp. 40-43; S. Pines, Beitrage Zur Islamischen Atomenlehre, Paris, 
1936, pp. 126-128. 
79 See the opponents of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in his treatise on divine determination in Abdullah Sliti, op. cit. 
pp. 375-391.  
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the basis of two faculties, namely will (irāda) - both innate and acquired through reflection - and 
power (qudra); hence man is accountable.80 Nonetheless, man’s decision regarding whether or 
not to act depends on an external agent such as God - or sometimes Satan - who must create an 
impulse (khāṭir) in the mind (ʿaql).81 Therefore, as long as man has will, power and an impulse 
to act, then his acts are attributed to his own free will or else to God.82 Abū al-Hudhayl also 
argues that man has free will in this life but will be compelled in the hereafter, since there is no 
religious duty (taklīf).83  
 Abū al-Hudhayl also has a much more developed position than Wāṣil on divine 
attributes; he engages with problematic conflicts between divine essence and divine attributes. 
As such, Abū al-Hudhayl stresses that divine attributes are in fact God’s essence, in order to 
avoid plurality within God.84 A similar discussion is seen in his engagement with the conflict 
between intentions and voluntary acts85. Abū Hudhayl’s discussion on meta-ethics is quite 
minimal in that he advocates the concept of rational moral obligation.86 This was perhaps due to 
the fact that he developed upon the issues discussed by his teachers. Similarly, he engaged in 
theological debates with fellow Muʿtazilīs such as al-Naẓẓām, regarding God’s ability to do 
evil;87 the early Shiʿities, such as Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam, on the doctrine of the Imāmate;88 the 
Jabrites, such as Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān and Ḥafṣ al-Fard,89 on the doctrine of jabr (compulsionism); 
                                                          
80 Mourad, Suleiman A.. "Abū l-Hudhayl." Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed., Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun 
Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson, Brill Online. 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid. 
83  Dr. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn, Dār al-ʿilm lil-Malāyyīn, Beirut, 2008, p. 133. 
84 ibid., Mourad, Suleiman A. op. cit.  
85 Dr. Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, op. cit., p. 134. 
86 ibid., p. 134-5. 
87 Mourad, Suleiman A. op. cit. 
88 ibid. 
89 ʿAlī M. al-Gharābī, Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf: Awal Mutakillim Islāmī Taʾthara bi-l-Falsafa, Maṭbaʿa 
Ḥijāzī, 1949, p. 16-17; Mourad, Suleiman A. op. cit. 
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the Traditionalists, such as Ibn Kullāb, regarding anthropomorphism;90 and the numerous 
theological sects in Iraq.91  
 However, it is during the final phase of Muʿtazilism, during which al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-
Jabbār (d.415/1025) was the chief figure, where one finds more comprehensive developments of 
the Muʿtazilites’ positions on the philosophical issues related to divine determination, which 
include: human agency, capacity, causation, evil, divine justice, purposefulness of divine acts, 
and meta-ethics. This was perhaps a consequence of his efforts to develop the previous concepts 
dealt by his predecessors and also due to his critical engagement with the Ashʿarites, the 
Baghdādī Muʿtazilitīs, and the Muʿtazilīs of his own school - the Baṣrīs.92   
 
The Jabrites 
 
The Jabrites, who are also known as the Jahmites, followers of Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/746), 
are another theological school who engaged in philosophical debates concerning human agency 
and divine determination. In fact, on the issue of divine determination, they held an entirely 
opposite view to that of the Muʿtazilites, namely the doctrine of jabr  (compulsionism): that man 
is compelled to act and hence has no real agency.93   
                                                          
90 ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, Nashʾat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām, 2nd ed., Manshaʾat al-Maʿārif, al-
Iskandariyya, 1962, vol. 1, p. 145.  
91 For more on the developments of Abū al-Hudhayl’s theology, see: ʿAlī M. al-Gharābī, Abū al-Hudhayl 
al-ʿAllāf: Awal Mutakillim Islāmī Taʾthara bi-l-Falsafa, Maṭbaʿa Ḥijāzī, 1949; Dr. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, 
Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn, Dār al-ʿilm lil-Malāyyīn, Beirut, 2008, pp. 121- 197; Josef van Ess, ‘Abū al-
Hudhayl in Contact: The genesis of an anecdote’, in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in honor of 
George F. Hourani, ed. Michael E. Marmura, Albany, 1984, pp. 13-30; Richard M. Frank, The Metaphysics 
of Created Being according to Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Istanbul, 1966; idem, ‘The Divine Attributes 
according to the Teachings of Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf’, Le Museon, 82, 1969, pp. 415-506; idem, Beings 
and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical Period, Albany, 
1978; Sabine Schmidtke, Gegor Schwarb, and David Sklare (eds.), Handbook of Muʿtazilite Works and 
Manuscripts (Leiden, forthcoming).  
92 See the many issues discussed in his al-Mughnī.  
93 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, al-Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣaliyīn, ed. Hellmut Ritter, Franz 
Steiner, Wiesbanden, 1980, p.276. 
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 Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that the accounts of the Jahmites are given to us by 
their opponents who naturally sought to refute their views.94 Therefore, most of these accounts 
are polemical and indoctrinating. A list is given by Ibn Taymiyya of the theologians who wrote 
refutations on the Jahmites, the majority of whom were Traditionalists.95 For example, there is a 
letter attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās (68/687–8) 96 in which he refutes a group of Jahmites from the 
Levant and similarly another letter by Ḥasan Ibn ʿAlī97 which refutes a group of Jahmites from 
Basra. Both of these sources also indicate that the doctrine of jabr  (compulsionism) is as old as 
the doctrine of qadar.98 
 The Jahmites School is typically described as having four stages of development.99 
Firstly, the stage of Jaʿad Ibn Dirham (d. 124/742) who was supposed to have engaged with the 
Jews and the philosophers of Ḥarrān, as is claimed by his opponents.100 Jaʿad seemed to have 
been mainly concerned with philosophical problems regarding anthropomorphic attributes, 
which he denied.101 
  The second stage is evident in Jahm Ibn Safwān’s engagement with Jaʿad’s ideas and 
with the Sumaniyya philosophers.102 As such, Jahm further develops the positions of Jaʿad on 
divine attributes and expounds on further issues such as: the duration of heaven and hell, the 
denial of all the divine names, and attributes and acts - since Jahm made a clear distinction 
between God and ‘things’ because God’s being absolutely transcends the being of every 
                                                          
94 William M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Oneworld, London, 2009, p. 144. 
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101 Vajda, G., "Ibn Dirham", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, 
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online. 
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‘thing’.103 Similarly, Jahm also allegedly questioned the epistemic status of solitary reports and 
hence he rejected the various notions of eschatology found in scripture;104 such as, seeing God in 
the hereafter, the bridge over Hell, the scale that weighs man’s deeds and the pond (ḥawḍ) of the 
Prophet in the hereafter.105 Jahm also discussed issues related to concepts of belief and disbelief, 
the nature of God’s knowledge and the creation of the Quran.106 On the issue of human agency, 
Jahm was a Jabrite in that he emphasised that there is no real agency in reality except the agency 
of God alone, therefore man has no real choice to act just as he has no choice in determining his 
colour or height.107 On human agency, the Jabrites are divided: some deny man’s agency entirely 
because they distinguish between the transcendental God - the only true actor - and the worldly 
being, who can never be an agent in the full sense of the word.108 Jahm belonged to this strand of 
Jabrites. The others assert that man possesses some sort of power; however, this power is non-
causative, in the sense that it cannot cause the existence of an act.109 Those who believed in this 
came to be known as the upholders of divine determination (ahlu al-Ithbāt)110 which is ascribed 
to Ḍirār Ibn ʿAmr (d. 200/815), Bashīr Ibn al-Marrīsī (d. 218/833), and his student al-Najjār, who 
died at the end of the third century AH.   
 The third stage of the Jahmites School’s development is represented by Bashir al-Marrīsī, 
which exposed the school to detailed refutation by polemical opponents. Arguably a unique 
feature of this stage is al-Marrīsī’s sophisticated approach to divine attributes which entails al-
Marrīsī’s allegorical interpretation (taʾwīl), rather than the straightforward rejection of his 
predecessors, Jaʿad and Jahm. Al-Marrīsī also developed Jahm’s stance on human agency and 
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143; William Thomson, ‘Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam II’, in The Muslim World, vol. 40, Issue 
4, October 1950, p. 277. 
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maintains the belief of man’s temporal power, rather than denying any such power entirely - like 
is the case with Jahm.     
 The last stage is the spreading of Jahmite ideas into other theological schools such as the 
Muʿtazilites, Kullabites, Ashʿarites and Māturidites. It is these schools who engaged with and 
further expounded on Jahmite ideas in order to develop their own consistent positions.  
 Lastly, the fact that many of the Jahmites belonged to the Hanafī School of Law111 may 
explain why the Jahmites tended to be rational towards theological issues and hence gave 
precedence to reason over scripture.112   
 
The Shiʾites 
 
Inevitably, early Shiʿites were mainly preoccupied with political issues, namely political 
legitimacy, and less so with metaphysical issues such as divine determination, divine corporality 
and the nature of divine knowledge.113 The Kūfan Hishām Ibn Al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795) was 
probably the first to elaborate on the theological issues which later formed the foundation of the 
‘Twelver’ Shiʿite School.114 Hishām adopted the idea that human acts are created by God and at 
the same time man is responsible for such acts.115 He also adhered to the concept of God’s 
corporality (tajsīm) and considered God’s divine attributes to be anthropomorphic.116 It is 
interesting to note that most of Hishām’s positions on human acts and divine attributes were 
maintained amongst later Shiʿite ‘Twelvers’, after which they adopted positions very similar to 
                                                          
111 William M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, p. 145; Dr. Nāṣir ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿAql, op. 
cit., p. 46.  
112 Dr. Nāṣir ʿAbd al-Karīm al-ʿAql, op. cit., p. 16; William M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, p. 77. 
113 See the early Shiʿite theological discussions in: Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, Kitāb al-Intiṣār wa al-Rudd 
ʿalā Ibn al-Rawandī al-Mulḥid, ed. Dr. H. S. Nyberg, Maktaba al-Dār al-ʿArabiyya li-al-Kitāb, Cairo, 1925, 
pp. 41, 60, 117, 120, 141-142; cf. al-Ḥasan al-Nubakhtī, Kitāb Firaq al-Shīʿa, ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-
Ḥifinī, Dār al-Rashād, Cairo, 1992; al-Shahrastānī, op.cit., pp 187- 192.  
114 Madelung, W. "Hish̲̲ām b. al-Ḥakam", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, 
Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online. 
115 ibid; Tim Winter, The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, p. 41. 
116 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, op. cit., p. 41.  
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the later Muʿtazilites. In Hishām’s dialogue with the early Muʿtazilite, Abū Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, it 
is clear that Hishām supports the concept of al-badāʾa: that God comes to know of things after 
they have occurred.117 Hishām is also known to have engaged with scholars of various 
theological orientations in Kufa, such as the dualists, Abū Shākir al-Dayṣānī and the Ibāḍī 
scholar, ʿAbd Allah Ibn Yazīd.118  
 There is an alternative narrative of early Shiʿite discussion on divine determination, in 
which the sixth ‘Twelver’ Imām, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), is reported to have said: ‘It is 
neither determinism nor free will but something between the two’.119 Similarly, the fifth 
‘Twelver’ Imām, Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 116/733), and his successor were reported to have said 
that ‘God loves His creation so much that He will not force them to commit sin and then punish 
them; God is so powerful that whatever He commands comes to be’.120 Lastly, the sixth Imām 
Jaʿfar upheld that ‘God is so generous that he does not make it a duty for men to do what is not 
in their power. He is so powerful that nothing comes into being in His kingdom which he does 
not will’.121 These quotations demonstrate early allusions to a potential compatibilist position 
where neither divine justice nor human responsibility is compromised.    
 During the fourteenth century, we witness the further development of issues related to 
divine determination with the ‘Twelver’ Shiʿite theologian, Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 
726/1325), who predominantly engages and adopts the theological positions of Abū al-Ḥusayn 
al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044)122, whilst simultaneously uses al-Razī’s terminologies.123 It is evident that 
al-Ḥillī engaged with other theological schools which allowed him to construct a coherent 
‘Twelver’ Shiʿite theology, seen in his works of theology.124 Similarly, it is worth noting that al-
Ḥillī’s contemporary, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 727/1326), who is an important reviver of the 
                                                          
117 Ibid., p. 60, 108-110; al-Sharastānī, op. cit., p. 187-190. 
118 Madelung, W., ibid.  
119 al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Tehrān, 1376AH, vol. 3, pp. 5, 6, 15. 
120 ibid. 
121 ibid. 
122 Sabrine Schmidtke, ‘al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī and Shiʿite Muʿtazilite Theology’ in Shiʿism: Critical Concepts in 
Islamic Studies, eds. Paul Lutf, and Colin Turner, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 27.    
123 ibid. 
124 Sabrine Schmidtke, The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), Schwarz, Berlin, 1991.  
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Traditionalist theological positions, also declares that Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī promoted the 
Sunnī opinion (qawl ahl al-Sunna) on the issue of divine determination and human agency.125 
The Kharijites 
 
The Kharijites was an early movement that formed as a direct consequence of the assassination 
of ʿUthmān Ibn ʿAffān (d.35/655), the third caliph, which also resulted in the battle of Ṣiffīn 
(37/657) between the partisan of ʿAlī (d. 40/661) and the partisan of Muʿāwiyya (d. 60/680).126 
The Kharijites quite possibly debated issues relating to divine determination, such as human 
agency and responsibility. Evidence for this lies in the Kharijites’ emphasis on man’s 
responsibility; they were the first to revolt against injustice perpetrated by rulers.127 According to 
the Kharijites, authority was given to the Quran in all spheres of life as it represents God’s will 
on earth and as a result man’s political authority was undermined.128 Similarly, sins were deemed 
an act of disbelief and as such they excommunicated the sinners129 - including those amongst the 
rulers - in order to justify their revolution and the killing of those who disagreed with their 
theology.130  
 Although not much is stated explicitly on the Kharijites’ theological doctrines on free 
will and divine determination, one may assume that they were advocators of free will and human 
responsibility given their active participation against injustice.131 However, one problem with 
this claim is that the Azāriqa or Azraqites, led by Nāfiʿ Ibn al-Azraq (d. 65/685),132 are a direct 
                                                          
125 See Daniel Gimaret, ‘Théories de l'acte humain dans l'école hanbalite’, in Bulletin d'études orientales, 
vol. 28, 1977, pp. 165–78; Fritz Meier, ‘Das sauberste über die vorbestimmung: Ein stück Ibn Taymiyya’, 
in Saeculum, vol. 32, 1981, pp. 74-89. However, Ibn al-Qayyim has further developments on the issue at 
hand with Ibn Taymiyya as we shall see in the next chapter. 
126 Levi Della Vida, G., "K̲h̲ārid̲ji̲tes", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online. 
127 William M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, p. 9- 14. 
128 ibid., p. 14- 15. 
129 ibid., p.15. 
130 Levi Della Vida, G. ibid. 
131 ibid. 
132 William M. Watt, op. cit., p.20.  
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off-shoot of the Kharijites,133 and they hold a compulsionist view134, similar to the Jabrites. 
Nonetheless, the debates related to divine determination during this period were still very 
primitive in that philosophical issues related to meta-ethics and theodicy were perhaps out of the 
question.  
The Murjiʾites 
The Murjiʾites (upholders of irjāʾ (to give hope or to defer)) formed as a direct opposition to the 
Khārijʾite position on grave sinners as apostates. In fact, al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad al-
Ḥanafiyya,135 the author of kitāb al-irjāʾ136, was one of the first Murjiʾites to propagate the 
doctrine of irjāʾ, which is: that acts are not a principle part of faith (imān) in that if the act is 
removed then so too is faith.137 For this reason, one cannot excommunicate Muslims based on 
their actions – which is contrary to the Khārijʾites - since faith is only belief, or confession of 
belief, which excludes acts.138 Some scholars have argued that the doctrine of irjāʾ was 
developed in order to protect the Umayyads139, while others argue that it was intended to protect 
the Muslims from the violent extremism of the Kharijites, in particular the Azraqites.140 In this 
                                                          
133 Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣal fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwāʾ wa al-Niḥal, Maktaba al-Khānijī, Cairo, 
n.d., vol. 2, p.89; ibid., vol. 4, p. 60.  
134 ibid., vol. 3, p. 14.  
135 The date of his death is unknown, but it must have been either during the caliphate of ʿAbd al-Malik 
(i.e. before 86/705), in 95/714 or during the caliphate of ʿUmar II (99-101/717-20) at the latest. See, van 
Ess, J. "al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online.  
136 Michael Cook doubts the authenticity of this book; see, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source-Critical Study, 
Cambridge, 1981, pp. 68 ff. Nonetheless, al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥanafiyya, also wrote an extensive 
refutation on the Qadarites, parts of which can be found in a later refutation written by the Zaydī imām 
al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq (see, Dr. Muḥammad ʿAmāra, Rasāʾil al-ʿAdl wa al-Tawḥīd, 2nd ed., Dār al-Shurūq, 
Cairo, 1971, pp. 245-98/859-911). 
137 Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 117. 
138 Madelung, W. "Murd̲ji̲ʾa", Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online. 
139 Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trs. Andras and Ruth Hamori, Princeton 
University Press (1981), p. 74.  
140 Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 120. 
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sense, many of the early Traditionalists141 were influenced by irjāʾ teachings, since they 
fundamentally opposed any armed revolt or killings of Muslims. These early Traditionalists 
include Abū Ḥanīfa (d.150/767), the leading representative of irjāʾ doctrine in Iraq at the time142 
and perhaps the first to philosophise this doctrine from amongst the Traditionalists.143 Abū 
Ḥanīfa’s teachings later formed the basis of all subsequent Ḥanafī Murjiʾite theology, including 
Māturīdism or Mātūridites.144  
The Māturīdites 
 
On the nature of faith (imān) the Māturīdites are another school which has Murjiʿite tendencies 
in that they limit faith to belief - excluding verbal and physical acts. On the concept of divine 
determination, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) who was the founder of the Māturīdites 
School and a contemporary of Imām al-Ashʿarī, seems to advocate that human acts are created 
by God in one respect (jiha), and in another respect from man’s free choice (Ikhtiyār).145 
Furthermore, obedience to God’s commandments is the initial choice of man according to the 
Māturīdites. This betrays another potential compatibilist stance on divine determination.   
 Al-Māturīdī was keen to expand upon the theological doctrines of Abū Hanīfa as 
transmitted by the Ḥanafī scholars of Balkh and Transoxania. He was renowned as being pro-
                                                          
141 Traditionalism, or Ahlu al-Sunna (the People of Prophetic Traditions), is a title that is claimed by the 
Māturīdites, Ashʿarites, and the typical Tradi7onists who were predominately scholars of ḥadīth; such as 
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Bukhārī, Ibn Khuzaima, etc. Nonetheless, as Ibrahīm Madkūr and Muḥammad 
ʿAmāra both state, the title Ahlu al-Sunna accurately describes the Traditionists in the sense that they 
strictly adhere to scripture- Quran and Sunna- and preferred transmitted traditions over deductive 
inferences and scripture over reason. See Dr. Ibrahīm Madkūr, Fī al-Falsafa al-Islamiyya: Manhaj wa 
Taṭbīqahu, Dār al-Maʿārif, Cairo, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 30- 35; Dr. Muḥammad ʿAmāra, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 93.   
142 Madelung, W., ibid.  
143 Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, ibid., p. 119. Ibrāhīm Madkūr states that it was Ibn Kullāb who was the first 
Traditionalist theologian who philosophised the Traditionalist theology- since, he engaged with both 
Abu al-Hudhayl and ʿAbbād Ibn Sulaymān (c. 250/864) from amongst the Muʿtazilites and developed 
doctrines which differentiated between divine essence and attributes, and also denied the attributes of 
divine acts- so as to avoid temporality in the nature of God. See al-Nashshār, ibid., pp. 142-157; and 
Ibrāhīm Madkūr, ibid., p. 32. 
144 Madelung, W., ibid. 
145 Madelung, W.,” al-Māturīdī”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online. 
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actively engaged in theological debates with the Muʿtazilites, Abū al-Qāsim al-Balhkī al-Kaʿbī 
and Abū ʿUmar al-Bāhilī, the Sunnī traditionalists and the Shiʿites, both Imāmites and 
Ismaʿilites.  That is not to say that he did not engage with other religions. On the contrary, he 
rebutted the views of Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Manichaeans, Bardesanites and 
Marcionites.146 As a result, al-Māturīdī and later Mātūridite scholars, such as Abū al-Muʿīn al-
Nasafī (d.507/1114), managed to develop concepts and doctrines into a coherent school of 
theology - unlike the early Ḥanafites who came before al-Māturīdī.147 Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that succeeding Ashʿarite and Māturidite scholars state that there are only twenty two 
theological differences between the two schools.148 
 
The Ashʿarites 
 
In contrast to al-Māturīdī, Imām Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935), the founder of the 
Ashʿarite School, sought to develop the doctrines of Ḥanbalī traditionalism149 so that they could 
                                                          
146 ibid; also see G. Vajda, ‘Le témoignage d'al-Māturīdī sur la doctrine des Manichéens, des Daysanites 
et des Marcionites’, in Arabica, vol. 12,(1966), pp. 1-38, 113-28. 
147 Compare the debated theological works of Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān, (al-ʿĀlim waʾl-Mutaʿallim, Fiḳh al-
Absaṭ, Fiḳh al-Akbar I, Fiḳh al-Akbar II and the Waṣiyyat Abī Ḥanīfa) and creed of al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933) 
with Taʾwilāt al-Qurān, Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, al-ʿAqid and Kitāb Tabṣirat al-Adilla. For further reading see, Dr. 
ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Maghrabī, Imām Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa: Abū Munṣūr al-Māturīdī wa Arāʾahu al-
Kalāmiyya, Maktaba Wahba li-Nashr, Cairo, 1985; Schacht, J., ‘Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān’, Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, 
Brill Online; Yanagihashi, Hiroyuki, ‘Abū Ḥanīfa’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, Edited by: Kate Fleet, 
Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson, Brill Online. 
148 ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Shaykh Zādah, Naẓm al-Farāʾid wa Jamʿ al-Fawāʾid fī Bayān al-Masāʾil allatī waqaʿ ﬁhā 
al-Ikhtilāf bayn al-Māturīdiyya wa al-Ashʿariyya fī al-ʿAqāʾid, al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya, Eygpt, 1317AH.   
149 Although al-Ashʿarī was also deeply influenced by Ibn Kullāb (d. 241/855); see, al-Nashshār, op. cit., 
vol. 1, p. 137. Ibn Kullāb was later to be known as the leader of the Kullābite School with students as 
such, Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Qalānisī (c. 255/ 869) and al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857). Ibn Taymiyya talks 
about two trends in the Kullābite School, the Kullābites of Iraq and the Kullābites of Khurasan, the 
former being closer to Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and the Traditionalist (Ahlu Sunna) than the latter (see, Ibn 
Taymiyya, Darʾ Taʿāraḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, ed. Dr. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām 
Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 268- 270). According to al-Nashshār, the 
later Kullābites were completely merged into the Ashʿarī School with the coming of Abū al-Ḥasan al-
Ashʿarī. (see, Dr.ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, Nashʿat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islāmī, Dār al-Salām, Cairo, 2008, vol. 
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exist in harmony with both reason and scripture. As a result, numerous theological doctrines 
were developed, such as: the doctrine of acquisition,150 responsibility, divine command theory,151 
the divine volition theory152 and other theories regarding evil153 - all of which are involved with 
divine determination. There are five distinct stages154 of the Ashʿarite School which all promoted 
the development of theological issues by subsequent Ashʿarite theologians.  
 The first stage is embodied by the Baghdādī theologian, Imām Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, 
who succeeded in bringing harmony and synthesis to the two opposing positions of his time, 
namely the anthropomorphism of Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān (d. 150/767) and the denial of divine 
attributes by Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān.155 As a result, al-Ashʿarī took a middle ground stance between 
the rejection and affirmation of divine attributes.156 Imām al-Ashʿarī also adopted a version of 
scripture and reason with regard to the epistemology of theology, making him different to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1, pp. 293-294; also see, Hādī bint Nāṣir al-Shalālī, Ārāʾ al-Kullābiyya al-ʿAqāʾidiyya wa Atharahā fī al-
Ashʿariyya fī Ḍawʾ ʿAqīda Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, Maktaba Rushd, Riyadh, 2000, p. 50.) Many 
Ashʿarite theologians claimed Ibn Kullāb to be amongst their founding fathers and hence referred to him 
as: ‘from our school’ (min aṣḥābinā), ‘our teacher’ (shaykhanā), ‘the teacher of the Traditionalists 
(shaykh Ahul Sunna), see, Tāj al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-Kubrā, eds. Dr. 
Maḥmūd al-Tannāḥī and Dr. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Ḥalū, Hijr li-Ṭibāʿa wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzīʿ, 1413AH, vol. 
1, p. 95; ibid., vol. 2, p. 300. While on the other hand, Ibn Nadīm hints that Ibn Kullāb held some 
Christian beliefs; see, Ibn Nadīm, op. cit., p. 224.  
150 Binyamin Abrahamov, ‘A re-examination of al-Ashʿarī's theory of kasb according to Kitāb al-lumaʿ’, 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 121, issue. 2, 1989, pp. 210–221; Michael Schwarz, “Acquisition” 
(kasb) in early kalām, in Islamic philosophy and the classical tradition eds. S. M. Stern, Albert Hourani 
and Vivian Brown, Oxford, 1972, pp. 355–387. 
151 George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.57-
66.  
152 G. Legenhausen, ‘Notes Towards an Ashʿarite Theodicy’, Religious Studies, vol. 24, Issue 02, June 
1988, pp. 257-266. 
153 ibid. 
154 Ibn Khuldūn mentions four, namely Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī; see Ibn Khuldūn, 
al-Muqqadima- Diwān al-Mubtadāʾ wa al-Khabar fī Tārīkh al-ʿArab wa al-Barbar..., ed. Khalīl Shiḥadah, 
Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 589- 591. Also see, Ayman Shihadeh, ‘From al-Ghazali to al-Razi: 
6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim Philosophical Theology’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 
15, Issue 01, March 2005, pp. 141-179. 
155 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, Nashʾat al-Ashʿariyya wa taṭawwuruhā, Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 
1982, p. 459. 
156 Ibn Khuldūn,ibid., p. 589; Dr. ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Ṣaghīr, ‘Wajūb al-Naẓr ʿinda al-Imām al-Ashʿarī wa rafʿ 
al-Shakūk ʿan Risālatahu fī istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fī ʿilm al-Kalām’, in al-Ibāna, Issues 1, June 2013, pp. 72-73. 
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majority of Traditionalist theologians before him who only employed scripture when developing 
their theology.157 
 Al-Ashʿarī was also famous for his doctrine of acquisition (kasb) which argues that man 
acquires his act, while God creates them. This doctrine had been clearly outlined before al-
Ashʿarī, by Dirār (d. 728-815).158 Al-Ashʿarī was also famous for his in depth knowledge of the 
Muʿtazilite doctrines, gained from being a direct student of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī. As such, al-
Ashʿarī played a vital role in transmitting early Muʿtazilite doctrines. Perhaps due to al-Ashʿarī 
capacity to engage critically with various theological schools, he managed to develop his own 
coherent school, which then became the chief Sunnī theological school in terms of its vast 
following and scholarship. This was perhaps made possible by the political support the 
Ashʿarites received from the Saljūqites, Ayūbites and Mohidites dynasties.159   
 Much of al-Ashʿarī’s early theological developments related to divine determination can 
be found in his works: Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn160, Risāla Istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fī ʿilm al-Kalām161, 
Kitāb al-Lumaʿ162, Risālat al-Imān163 and Kitāb al-Ibāna.164 
 The figurehead of the second stage was the Baghdādī theologian Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī 
who is considered as the first to implement a rational systematic methodology in Ashʿarī rational 
theology.165 Al-Bāqillānī is said to have endowed reason with more importance in theological 
issues than his predecessor, perhaps due to his critical engagement, dialogue and debate with 
                                                          
157 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 460.  
158 William M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, pp. 189, 191- 193; Hans Daiber, Islamic 
Thought in the Dialogue of Cultures: A Historical and Bibliographical Survey, Brill, 2012, p. 28.  
159 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 462.  
160 See R., Strothmann, ‘Islamische Konfessionskunde und das Sektenbuch des Aś’arī’, Der Islam, Volume 
19, Issue 4, Jan 1930, pp. 193- 242. 
161 See R. J. McCarthy, The Theology of al-Ashʿarī, Imprimerie Catholique, Beyrouth, 1953, pp. 117-134. 
162 ibid. 
163 See, A. J. Arberry, ‘al-ʾAshʿarī’s Tract on Faith’, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
vol. 19, issues. 3, 1957, pp. 160-163. 
164 See, W. C. Klein, The Elucidation of Islam’s Foundation, American Oriental Series, Kraus Reprint 
Corporation, vol. 19, 1940; R. J. McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 231-254. 
165 Ibn Khuldūn,ibid., p. 589- 590. 
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opponents in their own cities.166 As a result, more rational refutations were produced against the 
Ashʿarites’ opponents.  
 During this stage, the school became more coherent and refined, moving away from past 
ambiguities. There were also further developments and divergences away from al-Bāqilānī’s 
predecessors, evidenced by his stance on a causative temporal power and his adoption of Abū 
Hāshim’s statuses (al-Aḥwāl).167    
 The third stage is represented by the Naysabūrī theologian, Imām al-Juwaynī, who made 
excessive allegorical interpretations (tāʾwīl) and possessed thorough philosophical ideas.168 He 
was deeply influenced by both Greek and Muʿtazilite philosophies - especially Aristotelian 
logic169 - and as such he employed logical and philosophical proofs to further support Ashʿarite 
doctrine.170 Al-Jawaynī was competent in philosophical dialogue; perhaps a consequence of 
extensive experience debating with his opponents.171 He was said to have always rigorously 
defined his terminologies and concepts before embarking upon a dialogue on a certain issue.172 
As a result, al-Jawaynī contributed to the clarification of the Ashʿarite doctrines.   
 The fourth stage of Ashʿarite development occurred as a result of al-Ghazālī’s divergence 
to an anti-philosophical trend of theology173, which gave rise to his pragmatic introduction of 
Aristotelian logic as a methodological tool in rational theology.174 Some also argue that al-
Ghazālī later diverged to a theological epistemology more closely associated with Sufism, 
whereby he replaces sense and reason faculties with taste (dhawq) and discovery (kashf).175 
Nonetheless, perhaps the most important development of the Ashʿarite School was al-Ghazālī’s 
                                                          
166 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 363.  
167 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 363; cf. Jūdī al-Natasha, al-Imām Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī wa 
Ārāʾuhu al-ʿItiqādiyya fī Ḍawʾ ʿAqīda al-Salaf, Umm al-Qurā University, Mekka, 1989. 
168 Dr. Abd al-Majīd al-Ṣaghīr, op. cit., p. 113; Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 409. 
169 ibid., p. 410 
170 ibid., p. 409; Ibn Khuldūn, op. cit., p. 589- 591. 
171 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 409- 410. 
172 ibid., p. 410. 
173 Ibn Khuldūn, op. cit., p. 589- 591; Ayman Shihadeh, op. cit., p. 156-7; Dr. Hasan Qarīb Allah, Dawr al-
Ghazālī fī al-Fikr, Maṭbaʿa al-Amāna, Miṣr, 1978, p. 85. 
174 Ayman Shihadeh, op. cit., p. 144, 148; Dr. Hasan Qarīb Allah, op. cit., p. 89. 
175 Dr. Jalāl Muḥammad Musā, op. cit., p. 457. 
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influential teachings which contributed to the vast spread of Ashʿarite doctrine throughout the 
Muslim world.176  
 The final stage of Ashʿarite development is witnessed through al-Rāzī’s great synthesis of 
rational theology and philosophy, only to give rise to an Islamic philosophy which Orthodox 
theologians can relate to.177 This approach parted from the Ghazālian anti-philosophy trend in 
terms of argumentation and nature. That is, unlike the Ghazālian trend, al-Rāzī’s positivist 
philosophical theology employed demonstrative arguments rather than typically negativist 
Ashʿarite ad homenem methods of argumentation.178 As a result, al-Rāzī moves from apologetic 
objectives to philosophical inquiry as is distinct in his later works.179 This new development is to 
have a major influence on later Ashʿarite theologians as is noted by Ibn Khuldūn.180  
 
 
The Traditionalists 
 
With the early Traditionalists, we witness the beginning of theological positions concerning 
divine determination which are in accordance to scripture. Similarly, we find that the early 
Traditionalists were also engaging with other schools in order to refute positions which they 
deemed unorthodox. Hence, their theological engagement was more or less of a negativist, 
apologetic nature. Moreover, many of the early Traditionalists were strict upholders of divine 
determination181 with only primitive discussions on the nature of human agency and 
                                                          
176 ibid., p. 456.  
177Ayman Shihadeh, op. cit., p. 156, 162, 172, 178. 
178 ibid., p. 164. 
179 ibid., p. 170.  
180 Ibn Khuldūn, op. cit., p. 589- 591; It is evdent that al-Rāzī was well engaged with philosophical and 
theological doctrines of a wide range of schools- as is seen in his book Muḥaṣṣal Afkhār al-
Mutaqaddimīn wa al-Mutaʾakhkhirīn min al-‘ulamaʾ  wa al-ḥukamāʾ wa al-mutakallimīn (Compendium 
of the Thoughts of Ancient and Later Scholars, Philosophers and Mutakallimīn).   
181 This is inevitable due to the Traditionalists’ epistemic methodology which gives precedence to 
scripture over reason. As such, a Traditionalist is obliged to adopt the doctrine of divine determination 
of human acts, as if found in many Prophetic traditions, regardless of the philosophical problematic 
complexities inherent in such doctrine.    
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responsibility. Many of the early Traditionalists authored treatises refuting the views of 
Qadarites - some of which date back to the first century of Islam. Al-Baghdādī provides a list of 
the authors,182 which includes: Abū Aswad al-Duʾlaʾī (d. 69/688), Yaḥyā Ibn Yaʿmar (d. 
89/707), al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammed al-Ḥanafiyya,183 ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz (d.101/720), al-
Shaʿbī (d. 103/721). 
 Unfortunately, only some of these early treatises still exist. One of these is a treatise 
attributed to the caliph ʿUmar Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, found in Ḥilyat al-Awliyāʾ by Abī Nuʿaym.184 
The Ijāza (licence) of al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī on the narration of this treatise confirms its 
authenticity.185 This treatise provides valuable insights into the early Traditionalists’ stance on 
issues relating to divine determination.    
Furthermore proof resides in the works of al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammed al-Ḥanafiyya, the 
grandson of ʿAlī Ibn Abī Ṭālib, as we mentioned earlier, such as Kitāb al-Irjā’, and his extensive 
refutations against the Qadarites. Ibn Baṭṭa (d. 387/917) also states that al-Ḥasan 
excommunicates both the Qadarites and Kharijites due to their heretical theological positions.186  
 At a later date, during the Abbasid period, the Traditionalists also wrote extensive 
apologetic refutations against the Jahmites. In these works, it remains clear that issues related to 
divine determination were neither well defined nor philosophically developed. Rather, a specific 
issue would be argued either for or against, using scripture as the sole epistemic reference of 
argument. For examples of this one can look at Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal’s (d. 241/855) al-Radd alā al-
Jahmiyya wa al-Zanādiqa and Kitāb al-Sunna and Abū Saʿīd al-Dāramī’s (d.282/894) Naqd alā 
al-Marrisī al-Jahmī and Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-Jahmiyya. Also, Ibn al-Khuzayma’s (d. 311/924) 
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa Ithbāt Ṣifāt al-Rabb, and Makḥūl al-Nasafī’s (d. 318/930) al-Radd  alā ahlu 
al-Bidaʿ wa al-ahwāʾ. In these works, many issues are left unmentioned, such as the causative 
                                                          
182 ʿAbd al-Qahhār al-Baghdādī,Kitāb Uṣūl al-Dīn, Maṭbaʿa al-Dawla, Istanbul, 1928, pp. 316, 307- 308. 
183 This is the same al-Ḥasan Ibn Muḥammed al-Ḥanafiyya discussed in the Murjiʾite sec7on. 
184 Abū Nuʿaym al-Aṣfahānī, op. cit., vol. 5, pp. 346-353. 
185 Nonetheless, Michael Cook argues for the unauthentication of this treatise being attributes to ʿUmar 
Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, See M. Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source-Critical Study, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 124 ff. 
186 (see, al-Ibāna, n.d. p.32) this might be an attempt, by the Traditionalist, to claim al-Ḥasan Ibn 
Muḥammad as a puritan Traditionalist since this alleged excommunication opposes Murjiʾite theological 
tendencies such as faith being only belief, or confession of belief, both of which the Qadarites and 
Kharijites fulfil.   
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capacity of human agency, responsibility, rational morality, divine justice and evil. Perhaps the 
authors of these works had not yet been exposed to such debates.  
 Nonetheless, Abū Muḥammad Ibn Qutayba al-Daynūrī (d. 276/889) was perhaps the 
most shrewd and engaging of Traditionalists during this period. His work, al-Ikhtilāf fī al-llafẓ, is 
an example of an engaging Traditionalist text which demonstrates a reflective understanding of 
the reasons behind theological differences being largely due to the lack of fully defining 
terminologies.187 Ibn Qutayba potentially owes this insight to his linguistic background.188 
Likewise, Ibn Qutayba seems to have developed theological rules concerning the positions of the 
Salaf, such as: they believe in divine attributes without giving them modality (kayfiyya), limit 
(ḥad), and analogy (qiyās).189 Interestingly, Ibn Qutayba is critical of a Traditionalist trend, 
positioning himself as different in that Traditionalists do not theologically engage with issues 
unmentioned by the Salaf - as this is tantamount to heresy, according to them.190 As a result, this 
type of trend is very limited in terms of theological development. Similarly, Ibn Qutayba 
mentions some Traditionalists who went so far as to claim that faith (imān) is uncreated, did so 
in fear that they would be imposed to hold that the testimony of faith (lā ilah ill allah) is 
created.191 In addition, Ibn Qutayba seems to distinguish himself from an early taqlīd (uncritical 
religious imitation) tendency, which he criticises as having multiple narrations on the ‘Creation 
of the Quran Debate’, each attributed to Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, a contemporary Traditionalist, and 
each group claims its own narrations.192 In these circumstances, Ibn Qutayba argues that such 
narrations hold no epistemological weight in theological debates.193  
 Nonetheless, there are still many important issues related to divine determination that are 
not discussed in Ibn Qutayba’s works, such as: the nature of human agency vis-à-vis 
                                                          
187 Ibn Qutayba, al-Ikhtilāf fī al-llafẓ, Dār al-Rrāya, Riyadh, 1991, pp. 66-68. 
188 Ibn Qutayba was a profound linguist of this period. See, Lecomte, G., "Ibn Ḳutayba", Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, 
Brill Online. 
189 Ibn Qutayba, op. cit., p. 53. 
190 ibid., p. 58. 
191 ibid., p. 65.  
192 ibid., p. 58-59. 
193 ibid., p. 59. 
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responsibility and the multiple category of both divine will194 and evil195 with reference to divine 
determination.      
 Perhaps the two most remarkably distinct figures of the Traditionalist School in terms of 
critical engagement and theological development are Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple Ibn al-
Qayyim.196 In the works of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, it is evident that they engaged 
with rational theology and with the various schools of such discipline. Moreover, they also went 
further by engaging with philosophy - something unprecedented in the Traditionalist works prior 
and post the Taymiyyan era. The modern day Traditionalist School is much indebted to the 
works of these two Damascene scholars - perhaps due to the many relevant issues discussed and 
developed in their works, making them two of the most important figures after Aḥmad Ibn 
Ḥanbal.  
 Their critical engagement with philosophical theology was perhaps prompted by a need 
to reform Traditionalist doctrines on contemporary debates, so as to provide the masses with a 
more orthodox substitute197 - instead of the state supported doctrines of the Ashʿarite School. 
Thus, this may be seen as a ‘Traditionalisation’ of kalām and falsafa.      
 For example, Ibn Taymiyya states that God’s attributes are species and genera (ajnās wa 
anwāʿ), that is, they are the most general universals. This statement is perhaps a development of 
                                                          
194 Such as the universal will and the legislative will, as we shall see in chapter six. 
195 Such as evil of privation and relative evil as we shall, see in chapter seven. 
196 If we accept Ibrāhīm Madkūr’s opinion of Ibn Ḥazm belonging to the same Traditionalist trend as Ibn 
Taymiyya, then Ibn Ḥazm should also be mentioned amongst the list of important Traditionalists who 
partook in critical engagement and theological development. See, Ibrāhīm Madkūr, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 
32-33.   
197 Since the common theological trend of their time was Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s legacy of philosophical 
theology. Hence, al-Rāzī was perhaps one of the main figures that both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim 
engaged with. For al-Rāzī’s philosophical theology legacy, see Ayman Shihadeh, op. cit. For Ibn 
Taymiyya’s engagement with Rāzian ideas, see, Yasir Kazi, Reconciling reason and revelation in the 
writings of ibn taymiyya (d. 728/1328): An analytical study of ibn taymiyya's dar' al-ta'arud, Yale 
University, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2013. For Ibn al-Qayyim’s engagement with Rāzian text, 
see, Livnat Holtzman, ‘Debating the Doctrine of Jabr (Compulsion): Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya Reads Fakhr 
al-Din al-Razi’, in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim Al-
Jawziyya, eds. Birgit Krawietz, Georges Tamer, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2013, pp. 61- 93.    
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the Muʿtazilī Abū Ḥashim al-Jubbāʾī’s (d. 321/933) middle ground198 theory of attributes being 
states (aḥwāl). This theory was then developed to mean that states are universals that exist only 
in the mind and do not have any objective reality.199 Hence, Abū Hāshim’s statement that states 
are neither existence nor non-existence is understood to mean that states do not exist in the 
objective world but do exist in one’s mind.200 It is from this notion that Ibn Taymiyya’s theory of 
attributes as species and genera can be appreciated as a further development not only towards 
determining the nature of divine attributes, but also towards understanding an ontological 
purpose of why God creates. For this reason, attributes which are denoted as species and genera 
have, by necessity, particulars which are the existence, which God had created.201     
   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have challenged the contemporary conception that Traditionalist theology is 
derived entirely from scripture, as is interpreted by the monolithic understanding of the Salaf. 
This was made evident by the illustration of early theological differences between individuals 
within the Salaf, the first three generations, whom engaged with one another on theological 
concepts, which prompted long term developments by theologians of different schools. As such, 
these theological developments were, more or less, based on critical engagement and not entirely 
                                                          
198 Between the early Muʿtazilites who hold that only names (asmāʾ) indicate the essence of God, not 
attributes (ṣifāt), so as to avoid the problem of multiplicity in the nature of God. And the early 
Ashʿarites, on the other hand, who hold that names only indicate the alributes of meanings (ṣifāt al-
maʿānī) and not the essence. For example, the name al-ʿĀlim (the Omniscience) indicates the attribute 
of knowledge which resides in the essence of God and does not indicate the essence directly. See, ʿAbdel 
Hakim, Ajhar, ‘The Forgotten Rational Thinking in Ḥanbalite Thought with Special Reference to Ibn 
Taymiyya’, in Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, vol.14, 2004, p. 144.  
199
 See al-Shahranstānī, op. cit., p. 63; Ajhar, op. cit., p. 145. 
200
 Ajhar, ibid. 
201
 Ajhar, ibid. For more on Ibn Taymiyya’s theological developments which were the result of his critical 
engagements, see his theory of eternal creation of substances not ex nihilo and causality as reflecting 
the agency of God, in Abdel Hakim Ajhar, op. cit., pp. 146-152; idem., The Metaphysics of the Idea of God 
in Ibn Taymiyya’s Thought, PhD Thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 2000, pp. 46-61, 201-216, 185-201.  
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on scripture or a utopian monolithic first three generations of Islam. In the remaining chapters, 
we evaluate how Ibn al-Qayyim critically engages with various theologians and philosophers on 
topics related to divine determination and thereby investigate his original theological notions 
which remain relevant in the theology adhered to in the contemporary Traditionalist School.       
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3- FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: IBN AL-QAYYIM’S COMPATIBILISM 
OF DUAL AGENCY 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with both the Muʿtazilites and 
Ashʿarites on an important aspect of divine determination: the nature of divine and human 
agency in respect to action. Similarly, I will illustrate how Ibn al-Qayyim shows a profound 
understanding of the differences inherent within each school. As a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
critical engagement, I will argue that he develops a compatibilist position of dual agency - where 
both human responsibility and God’s omnipotence exist without compromise. Additionally, I 
will elucidate some of Ibn al-Qayyim’s original developments on the debate of human agency 
and evaluate how he succeeds in harmonising found difficulties by synthesising the opposing 
positions of the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites.   
 
Defining the Debate 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Ma’bad al-Juhani is commonly identified as having been the 
first to initiate this debate in Basra, due to the widespread practise of iḥtijāj bi-al-qadar – using 
divine determination to justify one’s sins. The debate is then subsequently developed in the 
works of the theologians and can be found under various titles such as: qadar, khalq afʿāl al-
ʿibād (creation of man’s acts), or taʾthīr al-qudra al-muḥdatha (causation of the temporal 
power). Moreover, the questions that are typically dealt with include: does man have free will or 
are his acts determined? Or, from a different angle: are man’s acts created or does he 
independently bring about his own acts? Does man have a causative ability? And importantly, is 
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man a responsible agent and how can such responsibility be justified if his acts are determined by 
God?  
 The schools involved in this debate generally agree that man is a responsible agent; 
however, they do differ as to how such responsibility is justified.  It must be noted that each 
school also differs internally vis-à-vis different issues within this debate, as we shall see shortly.  
 In summary of the positions in this debate, the majority of the Muʿtazilites hold that man 
is the sole originator of his own acts, which are the result of his own power and will. Thus, man 
is a responsible agent. However, some of the Muʿtazilites disagree that man is the creator of his 
own acts.   
 The majority of the Ashʿarites hold that man’s originated power has no causative ability; 
rather an act is solely the cause of God’s pre-eternal power. Additionally, some Ashʿarites 
believe that while man is incapable of causing an act, he is capable of defining the ethical nature 
of an act, that is, whether it is an act of obedience or disobedience. On the other hand, some 
Ashʿarites maintain that man does have the ability to cause an act but only with the aid of God. 
Lastly, some Ashʿarites went further, upholding that man does have the ability to cause an act 
without divine aid.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim adopted the position of dual agency of one act, which means that an act is 
the result of both God’s pre-eternal power and man’s originated power. This entails that man’s 
originated power has a causative ability but only partially causative in order to leave room for 
God’s omnipotence.  
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites 
On the debate of human agency, Ibn al-Qayyim claims that the Muʿtazilite School unanimously 
agree that man is the sole agent of his actions - which are the result of his own power and will.1 
                                                          
1 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl (Abbreviation: 
Shifāʾ), eds. Dr. Aḥmad al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 2, pp. 459- 460, 
637; al-Qāḍi ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fi ʾabwāb al-Tawhīd wa al-ʿadal (Abbreviation: al-Mughnī), eds. 
Dr. Tawfīq al-Ṭawīl and Dr. Saʿīd Zāyid, Maṭbaʿa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 1960- 1968., vol. 8, pp. 3, 177.  
75 
 
 
However, Ibn al-Qayyim states that the Muʿtazilites do differ on whether God is described as the 
inventor (mukhtariʿ), originator (muḥdith) or creator (khāliq) of man’s actions and whether God 
has capacity over (qādir ʿalayhā) such actions.2 Ibn al-Qayyim states that the majority of the 
Muʿtazilites deny the above whereas those who are closest to the Sunna (Prophetic traditions) 
affirm it.3 Nonetheless, upon analysis one does realise that the issues Ibn al-Qayyim bands 
together are where the differences occur within the Muʿtazilite School. I found that such a 
simplistic generalised depiction as ‘the majority who deny and the minority who affirm’ is not 
quite accurate. Ibn al-Qayyim’s simplistic depiction of the differences within the Muʿtazilite 
School is as follows:  
 
The Majority Position 
Mankind is the originator of their actions in which they invent (mukhtariʿūn) by their own will 
(irāda) and power (qudra). God is not to be described as capable of man’s capabilities (muqdūr), 
nor do man’s actions come under His power, just as man is not described as capable of God’s 
capabilities and His actions do not come under their power.4 
 
The Minority: al-Shaḥḥām
5
 and some Qadarites
6
 
…the action of man is the same action as that of God’s; with the condition that man performs it 
while God eschews it. This is not to say that man performs it and God is the agent, since it is 
impossible for a product to be the result of dual creators.7 
                                                          
2 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 459-60; al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. Ritter, Dār Iḥyā Turāth al-
Arabī, 2005, p. 199.  
3 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 459-60.  
4 ibid; al-Ashʿarī, al-Ashʿarī, op.cit., p.277; al-Baghdādī, al-Firaq bayn al-Firaq wa bayān al-Firqat al-
Nājiyya, Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, Beirut, 1977, p. 94. 
5 al-Shaḥḥām, Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsif Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Isḥāq (d. 233/ 847), an early Muʿtazilī theologian 
belonging to the Baṣran School. He was a student of Abū al-Hudhayl (d.227/842) and the teacher of Abū 
ʿAli al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/ 915); see, Aḥmad Ibn Yaḥyā Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila, ed. S. Diwald-
Wilzer, Beirut/ Wiesbaden, 1961, pp. 71- 72.    
6 Ibn Qayyim does not mention who he means by some Qadariyya (Qadarites). However, I think that he 
means the Muʿtazilites, since the label Qadariyya is commonly used for the Muʿtazilites; whereas ghulat 
al-Qadariyya (extreme Qadarites) refers to the early Qadarites.  
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Firstly, there are a number of issues which Ibn al-Qayyim groups together which should in fact 
be considered separately, such as: (1) Is God described as the creator of man’s actions? (2) Are 
man’s actions determined (muqaddara) by God? (3) Is God capable (qādir) of man’s actions? 
And lastly (4) did God empower man to originate his capability to act? As for the first issue, 
there is a consensus mentioned that the Muʿtazilites unanimously deny this particular description 
of God as the creator of man’s actions.8 So perhaps, the minority of the Muʿtazilites who Ibn al-
Qayyim states that affirm such, is Ṣāliḥ Qubba, as is mentioned by Imām al-Ashʿarī.9 The 
Muʿtazilī, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, also mentions this consensus whereby he says:  
 
The People of Justice (Ahlu ʿAdil) have agreed that the actions of man, from rising to sitting, are 
originated (ḥāditha) by them…there is no agent or originator other than them [man] and 
whosoever says that God is the creator and originator of such actions has fallen into great error.10 
 
I do not think it is accurate for al-Qāḍī to claim consensus upon such a position due to the fact 
that Dirār and al-Najjār, both of whom are Muʿtazilites11, hold a different position from that 
mentioned by al-Qāḍī above. Al-Shahrastānī quotes al-Najjār’s position as follows: ‘Verily God 
is the creator of man’s actions, the good and the evil, the pleasant and the unpleasant; and man is 
the acquirer of it.’12 
  Likewise, al-Qāḍī mentions the different position held by Dirār, that the action of man 
was not originated by him, but instead it was created by God.13 Al-Shaḥḥām is another Muʿtazilī 
who differed from the vast majority of the Muʿtazilites. Al-Shaḥḥām holds that both God and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 456; al-Ashʿarī, op. cit., p. 199. 
8 al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. Muḥammad Muḥī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-
Miṣriyya, Cairo, 1950, p. 273; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 3; Abū Muḥammad Ibn Mattawayh, Kitāb 
al-Majmūʿ fī al-Muḥīṭ bi-l-Taklīf, ed. Jan Peters, Dār al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1999, p. 364. 
9 al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. Ritter, Dār Iḥyā Turāth al-Arabī, 2005, p. 227. 
10 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 3; Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p.364. 
11 William M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Oneworld, London, 2009, pp. 189, 199.  
12 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Muʾassassa al-Ḥalabī, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 88-89. 
13 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Usūl al-Khamsa, ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-Karīm Uthmān, Maktaba Wahba, Cairo, 1996, p. 
363.  
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man have the power to act and in both cases their power should be independent. It is possible 
that God can perform man’s actions as long as both God and man are independent of one 
another. It must not be said that God is the agent of man’s actions, particularly those actions 
clearly performed by man. For example, God has the power to make a tree fall whilst man has 
the power to cut down a tree; the latter action should only be ascribed to man and not God. 
Hence, both actions are independent of each other and each action-taker has agency. But, 
according to al-Shaḥḥam, God acts out of necessity (iḍṭirāran) while man acts by way of 
acquisition (iktisāban).14 Ibn al-Qayyim commented that ‘this position is the exact same as the 
school that holds that the occurrence of an object by dual agents is compatible in a way that is 
interchangeable.’15  
Hence, the difference of opinion between Dirār, al-Najjār, al-Shahhām and Ṣāliḥ Qubba 
with the rest of the Muʿtazilites clearly indicates to us that there is no such consensus, as claimed 
by al-Qādī, upon the opinion that man is the creator (khāliq) of his actions.  So perhaps Ibn al-
Qayyim was right in this case to depict the differences as a majority position versus a minority.   
 There is another difference of opinion that occurs amongst the Muʿtazilites and is related 
to issue (1) aforementioned. That is, although the Muʿtazilites hold the position that man is the 
originator (muḥdith) of his actions, they differ regarding the term khāliq (creator), specifically 
whether man can be described as the creator of his actions. There are three different opinions 
concerning the meaning of khāliq (creator).  
 One opinion states that the khāliq (creator) is he who is determined (muqaddar) to act 
and whosoever is determined to act is the creator of that action - regardless of whether it is from 
God’s pre-eternal (qadīm) power or man’s originated (ḥadīth) power. Hence, man can be 
described as the creator of his actions. Al-Jubāʾī and his followers belong to this first position.16  
 A second opinion upholds that the term khāliq (creator) means he who acts, neither with a 
tool (ālah) nor by an originated power (quwa mukhtiriʿa). Thus, whoever acts without a tool or 
the originated power is to be described as the creator of his actions. Additionally, whoever acts 
                                                          
14 al-Ashʿarī, op. cit., p. 549. 
15 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 456. 
16 Cf. al-Ashʿarī, op. cit., pp. 248, 273. 
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by an originated power is not to be described as the creator of his actions.17 Hence, this position 
does not go so far as to suggest that man creates his actions, but rather that he originates them.18   
 A third position does not distinguish between agent (fāʿil) and creator (khāliq); both 
terms have the same meanings. However, this position does not ascribe the noun creator to man 
because the revealed law (sharīʿa) has prohibited this.19 On the contrary, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
allows for the attribution of such term to man, since it has been used linguistically (lughatan).20 
Perhaps for this reason, many of the early Muʿtazilites abstained from attributing the term khāliq 
to man, instead using terms such as ijād (bring about) and iḥdāth (originate). It has been 
mentioned that Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī was the first to declare that man is the creator (khāliq) of his 
actions, given that this attribute is present in man.21 Al-Jawaynī says: 
 
The early Muʿtazilites use to abstain from attributing the term ‘creator’ to man as they were close 
to the era of the early consensus of the Salaf that ‘there is no creator except God’. Then the later 
of them were bold enough to name man the creator literally (ḥaqīqa).22 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s reading of issue (2), which states that the majority of the Muʿtazilites deny 
divine determining (muqaddara) of man’s actions, is perhaps correct if the term ’determined’ 
means created.23 However, if the term ‘determined’ means knowing (ʿilām) and informing 
(ikhbār) then it is possible, according to the Muʿtazilites, that man’s actions are determined by 
God in the sense that God has knowledge of such actions.24 
 As for the third issue, I believe that Ibn al-Qayyim was incorrect in his interpretation of 
God being capable of man’s actions as meaning that God empowers man to originate his actions. 
                                                          
17 ibid 
18 There is no mention of who holds this position. cf. ibid.   
19 Ibid, p. 273.  
20 Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p. 414. 
21 Abū al-Maʿīn al-Nasafī, Tabṣirat al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Kalūd Salāma, al-Jafān wa al-Jābī li- l-Ṭibāʿa 
wa al-Nashr, Qubruṣ, 1993, vol. 2, p. 645. 
22 Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, Kitāb Al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭiʿ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-īʿNqād, eds. Muḥammad Y. 
Musā and ʿAlī ʿA. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba al-Khānijī, Miṣr, 1950, pp. 187-188. 
23 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., pp. 771-772.  
24 ibid 
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Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim claims that issue (3) is in fact issue (4) because the apparent 
meaning of issue (3) is impossible according to the Muʿtazilites.25 The term qādir alayhā, in 
issue (3) literally means God’s capacity over man’s actions; however, Ibn al-Qayyim insists that 
the term – as used by the Muʿtazilites - really means God created in man a power (qudra) to 
originate (iḥdāth) actions. For example, if a man lifts a stone, he does so with his own power, but 
this power was initially created in him by God. Thus, man can only perform that which God has 
given him power to do. Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim is interpreting issue (3) as issue (4). Ibn al-
Qayyim confirms his proposed interpretation of issue (3) as follows:  
 
This is not to say, that God’s capacity over it [man’s actions] means He is able to perform the 
action as it is impossible26, according to them [Muʿtazilites], but rather His capacity over it, is 
God’s empowerment of man to originate such actions. Hence, man originated the action by God’s 
power, empowerment and enablement; and these are the closest Qadarites27 to the Sunna.28 
 
The claim put forth by Ibn al-Qayyim, that the Muʿtazilites maintain it is impossible for God to 
perform the same acts as man, is not entirely accurate. I have found that al-Ashʿarī mentions al-
Shaḥḥām to affirm that God is capable of man’s actions and as such, it would be considered an 
act of necessity (ḍarūra).29 So, it is unclear why Ibn al-Qayyim interprets issue (3) as issue (4), 
bearing in mind that Imām al-Ashʿarī does mention both issues (3) and (4) on the same page,30 so 
it is possible that Ibn al-Qayyim confused the two issues. 
Similarly, I have found that Ibn al-Qayyim’s reading of issue (4), being that the majority 
of Muʿtazilites deny God’s empowerment of man with the ability to originate, is misinformed. In 
                                                          
25 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 460.  
26 This is according to the majority of the Muʿtazilites; see al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. 
Muḥammad Muḥī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, Cairo, 1950, vol. 1, p 251. 
However, as we shall see shortly in the next section dealing with al-Shaḥḥam’s position which holds that 
it is possible for God to perform man’s actions.  
27 Many of the classical Sunnī scholars refer to the Muʿtazilites as Qadariyya due to the fact that they 
affirm qadar to themselves and not God, i.e. man determines his actions not God. See, Ibn Taymiyya, al-
Fatāwā al-Kubrā li Ibn Taymiyya, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 1987, vol. 1, p. 83.  
28 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 460. 
29 al-Ashʿarī, op. cit., vol. 1, p 251 
30 ibid 
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fact, there seems to be a consensual agreement amongst the Muʿtazilites that God empowered 
mankind to originate their own actions.31 Ibn al-Qayyim states that only a minority held such a 
view.32 Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār says: 
 
The People of Justice (Ahlu ʿAdil) have unanimously agreed that man’s actions- from rising to 
sitting- are originated (ḥāditha) by them; and it was God who empowered them with such 
[ability]…33 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites’ Arguments 
 
The Muʿtazilites argue that every rational person knows intuitively that they are the agents of 
their own voluntary actions, which result from their intentions and motives; unlike the shivering 
and compelled persons.34 Ibn al-Qayyim agrees that man knows intuitively that he is the agent of 
his acts; however, does this answer whether God created their actions or that man created his 
own actions? Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the Muʿtazilites have not presented a sound 
argument to disprove that God is capable (qādir)35 of man’s actions.36    
 I think it is likely that the term ‘created’ (khalaq) is understood and employed differently 
by both the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim. I do not think the Muʿtazilites suggest that man 
creates his actions in the same sense that God creates. Al-Qāḍī argues that man cannot create 
essences (jawāhir) and attributes (ʿārāḍ); however, God can.37 Therefore, the meaning of 
                                                          
31 ibid 
32 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 460. 
33 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, p. 3; Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p.364. 
34 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 8, pp. 6-8, 43; idem, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsa, pp. 304, 
332, 336; Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., pp. 77, 79, 88, 340. Muḥammad ʿAmāra, al-Muʿtazila wa Mushkilat al-
Ḥuriyyat al-Insāniyya, Dār al-Shurūq, Cairo, 1988, p. 144.  
35 It is strange to see that Ibn al-Qayyim switches to a different word such as, ‘capable’, while the original 
word used is, ‘created’. This perhaps supports my opinion that both parties employ words ambiguously 
without properly defining what exactly they mean by the word they employ and thus results to different 
understandings.  
36 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 461.  
37 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsa, p. 381 
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‘created’ and its employment in regard to man’s acts is different from the meaning when used in 
relation to God - according to the Muʿtazilites. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim’s disagreement is a result of 
his failure to understand ‘created’ being used differently in regards to God and to man. Hence, 
there is no difference when the term ‘created’ relates to God or to man, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim. For example, if one states that man can create his own actions then, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim, this ‘created’ is the same as when God creates.38 Consequently, the difference of 
opinion between the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim can be seen as a difference of definition - 
the Muʿtazilites mean one thing and Ibn al-Qayyim means another.  
 The Muʿtazilites also argue that if man was not the agent of his sins then such sins would 
not have been attributed to him, as is found in the Quran. So accordingly, sins are attributed to 
man for the simple reason that he originated it, while good deeds are attributed to God since He 
has commanded and legislated them. God says: Whatever befalls you of good (ḥasana) is from 
God, but whatever befalls you of evil (sayʾa), is from yourself.39 
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the Muʿtazilites were incorrect in thinking the verse refers to 
sins and good deeds; he argued instead that they refer to blessing and tribulations. The words 
ḥasana (good deeds) and sayʾa (sins) are sometimes used in the Quran to refer to blessings and 
tribulations. For example, God says: If a good (ḥasana) befalls you, it grieves them, but if some 
evil (sayʾa) overtakes you, they rejoice at it.40 In other parts of the Quran ḥasana and sayʾa are 
used to refer to voluntary acts, such as, sins and good deeds. For example, God says: Verily, the 
good deeds (ḥasanat) remove the evil deeds (sayʾat).41   
 Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim makes use of the grammatical structure of the verse in order 
to further support his position that the verse employed by the Muʿtazilites refers to blessing and 
tribulations. He argues that there is no subject mentioned in the part of the verse which reads: 
whatever befalls you (mā ʾaṣābak). This indicates that the verse refers to blessings and 
                                                          
38 Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 449; ibid, vol. 2, pp. 466- 467. However, at times Ibn al-Qayyim 
does seem to agree that the term ‘creator’ can refer to man; see, ibid, vol. 2, pp. 794 ff; also see, al-
Ashʿarī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 273.  
39 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 733, 744; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, p. 316; idem, Sharḥ Uṣūl 
al-Khamsa, p. 385; Quran, 4: 79.  
40 Quran, 3: 120. 
41 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. 
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tribulations - over both of which man does not have agency. Had the verse read: whatever I 
[cause to] befall (mā ʾaṣabtu) or whatever I acquire (mā kasabtu), where there is a subject 
mentioned, the verses would refer to voluntary acts, such as, sins and good deeds.42    
 In the first instance, I think that a subjective interpretation of the verse can be used to 
oppose Ibn al-Qayyim. The Muʿtazilites interpret ḥasana as good deed and sayʾa as sin, both of 
which are valid in the Arabic language. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qayyim interprets ḥasana as 
blessing and sayʾa as tribulation; again both are valid in the Arabic language. Hence, in this 
regard, both parties employ subjective interpretations that are linguistically valid. Nonetheless, 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s analysis of the grammatical structure of the verse does provide a strong case in 
support of his position.     
 Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the verse: Whatever befalls you of good (ḥasana), is 
from God, but whatever befalls you of evil (sayʾa), is from yourself does not supports the 
Muʿtazilites’ position. The reason being, there is a clear distinction between the attribution of 
ḥasana and the attribution of sayʾa in the verse. Sayʾa (interpreted as ‘sin’ according to the 
Muʿtazilites) is clearly attributed to man, whereas ḥasana (interpreted as ‘good deed’ by the 
Muʿtazilites) is clearly attributed to God. Contrary to this, the Muʿtazilites hold that both sins 
and good deeds are attributed to man since he is the sole agent. Thus, they do not distinguish 
between the attribution of both sins and good deeds, unlike the verse. Therefore, according to Ibn 
al-Qayyim, this verse does not advocate the Muʿtazilites’ position.43  
 However, I think that a part of the verse does support the Muʿtazilites’ position on the 
agency of man, as the verse attributes sin to man. Despite this, Ibn al-Qayyim does spot an 
inconsistency in the Muʿtazilites’ employment of scripture, as a part of the verse which attributes 
good deeds to God clearly contradicts their position - bearing in mind that the Muʿtazilites argue 
for the sole agency of man with regard to voluntary acts. Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim’s claim that 
the verse does not support the Muʿtazilites’ position is slightly exaggerated, as a part of it clearly 
does: but whatever befalls you of evil (sayʾa), is from yourself.  
   
                                                          
42 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 734- 736. 
43 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 744.  
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Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites 
 
The classical Ashʿarites hold that man’s voluntary actions are created solely by God’s power and 
man has no cause to such actions. Hence, God originates (iḥdāth) man’s actions while man 
acquires (iktisab) them. On the other hand, there are those amongst the Ashʿarite School who 
hold a different position. These different positions are perhaps the result of the various 
explanations for the theory of kasb (acquisition).44 The wide range of different views and 
approaches arguably makes the Ashʿarite position more difficult to discern and also distinguishes 
them from most other theological schools. Furthermore, the Ashʿarites were not the only school 
that attempted to synthesize both the position of the Jabrites and Qadarites; as such, they were 
not Traditionalists in the same sense that was adhered to by Ibn al-Qayyim, as is commonly 
mistaken.45 Additionally, there are major differences between the Ashʿarites and Ibn al-Qayyim, 
and equally within the Ashʿarite ranks themselves.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim states that al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-6) holds man’s actions to be the literal 
actions of God and only metaphorically of man’s.46 On the other hand, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) 
presents al-Ashʿarī’s position slightly differently. Al-Rāzī states that the cause of an action is by 
God’s power, while man’s power has no cause to the existence of the action.47 Additionally, al-
Rāzī states that al-Ashʿarī is in agreement with those who hold that man has no power to cause 
neither his actions nor his attributes48. 
  However, the actual position of al-Ashʿarī is debated much amongst researchers49  
though Ibn al-Qayyim confirms that this position is the last opinion on which al-Ashʿarī settled 
                                                          
44 Ibn al-Qayyim states that the Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites and Ahlu Sunna wa al-Ḥadīth (Traditionalists) all 
employ kasb but all intend different meanings; see Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 758, 789. For Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
discussion on kasb and jabr, see Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 749-805. 
45 Cf. al-ʿAllama al-Ḥillī, Minhāj al-Karrāma fī ʾIthbāt al-ʾIimāma. 
46 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 457-8. 
47 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhiyya, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā, Dār al-Kitāb 
al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1987, vol. 9, p. 9. 
48 Al-Rāzī, Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, Hyderabad, 1353AH, pp. 227-228. 
49 Aḥmad Muḥammad ʿUmar, al-Muṣṭalaḥāt al-Kalāmiyya fī ʾAfʿāl illāh, Umm al-Qura, Mekkah, 1414AH, 
p. 244. 
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on. That is, man’s power (al-qudra al-muḥdatha)50 cannot bring into existence that which was 
determined for it (muqdūrihā), namely an act. Similarly, an act along with its attributes is not 
brought about by man; rather, it comes from God’s pre-eternal power (al-qudra al-qadīma).51 In 
this regard, Ibn al-Qayyim supports al-Rāzī’s position on al-Ashʿarī, namely that al-Ashʿarī 
denies man’s causative ability.52    
 However, it must be noted that al-Rāzī does not quote al-Ashʿarī directly as denying 
man’s power to bring about his acts; instead, al-Rāzī simply attributes this position to al-
Ashʿarī.53 In fact, contrary to al-Rāzī’s quotation, al-Ashʿarī explains what he means by kasb in 
his book al-Lumaʿ. He defines it as ‘the reality of acquisition is that a thing occurs by the 
acquirer from his originated power’.54 Also, in his Maqālāt, he states: ‘the true meaning of al-
Iktisāb (acquisition) is that something occurs by way of the originated power, thus it is 
considered acquired by he in whose power it was with’.55 Based on the latter two quotes, one 
may argue for some sort of causative ability in man’s originated power and nowhere does he 
claim that man’s power cannot bring about his actions. Thus, this arguably indicates a different 
position of al-Ashʿarī to what is commonly attributed to him by al-Rāzī - namely, denying man’s 
causative ability.56  
                                                          
50 Which literally translates as the originated or temporal power. 
51 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., p. 127. 
52 al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, pp. 9-10; idem, Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddīm wa al-
Mutaʾakhirīn min al-ʿUlamāʾ wa al-Ḥukamāʾ wa al-Mutakallimīn, ed. Ṭahā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿīd, Dār al-
Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1984, p. 455; Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 761. 
53 Aḥmad Muḥammad ʿUmar, op. cit., p. 244. Nonetheless, al-Juwaynī also paraphrases al-Ashʿarī’s 
position which encompasses both of the conflicting aspects, namely, the affirmation of man’s causative 
ability and the nullification of it. This was perhaps the root for the perceived conflicting views of al-
Ashʿarī. Compare, al-Juwaynī, Lumaʿ al-ʾAdilla fī Qawāʿid ʿAqāʾid Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, ed. Fawqiyya 
Ḥusayn Maḥmūd, ʿĀlim al-Kutub, Beirut, 1407AH, p. 121, with al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. Ritter, 
Dār Iḥyā Turāth al-Arabī, 2005, pp. 539, 542.   
54 al-Ashʿarī, Al-Lumaʿ fī al-Rudd ʿalā Ahl al-Zaygh wa al-Bidaʿ, ed. Ḥamūda Gharāba, Maṭbaʿa Miṣriyya, 
1955, p. 76. 
55 al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, p. 542. 
56 al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, pp. 9- 10; idem, Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, pp. 227-228; Ibn 
Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 761; ʿAḍud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Iījī, Kitāb al-Muwāqif, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
ʿUmayra, Dār al-Jīl, Beirut, 1997, vo. 1, p. 66. 
85 
 
 
 Furthermore, Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) upholds that when al-Ashʿarī explains what he 
meant by kasb, he always employs the phrase ‘it is what is obtained by the originated power’.57 
Similarly, the actual kasb occurs by both the originated power and the pre-eternal power; so the 
difference is with regard to the meaning of occurrence (wuqūʿ). When it occurs by means of 
God’s pre-eternal power, it means originated; when it occurs by man’s originated power, it 
means acquired.58 The failure to thoroughly define the different terms when employed to explain 
a concept could be the cause of the confusion regarding the conflicting positions attributed to al-
Ashʿarī. For example, when al-Ashʿarī seems to argue in favour of man’s originated power in 
bringing about an act, he employs the terms ‘waqaʿa’ (occur) and ‘iktasaba’ (acquire). This is 
the position mentioned in al-Ashʿarī’s Maqālāt59 and al-Lumaʿ60 and also mentioned by Ibn 
Fūrak61 and Ibn Taymiyya.62 Whereas, when al-Rāzī attributes the position to al-Ashʿarī, who 
denies man’s causative ability, the term ‘taʾthīr ‘(cause) and ‘aḥdatha’ (originate) are employed. 
Hence, it is possible that these different terms, badly defined, in actuality imply different issues 
and concepts, namely, the ‘occurrence’ of an act versus the ‘cause’ of an act and the ‘acquisition’ 
of an act versus the ‘origination’ of an act. To recapitulate, it is quite possible that al-Ashʿarī 
affirms man’s ability to acquire and make an act occur, while also denying man’s causative 
ability and origination of an act.63 If such is the case, then this will resolve the differences of 
opinion with regard to al-Ashʿarī’s position(s) discussed above.       
 Ibn al-Qayyim explains the position of al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) who holds that man’s 
power cannot cause the existence of an action; rather, his power can only have a cause to the 
attribute of an action. This is how al-Bāqillānī explains kasb, which means man’s power can 
cause the attribute of an action, otherwise said whether the action is good or evil. Al-Bāqillānī 
argues that acts of obedience and disobedience are made up of movements - none of which are 
                                                          
57 Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, ed. Daniel 
Gimaret, Dār al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1987, p. 93. 
58 Ibid.  
59 al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, p. 539, 542 
60 al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, p. 76. 
61 Ibn Fūrak, op. cit., p. 93. 
62 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī Naqḍ Kalām al-Shīʿa al-Qadariyya, ed. Muḥammad 
Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1986, vol. 3, pp. 13, 75, 109.  
63 Ibn Taymiyya also alludes to this; see ibid, vol. 3, pp. 31, 209. 
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distinct from each other except in regards to the attribute. That is, one set of movements makes 
up an attribute of obedience whereas the other set of movements make up an attribute of 
disobedience. As such, the movements and its existence are both caused by God’s power, 
whereas, the attribute of the act is caused by man’s power.64 Thus, God’s pre-eternal power 
determines the ontological status of an action, while man’s originated power determines the 
ethical status of an action. Al-Bāqillānī describes the latter as kasb.65  
 Ibn al-Qayyim explains that this position is close to what he believes to be the correct 
position; however, he states that al-Bāqillānī ‘did not do it full justice’. Ibn al-Qayyim says that 
in order for an act to have an attribute of obedience or disobedience it must comply with divine 
commandments or transgress them. As such, the act of compliance and transgression is either 
man’s action - which is the result of his power and choice - or it is not man’s action. If the former 
is true, then it has been established that man’s action is the result of his own power and free 
choice. However, if it is not man’s actions, then it has been established that man has no free 
choice, no action and no acquisition. Ibn al-Qayyim seems to agree with the first premise and 
comments that the Ashʿarites have not established anything soundly on kasb; hence, it is said that 
the unfeasible theories are three: the acquisition (kasb) of al-Ashʿarī, the states (aḥwāl) of Abū 
Hāshim and the leap (ṭufra) of al-Naẓẓām.66     
 Ibn al-Qayyim expands another Ashʿarite position, belonging to Abū Isḥāq al-Asfarāyīnī 
(d. 418/1027). Abū Isḥāq maintains that God’s power is the independent cause for an action - 
unlike man’s power. However, if God’s power is added (iḍāfa) to that of man’s power, man’s 
power would have an independent cause to an action.67 Therefore, in order for man’s power to be 
capable of an independent cause, it must be aided by God’s power which entails divine 
permission and empowerment for the cause of an action to take effect.68 
                                                          
64 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 452. 
65 Cf. al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf fī mā yajib īʿNqādahu wa lā yajūz al-Jahl bihi, ed. Muḥammad 
Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Maktaba al-Khānijī, Cairo, 1413AH, pp. 45-46; al-Iījī, op. cit., p. 239; Sayf al-Dīn al-
Āmadī, Ghāyat al-Marām fī ilm al-Kalām, ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, Cairo, 1971, p. 207. 
66 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 452- 453. 
67 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 455; al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, p. 11.  
68 Ayedh Saad al-Dowsari, Manhaj Ibn al-Qayyim fī Taqrīr Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar Min Kilāl Kitābihi 
Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl, MA Thesis, Jāmiʿa al-Malik Saʿūd, Riyadh, 2003, p. 451. 
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 This position seeks to preserve God’s power and independent cause to any given action 
and, in doing so, it tries to avoid complusionism69 as it offers a power and cause to man. 
Moreover, in order to advocate man’s responsibility, Abū Isḥāq argues for man’s independent 
cause (taʾthīr) to his actions. However, this is virtually impossible to achieve if God is to have an 
independent cause as well as man. Thus, Abū Isḥaq concluded in the partnership (ishtirāk) of 
two independent powers: God’s power aids man’s power to achieve an independent cause so that 
man may be solely responsible for what he acquires.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim is quite critical in pointing out that if one independent cause is dependent 
on another independent cause then it is a contradiction to the term ‘independent’ itself. John 
cannot be the independent cause to buying a can of Coke from a drink machine and at the same 
time John is dependent upon his mother70 to wheel him there. Thus, John’s action must not be 
considered independent since he is dependent upon his mother. So, the fact that John’s mother 
helped him buy a can of Coke contradicts the premises that John was independent from the start. 
Ibn al-Qayyim says: 
 
… this position is not free from error, as it claims that mans power is independent with the aid of 
God’s power. This takes us back to the issue of dual causes of one effect. But the power and 
cause of one of them depends on the power and cause of the other. It is like saying that God’s 
power is independently the cause to the existence of man’s power; and then man’s power is 
independently the cause to the existence of an action. This is also mentioned by a group of 
rationalist (uqalāʾ).71 
  
Ibn al-Qayyim further demonstrates that man’s power does not necessitate an act nor is it an 
independent cause; since any form of existence, such as a cause, is dependent upon God’s will. 
                                                          
69 Ibn al-Qayyim sometimes refers to the Ashʿarites as Jabriyya (compulsionists) and refers to the 
Jahmiyya as Ghulāt al-Jabriyya (extreme compulsionists).   
70 I must mention that the analogy I used is different from the position put forward by Abū Isḥāq, given 
that one cannot compare John’s mother to God, since they are two completely different concepts. 
However, I am trying to simplify Abū Isḥāq’s abstract position and make it more understandable and 
relatable to the reader.  
71 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 455.  
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Thus, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, man’s power cannot be the independent cause for the 
existence of any given action, as existence depends on the will of God. For this reason, it is 
inaccurate to say that man’s power is the independent cause to an action. Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
  
And again this position is not free from error, since it claims that man’s power is independent in 
causing the existence of that which is probable (al-maqdūr) [the action] and this is unsound. 
Given that the utmost degree of man’s power is a cause (sabab), rather a part of the cause; and the 
cause is not independent in obtaining an effect (musabab) nor does it necessitate the effect. There 
is nothing in existence that necessitates the existence of that which is probable (al-maqdūr) [the 
action] except the will of God alone (mashīʾatahu).72  
 
Imām al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) is another Ashʿarite scholar, whom Ibn al-Qayyim praises for his 
position on human agency.73 Al-Juwaynī seemed to have developed his first position - which was 
in agreement with the majority of Ashʿarites - to a position that marks a major development. He 
affirms that man’s power has the ability to cause the existence of an action. 74 He states that to 
affirm a power which has no capability to cause is like denying the power itself. 75 This is 
perhaps an indirect refutation of the majority position which denies that man’s power is capable 
of causing an action.76 As a result, al-Juwaynī was attacked by various Ashʿarite scholars who 
excused him of adopting the Muʿtazilites’ position77 or even adopting the philosopher’s 
                                                          
72 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 457.  Ibn al-Qayyim further adds that the people of this position also 
claim that God gave man the power and will (irāda) to act and eschew- while unattended by God 
Himself. Hence, man has the capability to act and eschew with his own power and will which God had 
entrusted him with. Cf. ibid.   
73 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 613, 621; al-Dowsari, op. cit., p. 461.  
74 Au al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīdat al-Naẓẓāmiyya fī Arkān al-Islām, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, 
al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-Turāth, Cairo, 1412AH, pp. 47- 49; Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 215- 216, 
267, 678.  
75 al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 98- 99. 
76 Cff. al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, p. 210.  
77 Muḥammad ʿAmāra, op. cit., p. 206.   
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position78. Some scholars went further to deny that al-Juwaynī developed a different position and 
instead they claimed that it was forged and attributed to him.79  
 Perhaps Ibn al-Qayyim’s only critique of al-Juwaynī’s later position is that he failed to 
acknowledge that God dislikes man’s acts of disobedience despite that it has been determined by 
God. Al-Juwaynī based this on the famous principle of whatever God wills, He also likes. So if 
God determines sins, then this means that He wills and loves them. The implication of this 
principle is a fallacy according to Ibn al-Qayyim.80     
 Ibn al-Qayyim engages with another Ashʿarite position which he attributes to an 
anonymous group (ṭāʾifa) instead of mentioning their names. This anonymous position holds that 
an action can be caused by both God and man’s power, independently of each other.81 As a 
result, both God and man’s agencies are preserved. 
 Moreover, this anonymous position can potentially be traced to one of the two 
probabilities put forth by al-Rāzī. He argues that the cause for the existence of an action is both 
God and man’s power.82 Al-Rāzī further argues for two probabilities of this position. Firstly, 
either both God and man’s power are independent in bringing about an action, given the fact that 
both independent causes of one effect is possible. This first probability is perhaps the anonymous 
position mentioned previously by Ibn al-Qayyim. The second probability is that God’s power is 
an independent cause while man’s power is a dependent cause. So if God’s power is combined 
(inḍamma) with that of man’s power, man’s power would have an independent cause for an 
action with the aid of God’s power.83 This is the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Asfarāyīnī, as we saw 
earlier.   
                                                          
78 al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 99; al-Rāzī, Muhaṣṣal, p. 280.  
79 Muḥammad ʿAmāra, op. cit., p. 210.  
80 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 772- 773. Ibn al-Qayyim overcomes this problem by differentiating 
between two types of divine wills – universal and legislative – and two types of acts – divine acts and 
objects of divine acts; See pp. 169, 181-2, 216.  
81 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 253; al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, p. 10; idem., Muḥaṣṣal, p. 455. 
82 al-Rāzī, ibid 
83 al-Rāzī, ibid, p. 11.  
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 Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the position of dual independent causes of one effect, 
namely, an action can be caused by both God and man’s power, independently of each other. Ibn 
al-Qayyim states: 
 
They say: There is no inconsistency in two independent causes of one effect. Similarly, one 
object being the result of two subjects [dual agents] and one probable act by two capable persons 
(maqdūr bayn qādirayn)… we witness two independently capable (qādirayn) persons, each 
partaking in the cause and agency of an act while each of them are acting independently. They 
say: the only argument employed against this position is that the one independent agent of an act 
contradicts the other independent agent of the same act. So to claim dual independent agency of 
one object is self-contradictory.84 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim acknowledges that this argument contains ambiguity (ijmāl) and needs further 
elaboration. He says that dual agency of one object is possible when both agents are dependent 
on each other; such as, two persons collaborating in an act which is not possible to achieve 
alone.85 Similarly, it is also possible for the dual agency of one object, each being independent of 
each other by way of exchange.86 Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that it is possible for the dual 
agency of one object, both in partnership and both capable of performing the act independently 
of each other. This can be illustrated by imagining two persons carrying something whilst 
knowing that each of them is able to carry it alone.87 Ibn al-Qayyim then argues that the one 
possibility of dual agency of one act which proves false is the claim that both agents are 
autonomous in performing the one act. When both are the independent agent of the same act, the 
autonomy of one agent opposes that of the other.88 
 So Ibn al-Qayyim states the problem lies within the ambiguity of this position. He shows 
that some outcomes of this position, once elaborated upon, are possible. However, the possibility 
of an act carried out by two separate persons each independent of each other in one instant, is 
                                                          
84 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 454.  
85 Ibid 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, pp. 454- 455. 
88 Ibid, p. 455. 
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practically impossible. For example, it is impossible to say that both John and Jimmy, two 
separate persons, bought the same can of Coke from the same drink machine, both independently 
of each other and at the same time.  
 Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) also believes that it is possible for dual agency to exist in one 
act, if the two agents’ capabilities are different. As such, man’s actions are from God in one 
respect and from man in another and so does man have a choice in the existence of his actions.89 
Al-Ghazālī states: 
  
The correct position is that the cause is from dual powers, God’s power and man’s power. So 
man’s acts are from God’s divine decree and determining; however, man has a choice. So the 
determining (taqdīr) is from God and the acquisition is from man. This is the position of the Ahlu 
Sunna, which is a middle way position between the Jabrites and the Qadarites.90 
 
Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the position of both Ḍirār Ibn ʿAmmar (ca. 110–200/ca. 
728–815) and al-Ḥusayn Ibn Muḥammad al-Najjār (d. end of 3rd/9th century). Although they do 
not belong to the Ashʿarite School91, Ibn al-Qayyim seemingly groups them with the Ashʿarites’, 
given that their position is comparable to that of the Ashʿarites. Dirār and Al-Najjār hold that it is 
possible for an act to occur as a result of dual agents with different attributions (nisba) - one 
being the originator, the other being the acquirer.92 This position seems remarkably similar to al-
Ashʿarī’s position, as al-Ashʿarī is famously known for having invented the theory of acquisition 
(kasb). It was used a century before him by Dirār and his student al-Najjār, but al-Ashʿarī had the 
best account of this doctrine, hence why he receives recognition for it.93  
 Ibn al-Qayyim highlights two differences between the position of both Dirār and al-
Najjār and the position of al-Ashʿarī. Firstly, Dirār and al-Najjār both hold that man is the real 
                                                          
89 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. ʿAbd Allah ʿArwānī and Muḥammad al-Shaqfa, 
Dār al-Qalam, Damascus, 2003, p. 25.  
90 Ibid  
91 al-Shahrastānī describes them as moderate Muʿtazilites; see, al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., p. 44. 
92 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 456- 457. 
93 Cff. W. M. Watt, ‘Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam’, in The Muslim World, vol. 36, Iss. 2, April 
1946, p. 145; idem., Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 2009, p. 86.   
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agent even while he has no choice and is not the originator of the action. Conversely, al-Ashʿarī 
holds that man is not the agent even though the action is attributed to him; rather, the real agent 
is God and none besides Him.94 Secondly, Dirār and al-Najjār, both say that God is the originator 
and man is the agent95 while al-Ashʿarī says that God is both the originator and agent and man is 
merely the acquirer.  
 Consequently, Dirār and al-Najjār both affirm that man has the capability to cause an act; 
they label this as ‘acquisition’. On the contrary, al-Ashʿarī denies that man has the capability to 
cause an act96 and instead he affirms man’s acquisition of an act. This is perhaps the fundamental 
difference between the position shared by Dirār and al-Najjār and the position of al-Ashʿarī; the 
former affirm man’s causative ability while the latter denies it.97 
 In summary of the Ashʿarite opinions, the majority hold that the originated power has no 
cause to an act; an act is solely the cause of the pre-eternal power.98 This was upheld by al-
Ashʿarī, Ibn Fūrak, al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037), al-Rāzī, and al-Iījī (d. 756/1355). Al-Bāqillānī 
believed that the originated power had no cause to an act but instead was capable of causing the 
ethical nature of an act, that is, whether it is an act of obedience or disobedience. Abū Isḥāq 
maintained that the originated power has the ability to cause an act only with the aid of the pre-
eternal power; whereas, al-Juwaynī was perhaps the only one to have adopted the position that 
the originated power has the ability to cause an act without the mention of divine aid. Al-Ghazālī 
seemed to have adopted his master, al-Juwaynī’s position. This position displays resemblance to 
the possibility put forth by al-Rāzī and may have its traces to Dirār and al-Najjār.   
 
 
 
                                                          
94 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 457- 458.  
95 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 458. 
96 According to the position attributed to al-Ashʿarī by al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Qayyim as we saw earlier.  
97 See al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 88- 89. 
98 For a detailed analysis of this position see, al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, p. 227- 228; idem., 
Muḥaṣṣal, p.140- 141; al-Āmadī, op. cit., p.207; al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya al-Iqdām fī ʿIl al-Kalām, ed. 
Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 1425AH, pp. 46- 48; al-Iījī, op. cit., p. 339.    
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Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites’ Arguments 
 
Al-Rāzī argues that knowledge is a condition of man’s agency instead of power. That is, if man 
did truly bring about an act, then this would imply that he must have known the specifics of that 
particular act. As such, it is impossible for man to know the specifics of a particular act - as this 
requires that man knows what he chooses and intends. For example, the conscious or 
unconscious people whom are unaware of the many specific aspects that makes up their 
particular movements.99 
 Al-Rāzī’s argument assumes that knowledge is a condition of man’s agency while, the 
Muʿtazilites assume that power is the condition of man’s agency. These positions are argued for 
in a separate debate on the agency of an unconscious or insane person.100 
 Unfortunately, Ibn al-Qayyim does not deal with the agency of a conscious person - nor 
do the Muʿtazilites. Instead, they discuss the agency of an unconscious or an insane person. This 
is perhaps to support their position that power alone is required for the existence of an act rather 
than knowledge. Ibn al-Qayyim comments on the agency of an insane person, whose movement 
resembles that of an animal or a child who lacks awareness (al-tamyīz). This insane person has a 
motive (dāʿī), will and power; however, these are not like that of a sane person. The same applies 
to a heedless person who is unaware of his act even though such an act is the result of his power; 
because without his power there would be no act. Therefore, this heedless person has a will but 
he is unaware of it101.  
 It seems that Ibn al-Qayyim did not refute al-Rāzī’s argument; indeed the Ashʿarites may 
argue that Ibn al-Qayyim is proving precisely their point. As, in all cases which consider the 
agency of conscious, unconscious and insane persons, the knowledge of specifics is absent; 
hence, these people did not bring about their actions. Instead, Ibn al-Qayyim merely claims that 
power or general knowledge is necessary for the existence of an act and not its specifics. It seems 
                                                          
99 al-Iījī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 142-152; ibid, vol. 3, p. 102; al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, p. 141. 
100 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, Dār al-Maʿrifa, 
Beirut, 1978, pp. 142, 148- 149; al-Iījī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 142-152; ibid, vol. 3, p. 102; al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 
p. 141.   
101 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., p. 149.  
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that both parties are talking over each other, the Ashʿarites claim that knowledge is required for 
an act to exist, while the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim claim that power is necessary for an act 
to exist. So perhaps a sound argument would be one that disproves the condition of their 
opponent, instead of citing examples to support their own condition.   
 Furthermore, I think that attempting to disprove any of the conditions for the existence of 
an act might be subjective. To argue against the condition of knowledge, for example, fire burns 
and the sun can cause forest fires, both without knowledge. In both examples, an Ashʿarite can 
simply state that it is not the fire or sun that burns, rather it is God. Hence, a subjective view 
claims that power is required, whereas, another subjective view claims that knowledge is 
required; and thus only God has knowledge of specifics. Similarly, to argue against the condition 
of power, for example, imagination can create anything imaginable in the mind of a person 
simply based on knowledge alone. Similarly, feelings can bring about tears when one is sad and 
also physical signs of happiness when one is happy - both of which are based on knowledge from 
one’s imagination. But then again, an Ashʿarite can simply claim that it is not the imagination or 
feelings that create, rather it is God. Hence, the subjective views are repeated.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim engages with another argument that he attributes to an ambiguous Jabrī.102 
In fact, it is clear that the unnamed Jabrī is al-Rāzī and the unnamed Sunnī is Ibn al-Qayyim 
himself. This is obvious because Ibn al-Qayyim actually names Ibn al-Khaṭīb, who is al-Rāzī, in 
a few sections in the debate.103 Similarly, in the books of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, 
al-Rāzī is often used as a representative of the Ashʿarite School.104 Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim 
describes al-Rāzī in his book shifāʾ, as the best of the later Ashʿarites105 and likewise, the editor, 
Ahmad al-Ṣamʿānī, of the Shifāʾ edition 2008, ascribes the Jabrī’s arguments to al-Rāzī.106 
                                                          
102  In a chapter of his Shifāʾ that deals with a long debate between a Sunnī and Jabrī- no names are 
mentioned, cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. 
Dr. Aḥmad al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 2, pp. 829- 871. 
103 Cf. Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 835, 840, 849. 
104 See Ibn Taymiyya’s, Tablīs al-Jahmiyya, and Darʾ Taʿāriḍ al-ʿAqal wa al-Naqal; Ibn al-Qayyim’s, al-
Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala, and Mukhtasar al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala. 
105 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 865; ibid, vol. 3, p. 1089. 
106 Ibn Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 829- 871. 
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Lastly, most of the Jabrī’s arguments discussed by Ibn al-Qayyim can be found in al-Rāzī’s, and 
also al-Āmadī’s, works.107  
 Al-Rāzī argues108 that if man’s originated power was capable of causing the existence of 
an act, then this would imply that his originated power is capable of causing the existence of 
anything. He argues that existence is one entity (qaḍiyya); regardless of whether it differs in 
circumstances (aḥwāl) and modalities (jihāt). [So, to claim that the originated power is capable 
of causation is false, since it cannot cause the existence of bodies (al-ajsām) or accidents (al-
aʾrād) - except actions (al-afʾāl) like: tastes, colours and smells. So, if the latter is false then the 
former is also false].109 That is, if man’s originated power cannot cause the existence of bodies 
and accidents then consequently it cannot cause the existence of anything.  
 Al-Rāzī’s argument implies that the cause to each and every thing that exists all have the 
same nature and therefore are of the same kind of cause. For example, there are many things 
which man cannot cause to exist; hence, this implies that he does not have the ability to cause 
anything to exist - since they are all the same kind of cause. Nonetheless, al-Rāzī then goes on to 
argue that man’s power can cause things like tastes, colours and smells. This seems to contradict 
the main premise of the argument, namely, if man’s power is able to cause the existence of 
something then it also has the ability of causing the existence of anything, both of which are false 
according to the Ashʿarites.110 
  Ironically, al-Āmadī argues for similar implication when he says: ‘when we argue that 
man’s power is incapable of creating or bringing about something from nothing (ibdāʿ), this also 
applies to what we affirm when we say that man’s power can cause some things other than 
                                                          
107  See Livnat Holtzman, ‘Debating the Doctrine of jabr (Complusion): Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya Reads 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’, in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya, eds. Birgit Krawietz, Georges Tamer, De Gruyter, 2013. 
108 It is likely that this argument belongs to Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī as is implied by al-Āmadī. See al-Āmadī, 
op. cit., p. 215-216; idem, Abkār al-Afkār fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Mahdī, Dār al-Kutub 
wa al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, Cairo, 2004, vol. 2, p. 385. If such is the case then this means that Ibn al-
Qayyim was picking arguments of various Ashʿarite scholars as to represent the Jabrī in the long Sunnī 
vs. Jabrī dialogue cited in Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 829- 871. 
109 This argument has variations; compare, Al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʾĀliyya, vol. 9, pp. 91- 93; al-Āmadī, 
Ghāyat al-Marām, p. 215-216; idem, Abkār, vol. 2, p. 385; Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 863- 864. 
The words in [parenthesis] belong to al-Āmadī.   
110 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, pp. 267-9; idem, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsa, p. 372. 
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others...’111 Al-Āmadī then goes on to state that this argument can also be used against al-
Qādī112, since he holds that man’s power is able to cause the attribute (ṣifa) of an act. ‘There is 
no escape for him’, as al-Āmadī puts it.113  
 So in order for the Ashʿarites to avoid such problematic implications, it was necessary for 
them to adopt the doctrine of kasb, which argues that man’s originated power has no cause 
whatsoever; rather man acquires, while God alone causes.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that what al-Rāzī [or al-Bāqillānī] is actually implying is that if 
man is able to lift a stone then he is also able to lift a mountain; if he is able to carry a litre then 
he would also be able to carry one hundred thousand litres. Ibn al-Qayyim is furthermore critical 
of the implications by insisting that if man’s power is able to cause the existence of certain acts, 
such as eating, drinking and praying, then he is also able to cause the existence of the heavens 
and the earth and everything in between. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that a common feature shared 
amongst all existing things, i.e. that they exist, does not mean that one type of existence is 
possible for all types of existence. Likewise, it does not mean that a fly is equal to an elephant, or 
that bodies (al-ajsām) are equal to accidents (al-aʾrād). Ibn al-Qayyim also mentions the same 
ironical implication that was mentioned by al-Āmadī. He states that some of the Ashʿarites admit 
that man’s power has the ability to cause some accidents. So, if the Ashʿarites use this argument 
to disprove man’s causative ability, then this includes all of man’s causative ability, even some 
of the accidents which they hold that man is able to cause.114  
   
Ibn al-Qayyim on Human Agency 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim adopts the position of dual agency of one act, which means that an act is the result 
of both God’s pre-eternal power and man’s originated power. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts 
that man’s originated power has a causative ability which can potentially bring about the 
existence of an act - where the existence of an act is dependent on divine volition. So due to 
                                                          
111 al-Āmadī, ibid. 
112 Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī. 
113 al-Āmadī, ibid. 
114 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid    
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man’s causative ability, he is considered a literal agent (fāʿil ḥaqīqī) according to Ibn al-
Qayyim,115given that God had created man with the ability to cause his own acts.116 Ibn al-
Qayyim says: 
 
A movement is the result of man’s power and will (irāda)117 both of which God had placed 
(jaʿala) in man; since, if God wants man to act, He creates in man the power and motive (al-
dāʿī)118 for that particular act. Thus, the act is attributed to man’s power like the effect is 
attributed to the cause and it is [also] attributed to God like the creation is attributed to the 
creator. Hence, it is possible for there to be dual agents of one act, since one power [man’s] is the 
effect of the other and also partially causative [whereas] the other power [God’s] is independently 
causative.119  
 
So in order for man’s causative ability to take effect, certain conditions are necessary. These 
include the presence of man’s originated power, motive120 (dāʿī) and God’s divine volition 
(mashīʾa).121 God’s divine volition means he is also considered a literal agent, according to Ibn 
al-Qayyim. 
 On the question of human motives,122 Ibn al-Qayyim uniquely argues that man’s motive 
does not necessarily cause an act; rather it is a condition for the causation of an act.123 This 
implies that the necessary conditions to cause an act, such as man’s motive and power, are only 
                                                          
115 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, p. 852. 
116 The concept of dual agency and man’s causative ability resembles the concept of secondary causality. 
117 Ibn al-Qayyim tends to use irāda (will) quite loosely by interchanging it with mashīʾa (volition) during 
his discussion on divine and human agency.  
118 Again, Ibn al-Qayyim tends to interchange dāʿī (motive) with irāda (will) during this discussion. 
Moreover the dāʿī (motive) is sometimes interpreted as knowledge, belief (iʿNqād), thought (ẓunn), or 
will (irāda) and sometimes it can be interpreted as all of them; cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna, vol. 3, 
p. 250 ff.  
119 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 852- 853.  
120 Also translated as desire. 
121 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 843- 846. 
122 For an interesting discussion on motives and its effect on causation see Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, 
pp. 837- 846.  
123 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 843- 844. 
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partially causative124 in the sense that they depend on God’s volition to preponderate the 
effect.125 Ibn al-Qayyim states that an act occurs by the originated power just like an effect 
occurs by its cause and simultaneously, the agent and tool (al-ālah) are all caused by the pre-
eternal power.126  
 It is important for Ibn al-Qayyim to argue for the independency of the divine cause and 
the dependency of all other causes, such as man’s causative ability, or else it would be 
tantamount to affirming dual independent creators or a created thing without a creator.127  
 Ibn al-Qayyim’s position on man’s motive can be appreciated as an attempted synthesis 
of both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites’ positions. The Muʿtazilites hold that man’s motive 
necessitates the causation of an act; 128 the Ashʿarites deny that man’s motive can potentially 
cause an act.129 As a result, Ibn al-Qayyim harmonises the two opposing positions by arguing 
that man’s motive is a necessary condition for the causation of an act and consequently partially 
causative. Thus, man’s motive does not necessitate an act as is the case of the Muʿtazilites nor is 
it totally free of any part in the causation of an act as is the case of the Ashʿarites. In essence, Ibn 
                                                          
124 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 843, 853.  
125 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, p. 847. Also cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna, vol. 3, pp. 267- 269. 
126 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 853, 843- 844, 845- 846. 
127 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, p. 853.  
128 This is the position of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, see Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 837- 838, 843; al-
Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, pp. 12-13, 255, 258; idem, Muḥaṣṣal, p. 455; al-Iījī, al-Mawāqif, vol. 3, 
p. 211. Al-Jāḥiẓ holds that both man’s power and motive necessitates the origination of an act; see Ibn 
al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 965-966.  Abū Hāshim holds that man’s power is sufficient to bring about 
an act; see Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 837, 839; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsa, p. 425, 428; 
al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, p. 12; al-Iījī, al-Mawāqif, vol. 2, p. 124 ff. Also, Maḥmūd al-
Khawārzamī holds that man’s motive does not necessitate an act rather the act becomes more adequate 
(awlā) to occur when man’s motive is present; see Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 838, 840; al-Rāzī, al-
Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, p. 12.  
129 This also includes man’s power; so both man’s power and motive has no causative ability. See Ibn al-
Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 837, 839, 843; al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, p. 10; idem, Muḥaṣṣal, p. 
455; al-Juwaynī, Lumaʿ al-Adilla, p. 121; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, vol. 1, pp. 97- 98; al-Iījī, al-
Mawāqif, vol. 1, p. 66. Abū Isḥāq and al-Juwaynī both hold that man’s power along with God’s power, 
both have a causative ability; see al-Juwaynī, al-ʿAqīda al-Naẓāmiyya, p. 43; al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, p. 455. 
Also, al-Bāqillānī holds that man’s power can cause an attribute of an act; see al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-
ʿĀliyya, vol. 9, p. 9-10; Muḥaṣṣal, p. 455; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, vol. 1, pp. 97- 98; al-Iījī, al-
Mawāqif, vol. 2, p. 113.   
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al-Qayyim introduces the terms ‘conditions and partially causative’ to the debate in order to 
harmonise both the positions of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim’s compatibilist position of dual agency is another example of synthesis 
between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites’ position. The Muʿtazilites’ position advocates man 
has sole agency of his moral acts; man’s free will necessitates his sole agency and God has no 
agency over such moral acts. Conversely, the Ashʿarites deny man has agency of his moral acts, 
given that it would be tantamount to dual creators and hence associationism. For this reason, the 
Ashʿarites assert that it is only God who possesses sole agency while man acquires that which 
has been pre-determined for him. Somewhere in between these two opposing positions is where 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s dual agency position can be appreciated as an attempted synthesis. Ibn al-
Qayyim’s dual agency can be understood as God’s agency of moral acts being justified on a 
macro-level, whereby God is the sole creator of everything - including man’s causative ability 
and the object of such ability; such as, man’s ability to see and the object of his sight.130 Equally, 
man’s agency of moral acts is justified on a micro-level in that he possesses a causative ability 
which has the potential to bring about an act - providing that all the conditions are present with 
no obstacles.131 So Ibn al-Qayyim attempts to resolve the two opposing positions by arguing that 
God’s agency on a macro-level is compatible with man’s agency on the micro-level. Thus, Ibn 
al-Qayyim adheres to the concept of dual agency where man has free will and argues that this is 
compatible with man also being pre-determined.132  
 A final aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s attempted synthesis concerns the implications of the 
opposing positions - namely the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. The Muʿtazilites hold that man’s 
moral acts are attributed to man’s causation and not God’s, since man is a free agent in regards to 
his moral acts.133 On the other hand, the Ashʿarites argue that the causation of moral acts is 
attributable to God given that He is the sole creator while man is the acquirer. It is worth bearing 
in mind the diverse differences within the Ashʿarite School regarding the meaning of kasb 
                                                          
130 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 840; 843- 844; 846. 
131 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, p. 844. 
132 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 843- 844. 
133 See previous section Muʿtazilites on Human Agency. Also see, Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 459- 
450; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, p. 3; Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts, p. 141- 144.  
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(acquisition).134 So, the Muʿtazilites’ concept of responsibility is justified by the fact that man is 
a free agent135 whereas, the Ashʿarites justify man’s responsibility based on his acquisition.136 
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that moral acts are attributed to God by way of divine creation, power, 
knowledge and general will.137 Equally, they are also attributed to man by way of his free agency 
and causative ability such as his power and motive 138 both of which are conditions for the 
causation of a particular act. Thus, man’s responsibility, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is justified 
by man’s free will, power, motive and acquisition of a given act.139  
 Ibn al-Qayyim refines ambiguous terms in the Muʿtazilites’ denial of attributing moral 
acts to God. He says: 
 
As for your stance of denying the attribution of moral acts to God, this needs further clarification. 
If you deny the attribution of moral acts based on your understanding that God is literally 
carrying out such acts, responsible for them and His names are derived from them, then this is 
correct [it is not a solely theocentric causation process according to Ibn al-Qayyim]. If you deny 
the attribution of moral acts based you your understanding that God has no knowledge, power, 
general will and creation over such acts then this is incorrect [it is not solely a humanist causation 
process according to Ibn al-Qayyim]. Therefore, both God and Man are involved in the causation 
process - since it was God who created the tools and object of the actions, namely, senses and the 
object of the senses such as the scene and sound.   
If man created the sight and hearing then did he create the object of it (maḥal) [i.e. the scene and 
sound]?140 
 
                                                          
134 See previous section Ashʿarites on Human Agency. Also see, al-Dowsari, op. cit., pp. 424- 460; 
Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā, al-Jabr wa al-Ikhtiyār bayn al-Mutakallimīn wa al-Ṣūfiyya, PhD, Azhar 
University, 1398AH, p. 133.  
135 Muḥammad ʿAmāra, op. cit., p. 76;  J. R. T. M. Peters, God's Created Speech: A Study in the 
Speculative Theology of the Muʿtazilī Qāḍī l-Quḍāt Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, 
Brill, 1976, p. 159; Sophia Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts: The Character of Mu'tazilite Ethics, 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2008, p. 145.  
136 Ayman Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Brill, 2006, p. 13. 
137 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 2, pp. 876- 877, 843- 844. 
138 Ibid 
139 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 829- 832. 
140 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 876- 877, 843- 844. 
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Subsequently, it is clear that Ibn al-Qayyim attempts to avoid diminishing God’s part in the 
causation of moral acts, because he argues that man’s sight, hearing and their objects - the scene 
and sound - are created by God. Thus, moral acts can rationally be attributed to God in this 
regard.141                 
 On the other hand, Ibn al-Qayyim also avoids diminishing man’s freedom by advocating 
divine general will in this debate. Divine general will (al-mashīʾa al-ʿāma), in the context 
employed by Ibn al-Qayyim, denotes that things occur according to God’s general will, meaning 
that within man God created the ability and motive to act and at the same time there is no 
continuous intervention by God before each act - as is the case with divine specific will (al-
mashīʾa al-khāṣṣa). For example, when a person moves and breathes, he/she does so by God’s 
general will; for, had God have willed every breath or movement of that person then it would 
have been done by God’s specific will. God intervenes each time man wants to act by creating in 
him the power and motive to act. Consequently, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that man’s agency is the 
result of God’s general will and hence, each movement is not conditional upon God’s specific 
will in order for it to be executed.142 This stance seems to be contrary to that of Ibn Taymiyya’s, 
which advocates the existence of things by God’s specific will;143 hence Ibn al-Qayyim’s stance 
indicates a potentially original development. Similarly, I think that Ibn al-Qayyim is seeking to 
develop a synthesized position where both free will and divine determinism are not 
compromised. So, to argue that man’s agency is the result of God’s general will - which was 
perhaps executed in pre-eternity - gives more freedom to man - within a theistic framework - 
than the limited freedom which results from God’s specific will. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim avoids 
limiting man’s freedom without compromising God’s will over all things; thus, he advocates 
divine general will instead of divine specific will in this debate. 
                                                          
141 Also see Ibn al-Qayyim’s dual agency in the example of opening one’s eye, Ibid., vol. 2, p. 843; and Ibn 
Taymiyya’s dual agency using the example of reciting, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn 
Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim, Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahad, Madīna, 1995, vol. 8, pp. 121 ff. 
142 Ibn al-Qayyim op. cit ., vol. 1, p. 178; ibid, vol. 2, p. 971; idem, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn wa Bāb al-
Saʿādatayn, ed. Muḥammad Ajmal al-Iṣlāhī, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1429AH, vol. 1, p. 88; cf. idem, 
Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn Manāzil iyāka naʿbud wa iyāka nastaʿīn, ed. Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, Dār al-
Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1996, vol. 1, p. 180; idem, Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda wa Manshūr wilāyat al-ʿIlm wa al-
Irāda, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998, vol. 2, p. 45. 
143 See Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism, Brill, 2007, pp. 150, 164.   
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Conclusion 
To summarise, in this chapter I have demonstrated that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with both the 
Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites on aspects related to divine determination, such as divine agency, 
human agency, human motives and causative ability, and the divine general will. Similarly, I 
have argued that Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a compatibilist position of dual agency - where man’s 
causative ability allows him to be a free and responsible agent on a micro-level. Similarly, God’s 
agency is justified by His creative ability which determines things on a macro-level. I have also 
illuminated a potentially original development in Ibn al-Qayyim’s position: man acts according 
to God’s general will. This entails more freedom and responsibility for man; unlike the limited 
freedom and responsibility implicit in God’s specific will. And lastly, I have shown how Ibn al-
Qayyim manages to harmonise and synthesise the opposing positions of the Muʿtazilites and the 
Ashʿarites by introducing terms such as ‘conditions’, ‘partially causative’, and ‘general will’ to 
the debate and also by arguing that moral acts are attributed to both man’s causative ability and 
God’s general will. In the next chapter, I will discuss Ibn al-Qayyim’s view on how far human 
agency comprehends good and evil, independently of divine agency as represented in scripture. 
Additionally, I will discuss whether Ibn al-Qayyim took good and evil to be characteristics that 
are inherent in actions or whether he believed that the ontological values of actions are derived 
from scripture. 
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4- IBN AL-QAYYIM’S TRADITIONALIST RATIONAL OJECTIVISM 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will show how Ibn al-Qayyim takes over from his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, by 
developing a middle way (waṣaṭ) position between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites in the 
debate on meta-ethics. This will be evident in two approaches of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical 
engagement, namely, a rationalistic and a Sufi approach. The rationalist facet of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
critical engagement is clear in his adoption of a Rāzian (Fakhr Dīn al-Rāzī) style of 
argumentation, characterised by a systematic employment of ad hominem arguments. The Sufi 
approach will be evident in his contribution of rational morality as a form of legal conveyance 
(ḥujja) and piety as a strengthening tool of one’s rational morality.    
 
Defining the Debate 
Islamic rational morality1 is a medieval debate on meta-ethics. The debates date back to 
103AH/722CE2 as it is recorded that the first to speak about this debate amongst the Muslims 
was Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān.3 This is deduced from his famous principle: ‘to affirm knowledge by 
reason before revelation’ (ijāb al-maʿārif bi al-ʿaqal qabal warūd al-sharʿ).4 Moreover, the 
                                                          
1 In Arabic it is commonly referred to as al-taḥsīn wa al-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqliyyan.  
2  Ibn Taymiyya, Mujmūʿ al-Fatāwā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim, Majmaʿ al-Malik 
Fahad, Madīna, 1995, vol. 11, p. 676; idem., al-Jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ li-man Baddal Dīn al-Masīḥ, eds. ʿAlī Ibn 
Ḥasan, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Ibrāhīm, and Ḥamdān Ibn Muḥammad, Dār al-ʿĀṣima, Riyadh, 1999, vol. 2, p. 
308. Cf. Idem., Mujmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 4, p. 192.   
3 Some researchers say it was Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī that was the first to talk about rational morality 
(see, Imān Yaḥyā Muṭahhar, al-Akhlāq al-Islāmiyya wa Uṣūliyya al-ʿAqadiyya bayn Miskawayh wa Ibn 
Taymiyya, MA Thesis, Umm al-Qurā University, 1418AH, vol. 2, p. 495.) and others say it was the 
Muʿtazilites (Ḥasan al-Shāfiʿī, al-Āmadī wa ārāʾhu al-kalāmiyya, Dār al-Salām, Cairo, 1998, p. 442). Ibn 
Tayymiya also states that this debate started in the year 300/913; see Ibn Taymiyya, al-Tasʿīnīyya, ed. 
Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-ʿAjlān, Maktaba al-Maʿārif, Riyadh, 1999, vol. 3, p. 908. 
4 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Muʾassassa al-Ḥalabī, n.d., vol. 1, p. 88. 
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debate on Islamic ethics deals with questions such as: is the intrinsic value of an action good 
(ḥusn) or detestable (qubḥ)5? How do we know that an action is either good or detestable? The 
first question focuses on the ontological status of values in ethics and the second question 
focuses on the epistemology of such values. In short, ethics in general is a practical science that 
seeks to establish which actions should be done and which avoided.6 Thus, it has considerable 
implications in theology, as we shall see. Furthermore, each theological school argues for its 
position on the debate and defines exactly where they differ in regards to the terminologies 
adopted; hence, each school has its own implications.  
 According to Ibn Taymiyya, the different meanings of al-ḥusn (good) and al-qubḥ 
(detestable) on the debate are defined as follows: 
(1) A perfect (al-kamāl) attribute or an imperfect (al-nuqṣān) attribute, like 
knowledge and ignorance. This seems to be an ontological question. 
(2) An inclination (al-mulāʾma) and disinclination (al-munāfara), this type is also 
known as benefit (maṣlaḥa) and detriment (mafsada) or tasteful (al-ladha) and 
distasteful (al-alam). This seems to be an aesthetical question. 
(3) The actions that are praiseworthy or blameworthy in this life and has a reward or 
punishment in the hereafter.7 This seems to be an epistemological question.  
The Muslim theologians are in agreement that both (1) and (2) are comprehended by reason (al-
ʿaqal). Ibn Taymiyya further adds that definitions (1) and (2) really have the same meaning.8 
 Therefore, it is in definition (3) where the differences occur between the Ashʿarites and 
the Muʿtazilites.9 According to the early Ashʿarites definition (3) of good and detestable is only 
                                                          
5 qubḥ is also translated as evil; see, George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 111, 125, 135, 137, 142, 145, 148, 153, 170. 
6 George Makdisi, ‘Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine’, in Ethics in Islam ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, 
Undena Publication, Malibu, California, 1985, p. 47. 
7 Muḥmmad ʿAbd Allah ʿAfīfī, al-Naẓariyya al-khuluqiyya ʿinda Ibn Taymiyya, King Faisal Centre for 
Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh, 1988, p. 380.  
8  See, Ibn Taymiyya, Mujmūʿ al-Rasāʾil al-Kubrā, Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d., vol. 2, p. 104. 
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known by revelation, divine command, and not reason.10 On the contrary, the Muʿtazilites hold 
that definition (3) of good and detestable is known by reason.11 Unfortunately, most secondary 
English sources tend to compare early Ashʿarism with later Muʿtazilism on the debate. I believe 
that it would have been fair to compare the two mature stages of each school on the debate, 
namely later Ashʿarism with later Muʿtazilism. The difference between the two later traditions is 
very subtle, given that later Ashʿarīs such as al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī, al-Shahrastānī, and 
al-Āmadī concluded that definition (3) of good and detestable is known by reason, like their 
Muʿtazilite counterparts.12     
 On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya seems to synthesise the two latter positions and 
advance into much more detail. He categorises definition (3) into three categories. Firstly, that 
the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act in this life is known by reason. Secondly, that 
the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act in the hereafter is known by revelation. Lastly, 
that the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an act in this life is a test, known only by 
revelation. This kind of critical engagement which allows for a synthesis or developed middle 
way position is what Ibn al-Qayyim will employ in this debate. 
 In summary, the positions on the debate of Islamic meta-ethics are as follows. The first 
position holds that good and evil are physical attributes that are intrinsic to acts and the 
epistemological tool of good and evil is reason. Moreover, the ontological status of good or evil 
in a given action is either from the essence (dhātihi) of an action or from one attribute of its 
many attributes that is an essential part of the action itself or from the implications of such given 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 ʿAḍud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Iījī, Kitāb al-Muwāqif, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, Dār al-Jīl, Beirut, 1997, 
vo. 3, p. 262; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā, Maktaba al-Kuliyyāt 
al-Azhariyya, Cairo, 1986, vol. 1, p. 346. 
10 For more on the meaning of good (ḥusn) and detestable (qubḥ) according to the Ashʿarites and the 
points of differences, Cf. al-Iījī, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 261- 282; Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn 
Manāzil iyāka naʿbud wa iyāka nastaʿīn, ed. Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1996, 
vol. 1, pp. 251- 25.  
11 al-Juwaynī, al-Irshād, Kitāb Al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭiʿ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-īʿNqād, eds. Muḥammad Y. Musā 
and ʿAlī ʿA. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba al-Khānijī, Miṣr, 1950-1369, p. 258 ff. 
12 Ibid., p. 261; al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī al-ʿitiqād, al-Muḥammadiyya al-Tijāriyya, Cairo, n.d., p. 96; al-
Sharastānī, Nihāya al-Iqdām, e.d. al-Farīd Jayūm, al-Muthannī Baghdād, pp. 371-3; al-Rāzī, al-Maʿālim fī 
al-Uṣūl al-Dīn, al-Ḥasaniyya, 1323AH, pp. 83-5; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, al-Āmadī wa Arāʿahu al-Kalāmiyya, Dār 
al-Salām, 1998, pp. 434-435. 
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action (li wūjūh wa iʿtibarāt ukhrā), which perhaps becomes apparent through difference in 
circumstances. Also, revelation only manifests and illustrates such attributes. Therefore, 
according to this position man is accountable for his moral acts before or absent of revelation. 
This position is held by the Muʿtazilites.13  
 The second position upholds that God is not obliged to do anything by reason and 
nothing is obligatory upon man before revelation. Thus, reason does not indicate what is good or 
evil before revelation nor does it indicate the qualification of religious duty (ḥukum al-taklīf). 
Rather, good and evil are only known by revelation and all the divine commandments and 
prohibitions are merely a test. This position is famously held by the Ashʿarites.14  
 The third position, which is held by Ibn al-Qayyim and his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya,15 is 
more detailed and takes up a middle way position between the two previous positions. This 
position adopts a threefold typology of actions. Firstly, an action that essentially consists of 
either benefit (maṣlaḥa) or harm (mufsada) and is known independently of revelation; just as it is 
known that justice is beneficial for the world and oppression is detrimental. This type of action 
can be either good or evil - both of which are known by reason and also by revelation. However, 
this does not imply that the agent is accountable to punishment in the hereafter, if revelation did 
not confirm the good or evil of the action. This is a crucial point that differentiates position (3) 
from position (1).  
 Secondly, an action that becomes either good or evil as a result of revelation which 
commands or forbids it. There are no examples given for this type of act. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
13 This position is also held by the Karamites, Shīʿites and the Zaydites. See, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 
ed. Dr. Aḥmad al-Ahwānī, Maṭbaʿa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 1382AH., vol. 6:1, pp. 26-34, 59-60; Abū al-Ḥusayn 
al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīd Allah, al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kāthūlīkiyya, Beirut, 
1384AH, vol. 1, p. 363; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Baḥr al-Zukhār, Muʾssassat al-Risāla, Beirut, 1975, vol. 1, p. 59; 
ʿAbd al-Raḥman Ṣāliḥ al-Maḥmūd, Mawqif Ibn Taymiyya mina al-Ashāʿira, Maktaba al-Rushd, Riyadh, 
1995, p. 1320.  
14 Cf. al-Juwaynī, op. cit., p. 258; al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddīm wa al-Mutaʾakhirīn min al-
ʿUlamāʾ wa al-Ḥukamāʾ wa al-Mutakallimīn, ed. Ṭahā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿīd, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 
1984, p. 293- 294; As I have mentioned earlier, this is the position of the early Ashʿarites. Cf. Hasan al-
Shāfaʿī, op. cit., pp. 434-435.  
15 This position is also held by the Sufīs and the Muslim philosophers, see, Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-
Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 434-436; Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn al-Wazīr, Iīthār al-Ḥaqq ʿalā al-Khalq, al-Adab 
wa al-Muʾayyid, 1318AH, pp. 377-379; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, op. cit., p. 444.   
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Prophetic practices and heretical innovations perhaps can be used as examples. The Prophetic 
practices become good due to scriptural commands and likewise acts of innovation become evil 
due to scriptural prohibitions. Hence, the ontological and epistemological values of such acts are 
derived from revelation.      
 The last type is an action which is commanded by revelation merely to test the individual 
on whether he obeys or disobeys such commandments. So, to physically carry out the action is 
not intended. The common examples for this type of action are: Abraham’s sacrifice,16 the 
Prophetic tradition of the three defective men17 and God’s commandments of fifty prayers a day 
instead of five.18 Hence, the purpose for this type is the commandment itself and not what is 
commanded. The last two types of action were supposedly not understood by the Muʿtazilites - 
as Ibn Taymiyya mentions.19 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites 
The Muʿtazilites believe that the criterion to know what is morally good and evil is within the 
essence of the action itself. That is, actions essentially possess attributes of good and evil. In 
addition, the praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of such actions are known by human 
rationality, intuitively or by way of analytical verification without recourse to revelation.20 
Hence, according to this position, rational morality is universal in that what is rationally good 
was also morally good before it was revealed in divine scripture and vice versa. For example, 
justice was good before it was commanded in divine scripture and oppression was detestable 
                                                          
16 Quran 37: 103-107. 
17 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Dār Ṭūq al-Najāt, 1422AH, vol. 4, p. 171, No. 3464; Muslim, Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim, 
Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī, Beirut, n.d., vol. 4, p. 2275, No. 2964.  
18 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, vol. 1, p. 145, No. 162. 
19  Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 434-436; However, this is not the case with the latter 
Muʿtazilites such as al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār who concludes that some acts acquire its attribute of good or 
evil from divine commands and prohibitions. Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, op. cit., pp. 377-379; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, op. 
cit., p. 444.        
20 ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār, Nashʾat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām, 9th ed., Dār al-Maʿārif, Cairo, n.d., vol. 1, p. 
346; George Makdisi, The Censure of Speculative Theology of Ibn Qudama: Tahrim al-Naẓar Fī Kutub Ahl 
al-kalām, Gibb Memorial Trust, 1985, p. 50. 
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before it was forbidden in divine scripture. Hence, revelation came to either confirm that which 
was already known by reason or to disclose that what the rational intellect did not know.21 
 The anti-rational moralist puts forth an argument against rational morality which states 
that such a position implies the imposition of religious duty before or in the absence of 
revelation. This means that God’s commandments and prohibitions are obligatory requirments on 
man even in the absence of revelation. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that the Muʿtazilites admit to this 
implication - the rational obligation of religious duty before or in the absence of revelation - and 
hence, this differentiates the Muʿtazilites’ ethical theory from that of the Traditionalists. Ibn al-
Qayyim states: 
 
They [the Muʿtazilites] say that divine obligations are necessary in the presence and absence of 
revelation; and likewise, its praiseworthiness and its blameworthiness. As for [the affirmation of 
rational] punishment they differ and the detail of such is that those who affirm it, their affirmation 
[of the punishment] is not the same as an obligatory affirmation [like] after the sending of a 
messenger. Instead they say, verily the affirmed punishment [as a result of] divine revelation is a 
different type of punishment from the affirmed punishment as a result of rational obligation. This 
is how they answer the verses that nullify punishment in the absence of revelation.  As for 
rational obligation and prohibition in the absence [of revelation], they explicitly support this and 
explain that it is necessary for God’s wise purpose.22  
The Ashʿarites refute this by arguing that religious duty in the absence of revelation implies that 
legal conveyance (ḥujja) is established independently of a messenger; however, this is 
impossible since God only establishes legal conveyance by way of His messengers.23 Ibn al-
Qayyim agrees with the Ashʿarites on this to a certain extent. But he explains that the meaning of 
obligation and prohibition is to attain the necessary reward or punishment even if this means that 
                                                          
21 Abū Muḥammah Ibn Mattawayh, Kitāb al-Majmūʿ fī al-Muḥīṭ bi-l-Taklīf, ed. Jan Peters, Dār al-Mashriq, 
Beirut, 1999, p. 254;  Aḥmad Muḥammad ʿUmar, al-Muṣṭalaḥāt al-Kalāmiyya fī ʾAfʿāl illāh, Umm al-Qura, 
Mekkah, 1414AH, p. 22.  
22 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda wa Manshūr wilāyat al-ʿIlm wa al-Irāda, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1998, vol. 2, pp.424-425. 
23 Ibid, p. 432. 
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the necessary reward or punishment is prevented by an obstacle or by the absence of a condition. 
This explanation is supported by the following Quranic verse: 
Otherwise, if disaster should afflict them because of that which their own hands have sent before 
(them), they might say: Our Lord! Why did You not send us a Messenger? We should then have 
followed Your revelation and been of the believers.24    
Ibn al-Qayyim explains: 
God has informed us that the reason for their punishment is because of what their hands brought 
forth and hence, God sent His messengers and reveled His scriptures so that they may not say 
‘Our Lord! Why did You not send us a Messenger? We should then have followed Your 
revelation.’ This verse shows the invalidity of both positions, those who say that actions in the 
absence of revelation is not detestable (qabīḥa) essentially (li-dhātihā); but rather it became 
detestable only by divine prohibition. And those who say that actions are detestable [in the 
absence of revelation] and therefore necessitate rational punishment without divine warning.25  
Additionally the Muʿtazilites argued that rational obligations are placed upon God, based on their 
position that reason alone can comprehend the essential attributes of good and evil within 
actions. Consequently, this equates to the obligation that God must do good and eschew (tark) 
evil. For example, they hold that God must: act according to grace (al-luṭf), perform the best and 
even better (al-ṣalāḥ wa al-aṣlaḥ), recompense those whom have been harmed (al-ʾiwaḍ ʾin al-
ālām), and He must reward and punish. Al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār says regarding this: 
And we have shown that there is nothing obligatory upon God except for that what He makes 
obligatory by religious duty (taklīf)26, such as: consolidation (tamkīn) [for his slaves], graces (al-
                                                          
24 Quran 28: 47. 
25 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 433. 
26 Because God made it obligatory upon man so whatever is considered befitting to man is also befitting 
to God and whatever is detestable to man is also detestable to God. Hence, it is an analogy of man’s 
actions to that of God’s.  
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ʾlṭāf), to reward [those whom] deserve reward, and to recompense [those whom] have been 
harmed. These are the things that are obligatory upon God the All-Praised and the Most-High.27 
For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim labels the Muʿtazilites as al-Muʿaṭṭila al-Mushabbiha28 (the 
Deniers and the Resemblers), because they deny God’s attributes and compare His actions to 
those of man. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that the Muʿtazilites were led to deny God’s attributes 
because of their anthropomorphic meanings. Nonetheless, they simultaneously fell into that 
which they were trying to avoid, namely making a likeness between God to man; by obliging 
certain acts upon God based on their rational analogy of man’s actions.  
 Another difference between the Muʿtazilites and the Traditionalists is that the latter hold 
no obligations upon God except for that what He made obligatory upon Himself or prohibited for 
Himself. The difference here is that the Muʿtazilites oblige things upon God as a result of 
rational analogy. The Traditionalists hold that it is by way of Divine commands or Prohibition 
and not human reason. Ibn Taymiyya states: 
 
As for obligating or prohibiting things upon God by way of analogy (qiyās) of His creation, this is 
the stance of the Qadariyya and it is an innovation. The Ahlu Sunna are in agreement that God is 
the Creator of everything and what He wills is, and what He wills not is not. And man does not 
make anything obligatory upon Him. For this reason, we find those from Ahlu Sunna who held 
this stance [obligating things upon God] say: verily, He wrote upon Himself mercy and prohibited 
for Himself oppression, not that man has a right upon God for something…..until he said: and the 
rights for His slaves is by His favour (faḍlihi) and benevolence (iḥsānihi) and not by way of 
compensation (muʿāwaḍa), nor from something made obligatory upon Him by other than Him; 
for verily He transcends that.29  
Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim reiterates: 
                                                          
27 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fi ʾabwāb al-Tawhīd wa al-ʿadal, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Saqā, al-Muʾassasa al-
Maṣriyya, Cairo, 1385AH, vol. 14, p. 53. 
28 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 367. 
29 Ibn Taymiyya, Iqtiḍāʾ al-Ṣirāṭa al-Mustaqīm li Mukhālafat Aṣḥāb al-Jaḥīm, ed. Nāṣr ʿAbd al-Karīm al-
ʿAql, Dār ʿĀlim al-Kutub, Beirut, 1999, p. 310 ff. 
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And the third group, the People of Guidance and Correctness say: nothing is obligatory upon God 
by way of man’s deeds, [whether the obligation is for] salvation or success. Nor are anyone’s 
deeds going to guarantee him paradise. By God’s favour and generosity, He emphasises His 
benevolence that He made obligatory upon Himself a right for His slave as a promise. And His 
generous promise is enjoining even by [phrases such as] ‘maybe’ and ‘perhaps’.30 
Therefore, the Traditionalists do not absolutely consider things to be obligatory upon God nor do 
they completely deny it. Instead, they affirm only that which God has made obligatory upon 
Himself and by His favour (faḍlihi); hence, they deny that anyone can place obligations upon 
God.  
 This point of difference may be due to language. If a person does a good deed for which 
God promises a certain reward, one may argue that it was the person who made it obligatory 
upon God; whereas, the other may argue that it was God who made it obligatory upon Himself. 
Nonetheless, the difference then remains, how do we know of this obligation upon God: it is by 
reason or revelation? The Muʿtazilites say that it is through reason whereas the Traditionalists 
say that it is through revelation.  
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites’ Arguments 
Firstly, al-Qādī ʿAbd-Jabbār argues that God is obliged to act according to certain moral 
standards that are known to human reason. He states:  
God knows the evilness of evil (qubḥ al-qabīh) and He is in no need of it (mustaghnī ʿinhu). 
Additionally, He knows that He is in no need of it, thus if such is the case, then He will never 
choose evil in any form whatsoever.31 
                                                          
30 Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn Manāzil iyāka naʿbud wa iyāka nastaʿīn, ed. Muḥammad al-
Baghdādī, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1996, vol. 2, p. 322. 
31 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Usūl al-Khamsa, ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-Karīm Uthmān, Maktaba Wahba, Cairo, 1996, p. 
302.  
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Secondly, al-Qādī emphasises this further in the following argument while also showing that 
certain acts are also obligatory for man, such as, good manners in the absence of revelation. He 
states:  
If a great powerful king sees a weak person near destruction, verily, he will be inclined to save 
him and he will see it as a good thing…32  
Therefore, the king will still see it as a good deed and from this the Muʿtazilites derive the 
obligation of acts, such as good manners, even in the absence of revelation. Similarly, they use 
this as an analogy for God’s actions, namely that God is obliged to act according to what human 
reason perceives as good. This is also supported by the following argument. Al-Qādī says:  
If a rational person was presented with a need (ḥāja) and was able to fulfill it by either a 
[statement of] truth or lie; both of which are equal in order to fulfill this need. Verily, he will opt 
for the truth and choose it. His natural disposition (ṭabʿhu) will incline towards it for no other 
reason than its goodness. Therefore, if lying did not have an attribute, that one should be cautious 
of, then telling the truth would not have exceeded it (tarajjaḥ).33  
From this, we can extract the following premises that probably led the Muʿtazilites to hold that 
acts are obligatory for man in the absence of revelation and similarly, for God by human reason. 
The premises are as follows: (1) Good acts are obligatory by revelation (2) Good acts are good in 
essence or in attribute (3) Therefore, good acts in essence or attribute are obligatory even without 
revelation; that is to say, by reason. The same applies to evil acts. 
 Ibn al-Qayyim willingly accepts that acts have value in essence or in attribute. However, 
he does not accept the predicate (3) the obligation of acts by reason. This is clear in Ibn al-
Qayyim’s refutations in the section below, entitled Ibn al-Qayyim’s Arguments. 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p. 307-8; Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 365; Muḥammad Rabīʿ al-Madkhalī, al-Ḥikma wa al-
Taʿlīl fī Afʿāl Illah taʿālā, Maktaba Līna, n.d., pp. 95-96. 
33 Ibid. 
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 Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim cites a further eighteen ad hominem (ilzāmāt)34 arguments as 
refutations against the Muʿtazilites’ view on the obligations and prohibitions upon God. Ibn al-
Qayyim states: 
The ninth ad hominem: is that what Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿārī imposed on al-Jubāʾī, when the 
former asked him a question regarding the fate of three brothers35; [the dialogue is as follows,] 
Al-Ashʿarī: O Shaykh, what do you say regarding the fate of three people [in the Hereafter]: a 
believer, an unbeliever, and a child? 
Al-Jubbāʾī: The believer is among the [honored] classes; the unbeliever is among the doomed; 
and the child is among those who escape [perdition]. 
Al-Ashʿarī: If the child should desire to ascend to the ranks of the honored, would it be possible? 
Al-Jubbāʾī: No. It would be said to him, “The believer simply earned the rank through his 
obedience, the likes of which you do not have to your credit.” 
Al-Ashʿarī: If the child should respond, “This is not my fault. Had You allow me to live longer, I 
would have put forth the same obedience as the [adult] believer”? 
Al-Jubbāʾī: God would respond, “I knew that had I given you [additional] life, you would have 
disobeyed Me, for which you would have been punished. So I observed your best interest and 
caused you to die before reaching the age of maturity [at which time you would have become 
responsible for obeying Me according to the religious law].” 
Al-Ashʿarī: what if the [adult] unbeliever should then protest: “O Lord, You knew my fate just as 
You knew his. Why did you not observe my best interest as You observed his?” 
At this, al-Jubbāʾī is said to have fallen silent.36 
                                                          
34 These rational impositions are found in: Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 370-375. 
35 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 371. 
36 The translation of this dialogue is taken from, Sherman A. Jackson, Islam & the Problem of Black 
Suffering, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 75-76. For a study on this dialogue see, Gwynne, R. W., ‘al-
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This ad hominem response evidently seeks to expose the inconsistency in the Muʿtazilite position 
that God must act in the best interest of man. This is clear in the fallacy that God must act in the 
best interest of the child but not the adult unbeliever. Therefore, this implies that God does not 
always act in man’s best interest, as is perceived by man’s rationality. Ibn al-Qayyim further 
argues:     
The seventieth ad hominem: there is not a ‘best interest’ (aṣlaḥ) except that there is an even better 
interest than the previous (Aṣlaḥ minhu) and to limit it to one level is like limiting it to practicality 
(ṣalāḥ). Thus, there is no meaning to your position that it is obligatory [upon God] to maintain the 
best interest (murāʿāt al-aṣlaḥ) [for man] since there is no end to it; therefore, it is not possible 
for the action to be maintained [according to the best interest of man].37 
In this ad hominem, Ibn al-Qayyim attempts to argue for the multiplicity and relativity in the 
Muʿtazilites’ concept of ‘best interest’. The reason being is that ‘best interest’ is a relative 
concept and therefore there will always be a better ‘best interest’ than a particular ‘best interest’. 
 This rational ad hominem, like the many others mentioned in Ibn al-Qayyim’s Miftāḥ Dār 
al-Saʿāda, is very much Rāzian38 stylistically. Furthermore, this style of debate is not common in 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s other works. Hence, these rational ad hominems reveal either a possible Rāzian 
influence on Ibn al-Qayyim in the domain of Philosophical Theology or that these ad hominems 
possibly belong to al-Rāzī without Ibn al-Qayyim citing it as such.       
Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues:   
 
The twelfth ad hominem: verily, they [the Muʿtazilites] should maintain that it is obligatory on 
God, to whom belongs might and majesty, that He should cause to die all the children whom He 
knows that if they grow they will disbelieve and become stubborn. So if He causes them to die 
then there is no doubt this is for their best interest. Or they [the Muʿtazilites] should deny His 
knowledge, glory be to Him, of what will happen, before He created the universe just as their foul 
predecessors imposed…..there is no escape for them from these two ad hominems except by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jubbā'ī? al-Ash'arī?  And the Three Brothers: The Uses of Fiction’, in The Muslim World, vol. 75, Iss. 3-
4, October 1985, pp. 132–161.   
37 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 373. 
38 Resembling Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. 
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adopting the positions of the Ahlu Sunna wa Jamāʿa, that God’s actions are not to be deduced by 
analogy to the actions of man, nor is it comprehended by their narrow minds. Rather, His actions 
do not resemble that of His creation nor are His attributes or His essence likes theirs; There is 
nothing like Him and He is the All-Seer the All-Hearer.39    
In this ad hominem, Ibn al-Qayyim paves the way to two false implications based on the 
Muʿtazilites’ position that God must act in the best interest of man. Firstly, God must either 
cause all unbelieving children to die if He is to act according to their best interest - as is found in 
the previous debate between Abū al-Hasan al-Ashʿarī and al-Jubbāʾī. Or Secondly, God must 
have no knowledge of the future, as is the position of the early Qadarites. Consequently, the only 
option left, according to this argument, is to hold that divine acts transcend the acts of man and 
hence cannot be comprehended or deduced by rational analogy.     
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites 
Ibn al-Qayyim engages with three different approaches of the anti-rational moralist’s arguments. 
Firstly the approach of Abū ʿAbd Allah Ibn al-Kaṭīb, who is also known as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. 
Then the approach of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Āmadī; lastly, the approach of al-Qādī al-Bāqillānī and 
al-Juwaynī. Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a systematic employment of ad hominem arguments in order 
to refute these three Ashʿarite approaches.40  
Firstly the approach of Ibn al-Khaṭīb is that:  
Man’s actions are not the result of free will and whatever actions that are not the result of free 
will are neither morally good nor detestable by consensual rationality (ʿaqlan bi-itifāq). Since, 
those who hold the opinion of rational morality admit that such is the case only if it results from 
free will; and we have proven that they [the actions] are necessitated (iḍṭrārī), thus, it is 
                                                          
39Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 373. 
40 The arguments that I shall cite in this section are not the sixty arguments against the Ashʿarites as are 
mentioned by Ibn Qayyim in Madārij, vol. 1, p. 175 and Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 381-438. Nonetheless, one 
does notice that Ibn Qayyim’s style of refutation in these sixty arguments is very similar to that of al-
Rāzī. Hence, it is possible that Ibn Qayyim had a copy of al-Rāzī’s arguments nearby and refuted them 
point by point. If not, then it is a clear indication of some possible Rāzian influence on Ibn Qayyim.   
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necessarily (yalzam) not described as either good nor detestable according to the [theological] 
schools. As for proving that it [an action] is not out of free will, this is because if man cannot 
perform or eschew an action then this is clear [that he has no free will]. And if he can perform or 
eschew an action then this is possible (jāʾz). However, if the action depends on a contingent 
(murajjiḥ) that will result in the preponderance (tarjīḥ) of performing over eschewing (tark), then 
[firstly], if it has no dependence then it is accidental (ittifāqī); and whatsoever is accidental is 
neither described as good nor detestable. And [secondly], if it [the action] depends on a 
preponderant, then it is according to its preponderance- whether it be necessary (lāzim) or 
possible (jāʾz). If it is necessary then it [the action] is necessitated and if it [the preponderance] is 
possible then the categorisation is repeated, either it [the preponderance] ends up becoming 
necessary and hence [the action] is necessitated or not [i.e. the preponderance becomes possible] 
and ends up in a infinite regress (tasalsal); and it is impossible to become accidental so it is 
neither described as good nor detestable.41 
Al-Rāzī’s aim in this argument is to prove that man’s actions are not the result of his free will, 
rather they are necessitated. If such is the case, then they are neither described as good nor 
detestable since they are not from his own free will. He then argues that actions which are 
possible (in terms of it being possible to either perform or eschew them) are either dependent on 
a preponderant or are accidental. If the actions are accidental, then they are neither described as 
good nor detestable since the act came about by chance. Nevertheless, if the action depends on a 
preponderant, then either the preponderant is necessary or possible. If the preponderant is 
necessary, the act is not by man’s free will hence it is neither good nor detestable. However, if 
the preponderant is possible then the whole categorical process repeats itself and results in an 
infinite regress. Therefore, al-Rāzī’s carefully devised argument only allows room for 
necessitated actions which in turn is neither described as good nor detestable. 
Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this argument in twelve different points (awjuh). Firstly, he argues 
that al-Rāzī’s argument also applies to God’s actions. As a result, to possibly imply that God has 
no free will – which no Muslim theologian would accept - proves the falseness of al-Rāzī’s 
argument. Ibn al-Qayyim states:     
                                                          
41 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 342; al-Madkhalī, op. cit., p. 101. 
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The second point: if the argument is true then it will imply that God has no free will regarding 
His actions since the categorisation and repetition mentioned also applies to Him. Like saying, 
His actions are either necessary or possible, so if it is necessary then it [His action] becomes 
necessitated. And if the action is possible, then it either requires a preponderant (murajjiḥ)- which 
results in the categorisation being repeated- or, it is accidental (itifāqī). And the implication of 
God having no free will is sufficient in proving the falseness of this argument.42 
Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that al-Rāzī’s argument implies the rejection of scriptural morality. 
The reason being is that divine commands and prohibitions require that one can perform such 
commandments or eschew such prohibitions. Therefore, divine commandments and prohibitions 
do not seek acts that are necessitated or accidental, since this may contradict the concept of 
responsibility. As a person who acts or eschews by free will is rightly responsible and not one 
who acts or eschews by necessity or accident. Ibn al-Qayyim says: 
The third point: if the argument mentioned is true then it would necessitate (lazima) the 
nullification of scriptural morality [al-ḥusn wa al-qubḥ al-sharʿīyan] because man’s action is 
necessitated (ḍarūrī) or accidental (itifāqī); and if it is such, then divine revelation (al-sharʿ) 
neither [deems it] good nor detestable. This is because [divine revelation] is not concerned with 
religious duty (taklīf) [that is necessitated or accidental] and even more so not concerned with 
morally good or detestable [acts that are necessitated or accidental].43  
Ibn al-Qayyim explains that al-Rāzī’s argument in fact proves that man acts by free will. He 
states that:   
The sixth point: this same argument mentioned, is proof that it [man’s action] is by free will 
because it has been obliged (wajaba) by free will (ikhtiyār) and whatsoever is obliged by free will 
is nothing but free will; or it would be free will without free will and this is combining between 
two contradictions. The argument just mentioned is proof of your false position and that an 
obliged action by choice is free will.44 
                                                          
42 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 343. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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This argument can be simplified into the following premises. Firstly, man’s act is obligatorily 
dependent on a preponderant. Secondly, the preponderant is subservient to man’s free will. 
Therefore, man is obliged to act by his free will. For example, if a person is presented with some 
food, this person may be obliged to act or shun, according to one or more of many 
preponderances such as: he is hungry, the food smells nice, he is full, the food smells horrible, he 
is busy, etc. However, the obligation to act or eschew according to one or more of these many 
preponderances does not contradict the fact that he has free will. One can still choose not to eat 
even when one is hungry, perhaps because he does not like the look of the food or he is busy. So, 
his free will is intact, although his is obliged by free will. 
 Ibn al-Qayyim stresses that al-Rāzī’s argument assumes that all necessary actions means 
that the agent has no free will. In Ibn al-Qayyim’s previous counter refutation, he shows that an 
agent’s free will is still intact even while his action is necessary; even when he is obliged by free 
will. So Ibn al-Qayyim explains that al-Rāzī should convince us that necessary actions are 
precluded from being declared good or detestable and not actions where the agent has no free 
will - since Ibn al-Qayyim agrees with this. Consequently, al-Rāzī’s argument fails to tackle the 
point of disputation which is: are necessary actions precluded from moral judgments? Again, the 
disputed point is not: are actions where the agent has no free will precluded from moral 
judgments? According to Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Rāzī confuses the two notions, necessary actions and 
no free will, in that al-Rāzī equates them to the same thing. Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
The tenth point: the aim of this argument was to prove that an action is necessary (lāzim) when 
the cause (sabab) is present. You did not put forth an argument to prove that whatever is 
[necessary] is precluded (imtanaʿa) from being declared good or detestable other than a mere 
claim. So where is the evidence, that whatever [action] is necessary is precluded from being 
declared good or detestable? But rather your argument only proves that whatever actions are not 
the result of free will is precluded from being declared good or detestable. The argument does not 
tackle the disputed point (maḥl al-nizāʿ); [instead] what the argument tackles is agreed upon and 
its premises are correct, hence, your argument did not benefit in anything.45 
                                                          
45 Ibid., p. 344 
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Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim also argues: 
The eleventh point: regarding what you said ‘thus, it is necessarily (yalzam) not described as 
either good nor detestable according to the [theological] schools’, this is false. Since, those who 
dispute with you only preclude an action from being described as good or detestable if it is not 
associated with power (qudra) and free will (ikhtiyār). As for what is the result of power and free 
will, then they do not help you, by not describing it as good or detestable.46 
According to this counter refutation, both Ibn al-Qayyim and the Muʿtazilites hold that actions 
which are the result of power and free will are described as good or detestable - this includes 
necessary actions. Once more, al-Rāzī assumes that necessary actions are actions that are not 
associated with power and free will. This is not the case with other schools such as the 
Muʿtazilites, as Ibn al-Qayyim maintains.           
 As for al-Āmadī’s approach, he argues that if a good action is an extra quality (amran 
zāʾdan) from its essences then this would imply that meanings (maʿnā) are brought about by 
meanings; and this is impossible since accidents (ʿarḍ) are not brought about by accidents.47  
Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this argument as follows: 
This [argument] is just as false as the one before it given that it is contradicted by the many 
meanings that are described by meanings such as, necessary knowledge (ʿilm ḍarūrī), acquirable 
knowledge (ʿilm kasbī), absolute will (irāda jāzima), fast movement, slow movement, round 
movement, straight movement, pleasant nature, devious nature…..and much much more of that 
which is uncountable, of meanings and accidents that are described as existing meanings and 
accidents and whosoever claims they do not exist then he is arrogant.48 
Lastly, we consider the approach of al-Qādī al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī and Abū ʿAmmar Ibn al-
Ḥājib, the latter two are later Ashʿarite scholars. They argue as follows: 
If good and evil are inherent qualities then they would not have differed according to different 
circumstances, relations (mutaʿliqāt), and times. Nor would it be inconceivable for the abrogation 
                                                          
46 Ibid. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutations of al-Rāzī’s arguments see Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 342-344.  
47 Ibid; Also see Ibn Taymiyya, al-Tasʿīnīyya, p. 909.  
48 Miftāḥ, p. 344. For more refutations against al-Āmadī’s argument cf. Miftāḥ, p. 344-345.  
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(al-naskh) of actions, since, an inherent quality is permanent…It is known that lying is good if it 
is to save a Prophet or believer, and if it was an inherent quality it would be evil in all scenarios. 
Likewise with the abrogation of revelation, if it was inherently good then it would not legalise 
evil [like Abraham’s sacrifice] and if it were inherently evil then it would not legalise good by 
abrogation [like the abrogation of certain worships such as, the fifty prayers a day instead of 
five].49 
Ibn al-Qayyim again refutes this argument with five very lengthy points. Firstly, he points out 
that they have misunderstood what is meant by ‘good and evil in essence’. According to Ibn al-
Qayyim, this does not always mean that it is an intrinsic quality. Secondly, he argues that lying is 
always evil regardless of the circumstance. But what is allowed is an antonomasia (tawriyya), 
which is to use a word or phrase that may be understood in two different ways. Ibn al-Qayyim 
then goes on to explain the divine wise purpose of actions or laws that have been abrogated50 and 
importantly the wisdom behind Abraham’s sacrifice.51  
Ibn al-Qayyim explains: 
And from here is where our disputers have misunderstood us and have rationally imposed on us 
things that should not have been imposed. What we mean by good and evil in essence or attribute 
is that it is inherently the source of benefit (muṣlaḥa) and harm (mufsada). And the disposition 
(tartīb) of the two [benefit and harm] in relations to it [good and evil in essence] is like the 
disposition of effects (musababāt) in relation to causes (asbāb) which is a consequential 
precondition. [For example] this disposition is like feeling full (al-shabʿ) after eating or like the 
benefits and harms in foods and medicines.52  
Ibn al-Qayyim argues, regarding lying: 
                                                          
49 Cf. Al-Mawāqif, p. 325; Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid fī ʿIlm al-Kalām, Dār al-
Maʿārif al-Nuʿmāniyya, Pakistan, 1981, vol. 4, p. 285; Miftāḥ, p. 345. For more arguments that pertain to 
this Ashʿarite approach, see Miftāḥ, p. 345. 
50 Ibid, p.346-352. 
51 Ibid, p. 349-350. 
52 Ibid, p. 346. 
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Nay, lying is nothing but evil. As for what is considered good is an indirect statement (taʿrīḍ) or 
an antonomasia (tawriyya) just as is stated in the Prophetic tradition that Abraham indirectly 
stated to the oppressive king: this is my sister, regarding Abraham’s wife. Also, like he said: 
verily, I am ill. So he indirectly stated (ʿaraḍ) that he was ill in his heart because of their 
polytheism, or he will become ill one day. Similarly when Abraham said: Nay, this one, the 
biggest of them (idols) did it. Ask them, if they are able to speak!53  
Ibn al-Qayyim claims that these were not lies as we may understand them to be, instead they 
were true according to the intentions of the speaker, namely Abraham, and misunderstood by the 
receiver, as was intended by the speaker.54 
 Ibn al-Qayyim concludes that these are the strongest arguments of the anti-rational 
moralists (al-nufāt) and it is sufficient that they themselves admit that all of their arguments 
besides these ones are weak (ḍaʿīf).55 So there is no need to mention and falsify them since the 
morning light is clear to he who has sight.56  
Ibn al-Qayyim on Morality 
Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim defines the point of differences in this debate by two principles. First, do 
actions according to definition (3) contain attributes of good and evil,57 in that good and evil are 
intrinsic to the action itself? Secondly, how do we know the reward for good actions and the 
punishment for evil actions: is it by reason or revelation?58  
                                                          
53 Ibid., p. 354; Quran 21: 63. 
54 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 354. 
55 There is another argument put forth by the Ashʿarites which I thought was quite interes7ng but the 
refutations were also lengthy, hence, I will only cite it as follows: ‘If good and evil were from the essence 
or attribute of an action, then this would imply that God has no free will regarding His qualification 
(ḥukm). Given that, the qualification from God would be according to [man’s] reason and it would not be 
fitting for Him to leave it [i.e. differ with man’s reason]; hence, this undermines God’s free will.’ Cf. al-
Taftāzānī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 151. The refutation of this argument is found in the following places, Ibn al-
Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 355-360; Ibn Taymiyya, Iqtiḍāʾ al-Ṣirāṭa al-Mustaqīm, vol. 2, pp. 776-777; al-
Taftāzānī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 151 ff. 
56
 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 355. 
57
 I will interchange the translation of qubḥ as detestable or evil according to the context of the 
discussion.  
58
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij al-Sālikīn, vol. 1, p. 246. 
122 
 
 
 Ibn al-Qayyim goes on to show that the Muʿtazilites hold that the two latter principles are 
inseparable (talāzum), in that good and evil are intrinsic to acts and thus the moral judgments of 
such acts are known by reason.59 Conversely, the Ashʿarites deny the two principles given that 
actions do not contain intrinsic attributes of good and evil but rather good and evil are only 
known by revelation.60 So, whatever God commands is good and whatever he forbids is evil.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim states that the Muʿtazilites were incorrect in upholding the two principles 
as inseparable and likewise, the Ashʿarites were incorrect in denying the two principles 
altogether.61 Ibn al-Qayyim holds that the two principles are not inseparable and also actions62 
are good and evil just like they are beneficial and harmful. Nevertheless, there is no reward or 
punishment as a result of the actions except by divine commands and prohibitions.63 Likewise, in 
the absence of revelation, punishment is not obligatory for evil actions, even though evil is an 
essential attribute of the act itself. God only punishes after He sends a warner, namely a 
messenger. Thus, to prostrate to the devil, to lie, to fornicate, and to oppress are all essentially 
evil, but the condition of punishment for them is revelation, as Ibn al-Qayyim argues.64       
 On the point of differences regarding the debate at hand, Ibn al-Qayyim converses with 
himself as follows: 
 
                                                          
59 However, I must point out that Ibn al-Qayyim does not differentiate between the early and later 
Muʿtazilites. The posi7on men7oned here belongs to the early Muʿtazilites; whereas, the later 
Muʿtazilites hold that some7mes moral judgments are known by revela7on and do not necessarily 
consist of an intrinsic attribute of good or evil. Cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, eds. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-
Najār and ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Najār, vol. 11, pp. 135 ff; ibid., vol. 14, pp. 149- 161; ibid., vol. 5, pp. 19 ff; 
Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Zarkān, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī wa Āraʾuhu al-Kalāmiyya wa al-Falsafiyya, Dār al-Fikr, 
Cairo, 1963, pp. 523 ff; Hasan al-Shāfaʿī, op. cit., p. 444.  
60 Ibid., p. 176. Again, Ibn al-Qayyim fails to differentiate between the early and later Ashʿarites. It is the 
early Ashʿarites who hold the posi7on men7oned by Ibn al-Qayyim. Whereas, the latter Ashʿarites hold 
that some acts have intrinsic attributes of good or evil and hence is known by reason, cf. Hasan al-
Shāfaʿī, op. cit., p. 436.  
61 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 246- 248. 
62 By Ibn al-Qayyim holding that the two principles are not inseparable, he is agreeing with his teacher, 
Ibn Tymiyya’s second types of acts in his threefold typology of actions; namely certain ontological and 
epistemological values in acts are derived from revelation, as we shall see shortly. 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid 
123 
 
 
If it is said, the point of differences is that the action’s essence (dhāt) or attribute (waṣf) is 
essential (lāzim) to the action itself hence it is necessarily good and evil. However, these two 
conditions oppose each other as it is not possible for each of them to be an essential attribute 
since; essentiality (al-lāzim) prevents the [action from being] separable to it [namely the attributes 
or essence].65 It is said (qīl), the meaning of good and evil being essential to the action’s essence 
or attribute is that, good originates (yanshāʾ) from its essence or attribute by a certain condition 
and evil originates from its essence or attribute by another condition. Therefore, if the condition is 
not present or there is an obstacle to the essentiality [of the action and its essence or attribute] 
then the essentiality is removed in regards to the essence or attribute because of the absences of 
the condition or the presence of an obstacle.66 
So, one of the points of differences is the ontology of value, whether or not an action has an 
essential essence or attribute to it. According to those who opposed the ‘essentiality’ of an 
action, there is a potential problem in that the action’s essence or attribute cannot be essential to 
the action itself, given that essentiality means that it is  inseparable. This is clearly contrary to the 
different circumstance of an action where the same action could be good at certain times and evil 
at others. Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this argument by explaining that this ‘essentiality’ is conditional 
upon the presence of its condition and the absence of any obstacles. Hence, the essentiality of an 
act’s essence or attribute is not always inseparable. However, he did not show how this was 
possible but rather said that ‘this is very clear’ (hadhā wāḍiḥ jiddan).67 
 Ibn al-Qayyim defines another point of difference in the debate which deals with the 
epistemology for the accountability of moral value. How do we know the reward or punishment 
for actions: is it by revelation alone or by reason or both? Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
The anti-[rational moralists] (al-nufāt) agree that the good or evil of an action, which is defined as 
inclination (al-mulāʾma) and disinclination (al-munāfara) or perfect (al-kamāl) and imperfect (al-
                                                          
65 This is based on the argument put forth by al-Qādī al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwanynī that, if good and evil 
were essential to an action, then the action would not have been different as it is in different situations 
and times. For example, lying can be good if it was to save a Prophet and is evil in other situations. Thus, 
evil is not an essential attribute or essence to the action itself. (Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 345.  
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
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nuqṣān), is known by reason. They say, we do not argue with you on the good and evil that is 
defined by these two notions. But rather we argue whether reason can know the praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness of an action in this life and the reward or punishment for it in the hereafter. 
According to us, reason has no say in this, only revelation alone. They [anti-rational moralists] 
say that the good and evil that is defined as inclination and disinclination is known by reason. 
And [the good and evil] that is defined as perfect and imperfect is also known by reason. And [the 
good and evil that is] defined [as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and its] prerequisite of 
reward and punishment is where the differences arise.68  
Ibn al-Qayyim then continues by elaborating how this point of difference could become 
consensual (itifāqiyya) if it was given its full rights and all were to abide by its impositions 
(lawāzimuh).69   
 As we can see from previous positions, there are clear differences between Ibn al-Qayyim 
and the other theological schools on this debate. Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Muʿtazilites in 
that he holds punishment to be determined by revelation and not reason alone.70 Similarly, Ibn 
al-Qayyim maintains that nothing is obligatory for God except for obligations He has placed 
upon himself71 as is befitting of His divine names and attributes; this is known by revelation and 
not by human reason.72 Likewise, Ibn al-Qayyim advocates that religious duty (taklīf) is only 
known by way of revelation and not reason; therefore, nothing is required of man in the absence 
of revelation.73 Thus, while Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Muʿtazilites on these points he is also 
agreeing with the Ashʿarites.  
 On the other hand, Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Ashʿarites on the following points. Ibn 
al-Qayyim is a pro-rational moralist who believes that good and evil are found in the essence and 
                                                          
68 Ibid., p. 362. 
69 Ibid 
70 Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij, vol. 1, pp. 246- 248; idem., Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 324- 325, 362- 363, 424-426, 
433, 437. 
71 A potential research avenue is to study the different notions of self divine necessity- namely Ibn Sīnā’s 
natural necessity theory, the Muʿtazilites’ divine moral obliga7on, the Ashʿarites’ divine voli7on 
obligation, and Ibn al-Qayyim’s divine wise purpose obligation. 
72
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 367, 378, 430. 
73
 Ibid, p. 432, 380, 378,  
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attributes of acts and are known by reason.74 Furthermore, revelation sometimes further 
emphasises the moral value of certain actions.75 So while Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the 
Ashʿarites on this point, he is also agreeing with the Muʿtazilites. In this sense, Ibn al-Qayyim is 
engaging with both the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites in order to develop his own position, which 
could be seen as a middle way (waṣaṭ)76 position. He also introduces new concepts to his middle 
way developed position, such as: rational moral values as a form of legal conveyance and piety 
as a means to strengthen ones’ rational moral values.      
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God has established two kinds of legal conveyance (ḥujja) 
upon man: rational moral values and a messenger - the former which is firmly embedded in 
man’s intellect so that he may differentiate between good and evil.77 Additionally, Ibn al-Qayyim 
considers that the highest form of defectiveness is when one lacks rational moral values78 and 
hence fails to distinguish right from wrong and good from evil. That is to say, the more you get 
to know God the clearer your rational moral values become.79 Nevertheless, punishment is not 
justified by rational moral values; it is a messenger who makes punishment justified. Ibn al-
Qayyim says: 
 
The verified position in this great doctrine (aṣl) is that detestability (qubḥ) is firmly inherent 
within action[s] and God does not punish for it only after legal conveyance (ḥujja) has been 
establish by a messenger. This is the point that both the Muʿtazila and Kallābiyya missed.80 
It is likely that Ibn al-Qayyim initially followed his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, in the process of 
engaging with the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites in the debate on meta-ethics. As a result of this 
                                                          
74 Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij, vol. 1, pp. 246- 248; idem., Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 319, 324- 326.  
75 Madārij, vol. 1, p. 250. 
76 Ibn al-Qayyim claims that the Traditionalists hold a middle way position between other theological 
schools on the debate at hand, See, Miftāḥ, vol.  2, pp. 61, 243.   
77 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, ed. Al-Ḥassānī 
Ḥasan ʿAbd Allah, Maktaba Dār al-Turāth, Cairo, n.d., p. 260. 
78 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala fī al-Rudd ʿalā al-Jahmiyya wa al-Muʿaṭṭila, ed. ʿAlī Ibn 
Muḥammad al-Dakhīl Allah, Dār al-ʿĀṣima, Riyadh, 1408AH, vol. 4, p. 1498.  
79 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, p. 32. 
80 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 325. 
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critical engagement, a middle way Traditionalist position, which agrees with the Muʿtazilites on 
certain points and the Ashʿarites on others, was developed.  
 Ibn Taymiyya categorises the meta-ethics of declaring good or evil (al-taḥsīn wa al-
taqbīḥ) into two types of actions. Firstly, actions which are both beneficial and inclined towards 
by the agent or that are harmful and disinclined away from by the agent. This type of action is 
known by reason and all theological schools are in agreement with this.81 The second category is 
made up of actions which are the cause to blameworthiness and punishment. The moral 
judgment nature of this category is where differences occur between the different theological 
schools.82 The Muʿtazilites say that evil, oppression, associationism, lying, and indecency (al-
fawāhish) are known by reason and the agent of such is worthy of punishment in the hereafter, 
even if no messenger was sent to him.83 The Ashʿarites on the other hand say that moral 
judgment is valid by revelation. They maintain that there is no such thing as good, detestable or 
evil moral judgments before the coming of a messenger. Instead, the moral judgment of good is 
only that which revelation says ‘do’, namely the commandments. Equally, a moral judgment of 
‘detestable’ is only that which revelation says ‘do not do’, namely the prohibitions. 
Consequently, the Ashʿarites denied any wise purpose in divine commands and prohibitions - 
instead such rulings are the result of arbitrary divine volition.84  
 Ibn Taymiyya confirms the Traditionalists’ position which holds that oppression, 
associationism, lies, and indecency (al-fawāḥish) are detestable even in the absence of 
revelation; however, punishment is only justified after the sending of a messenger,85 namely 
revelation, after which man can no longer use ignorance as an excuse.86  
                                                          
81 Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Mujmūʿ, vol. 8, pp. 90, 309-310. 
82 Ibid, vol. 8, p. 309.  
83 Ibid, vol. 8, p. 435. 
84 Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām 
Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1991, vol. 8, p. 54; idem., Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī 
Naqḍ Kalām al-Shīʿa al-Qadariyya, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd 
al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1986, vol. 3, p. 351.  
85 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Mujmūʿ, vol. 8, p. 435.  
86 For a study on Ibn Taymiyya’s ethics see, Sophia Vasalou, ‘Ibn Taymiyya’s ethics between Ashʿarite 
voluntarism and Muʿtazilite rationalism: a middle road?’ in Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in 
Medieval World of Islam: New texts and Perspectives, ed. Gregor Schwarb, Sabine Schmidtke, and Lukas 
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 I think the Ashʿarites’ anti-rational morality position was perhaps inevitable due to their 
opinion of complusionism (jabr). If man is not the agent of his actions then none of man’s 
actions are detestable since God is the sole agent; therefore morality is only determined by God, 
and not reason. Al-Rāzī clearly emphasises this by saying, ‘man is compelled (mujbūr) to act 
detestably, and hence, none of his actions are detestable.’87 Ibn Taymiyya comments on this: 
 
This opinion is like the argument of the polytheist who use qadar to justify their sins, [they say] 
‘Had God willed, we would not have ascribed unto Him partners neither had our fathers, nor had 
we forbidden aught88 
It is also likely that Ibn al-Qayyim contributed some Sufi aspects to the debate, given that he 
commonly argues for a particular theological position in order to encourage piety, worship and 
love of God.89 At times, he argues that sins corrupt human rational morals. The more pious one is 
the clearer one’s rational moral judgment, namely the ability to distinguish right from wrong and 
good from evil.90 Ibn al-Qayyim also maintains that a living heart has a strong rational morality 
and a dead heart is one that has a weak rational morality.91 As such, one may argue that one side 
of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theology has a Sufi aspect to it which seeks to better man and his relationship 
with God92 while the other side is rationalistic, especially considering his intellectual critical 
engagement with rational schools of theology.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Muehlethaler. Leuven: Peeters, forthcoming; And Sophia Vasalou, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics, 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming.   
 
87 al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, p. 202- 203; Ibn Taymiyya, al-Tasʿīnīyya, p. 909. 
88 Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Mujmūʿ, vol. 16, pp. 246- 247; idem., al-Tasʿīniyya, p. 247; Quran 6: 148. 
89 For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s encouragement of love, see Joseph, N. Bell, Love Theory in Later 
Hanbailite Thought, State University of New York Press, 1979, chapter six to chapter nine. For more on 
Ibn al-Qayyim encouragement of worship, see chapters six and seven of this study.  
90 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, p. 32; idem., al-Ṣawāʿiq, vol. 4, p. 1498.  
91 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ighātha al-Luhfān min Maṣāyid al-Shayṭān, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī, Maktaba al-
Maʿārif, Riyadh, n.d. vol. 1, pp. 20-21. 
92 For more on Ibn Qayyim’s Sufi theology synthesis on the debate of rational morality, Cf. Shifāʾ, p. 32; 
al-Ṣawāʿiq al-Mursala, vol. 4, p. 1498; Ighātha al-Luhfān, vol. 1, pp. 21-23; Madārij, vol. 1, pp. 242-257. 
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 Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim points out even animals possess rational morality, which seems 
to be his main point; he talks at length about different kinds of animals.93 However, there is a 
Prophetic tradition that I think would be somewhat troublesome to Ibn al-Qayyim, which states 
that every living thing will receive justice in the hereafter even a goat with one horn which was 
hit by a goat with two horns. This tradition indicates that even animals will be punished for the 
evil they do, which seems to support the Muʿtazilites’ position of punishment by reason in the 
absence of revelation. Unless, of course, Ibn al-Qayyim can argue that this is a weak tradition 
since it opposes the clear verses in the Quran.94 Yet, a problem still remains, namely, this type of 
punishment is different from the ones mentioned in the Quran, as the Muʿtazilites suggest.95  
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim concludes his extensive discussion on ethics by stating that God 
had facilitated his effort (fataḥa ʿalaya)96 in that much of the fine details herein will not be found 
in the works of the theological schools.97 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Arguments 
Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues for an epistemological objective rationalism of moral values. He 
asserts that God established rational proofs in divine scripture which reveals that good and evil 
are things that are inherently so in essence or by attribute, which can be grasped by human 
reason. God does not use His commands or prohibitions as proof; instead He uses rational 
arguments which require that man uses his sound reason and natural disposition (fiṭra).98 For 
example God says:  
O mankind! A similitude has been coined, so listen to it: Verily! Those on whom you call besides 
God, cannot create a fly, even though they join together for the purpose. And if the fly snatched 
                                                          
93 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. Dr. Aḥmad 
al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 2, pp. 522- 568. 
94 And We do not punish except until We send a messenger. Quran 17: 15. 
95 The punishment which the verses refer to concerns religious duties. See al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, 
Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, Beirut, 3rd edition, 1407AH, vol. 2, p. 653. 
96 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 1, p. 47; ibid., vol. 2, p. 354.  
97 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 430. 
98 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 326. 
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away a thing from them, they would have no power to release it from the fly. So weak are (both) 
the seeker and the sought!99  
God has put forward a rational similitude which indicates the evil of worshipping other than Him 
and also that the evil of this practice is something embedded in all reason, even in the absence of 
revelation. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that there is nothing more rationally evil than to worship 
something unable to create or defend itself from a fly, and at the same time, to abandon the 
worship of He who is the Creator, the Omniscient, the Omnipotent, and the One who there is 
nothing alike Him: ‘do you not see!’100 
 One must note that Ibn al-Qayyim does not necessarily deny that God’s commands or 
prohibitions give moral value to certain acts. Rather, divine commands and prohibitions further 
emphasise the moral value of an act. Hence, an action can be inherently just and simultaneously 
emphasised as such by the divine commands. Subsequently, the act is morally good from two 
points: by reason and by revelation.101 As for the Muʿtazilites, they uphold that revelation unveils 
(kashf) that what reason may have become unclear about. Hence they avoid saying that 
revelation adds further emphasis to the moral value of an act, perhaps to give human reason 
exclusivity in comprehending moral values, thus overstressing human responsibility. On the 
contrary, the Ashʿarites maintain that it is only revelation which decides the moral value of an 
act. In this regard, Ibn al-Qayyim’s position can therefore be seen as middle way position 
between the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites.  
 Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim further argues for an ontological status of moral values. He 
explains that the fact that God never commands al-faḥshāʾ102 (abomination) is evidence that evil 
is an intrinsic quality, which exists either in essence or by attribute. Similarly, this also indicates 
that al-faḥshāʾ is a phenomenon and not something that God labels as al-faḥshāʾ. If such were 
                                                          
99 Ibid; Quran 22: 73. 
100 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 326.  
101 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 327. 
102 As the verse reads:  ‘And when they commit a fāḥishaʾ , they say: We found our fathers doing it, and 
God has commanded us of it. Say: Nay, God never commands fāḥishaʾ. Do you say of God what you 
know not?’ Quran 7: 28. 
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the case, then God would say: I do not command that which I prohibit instead of God never 
commands al-faḥshāʾ.103 Additionally God says:    
 
Say: My Lord has commanded justice and that you should face Him only in each and every place 
of worship, in prayers, and invoke Him only making your religion sincere to Him.104  
Ibn al-Qayyim comments: 
So He has informed us that He is far above commanding al-faḥshāʾ, rather all his commandments 
are good by reason and accepted by the natural disposition (fiṭra). So He commands justice not 
oppression and to worship Him alone none beside Him, and to call upon Him sincerely and not by 
association (shirk). This is what He, the Most-High commands and not al-faḥshāʾ.105  
Thirdly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues for a divine exclusivity on human accountability, such that 
punishment is only justified after a messenger legally conveys moral judgments. So, performing 
evil is not sufficient reason for receiving punishment, instead it is the conveyance of moral 
judgments which validate punishment. This implies that there are no obligations upon man while 
in the absence of revelation - which is a contrary belief to that of the Muʿtazilites. Ibn al-Qayyim 
insists that obligations and prohibitions upon man in the absence of revelation is invalid, since if 
such were the case, legal conveyance (ḥujja) can be established independently of a messenger.106 
Hence Ibn al-Qayyim is not willing to compromise or undermine the role of revelation in legal 
accountability - that is, it is God alone who set the laws and also it is He who holds man 
accountable for them.  Ibn al-Qayyim supports his stance with the following verse: In order that 
mankind should have no plea against God after the Messengers.107 
 Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that although human reason can recognise (but not 
legislate) religious duty in the absence of revelation, it certainly has no role in the accountability 
for religious duty. Ibn al-Qayyim states that if obligations and prohibitions were affirmed by 
                                                          
103 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 327 
104 Ibid; Quran 7: 29. 
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 369. 
107 Ibid; Quran 4:165. 
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human reason - while in the absence of revelation - then there would certainly be no 
accountability for such obligations and prohibitions.108 He argues that God has invalidated any 
form of punishment in the absence of revelation. This is supported by the following verses: God 
says, ‘And We never punish until We have sent a Messenger [to give warning].’109 Similarly, 
God says: 
 
Therein they will cry: Our Lord! Bring us out, we shall do righteous good deeds, not that [evil 
deeds] we used to do. Did We not give you lives long enough, so that whosoever would receive 
admonition, could receive it? And the warner came to you.110  
From the above verses, we can clearly see that God uses a ‘warner’ to legally convey (ḥujja) 
moral judgments, so that man has no excuse in avoiding punishment.111  
 Fourthly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that rational morality does not necessarily mean that God 
is obliged to act according to human moral criteria - like the Muʿtazilites uphold. Furthermore, 
Ibn al-Qayyim states that God is not asked about His action: He cannot be questioned as to what 
He does, while they will be questioned.112 He argues that human reason can never possibly know 
what is obliged upon God; this is something which is concealed from us. Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim 
follows an agnostic approach in this regard. Moreover, he argues that we do not know whom 
God is pleased with or displeased with, who He shall reward or punish, since reason cannot 
inform us of this nor have we been informed of it; hence, reason alone cannot indicate what is 
obliged upon God. So, Ibn al-Qayyim sarcastically argues that this leaves us with only one 
option, which is to draw a comparison between God’s actions and to that of man’s. Ibn Qayyim 
is adamant that is the most false of analogies and the greatest of vanities.113 Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
                                                          
108 Ibid 
109 Quran 17: 15. 
110 Ibid, 35: 37. 
111 Ibid; For more on Ibn Qayyim’s arguments against the validity of punishment in the absence of 
revelation, see, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 357, 369-70, 433; Madārij, vol. 1, p. 247.  
112 Quran 21: 23. 
113 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 370. 
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Just like there is nothing similar to Him in His essence or His attributes, likewise, there is nothing 
similar to Him in His actions. How does one then make analogy of His actions to that of His 
creation? They make good for Him what is good for them and evil for Him what is perceived evil 
to them. Despite this, we see many things that are evil to us and good to Him the Most-High; such 
as, the pain of children and animals….some scholars were asked about this, so the questioner 
recited: 
Evil is an action by other than you to me so when You perform it, it becomes good114   
Likewise, we perceive the abandonment of a drowning person or someone being destroyed, as 
evil. But if He the All-Praised, drowns or destroys them, it would not be considered evil by 
Him.115 
Ibn al-Qayyim further confirms, in Sufi language, that certain actions may be perceived as evil 
by man but in fact they are considered good by God. He says:   
As long as man is in the level of dispersion, he sees certain actions good or evil given its essence 
and what is scattered from it. However, when he passes [this level] and perceives [things] from its 
first source (al-muṣdr al-awwal), deriving from the specified command (ʿain al-ḥukum), and the 
union of everything in that specified [command], and the withdrawal of the additional will from 
it, and the union of the source (waḥda al-muṣdr) which is the general will. For it [the actions] in 
regards to the source of the command and the specified will, is not described as either good or 
evil. Since, good and evil only applies to it when in contact with the universe and pursues the 
same way as it. For it is like the singular essential sun ray in and of itself without colour- it is not 
described as red, yellow or green. However, when in contact with the object of colour, only then 
is it described according to the object (al-maḥāl), because of its attachment and contact with it. 
Thus, he perceives red, yellow, and green but in fact it is free from all of it.116        
                                                          
114 This is a literal translation of a two stanza Arabic poem that is mentioned in ibid. 
115 Ibid 
116 Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij, vol. 1, p. 242. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutation of the position that God 
must act according to human moral standards, see his eighteen rational impositions in Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 
370-375.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated how Ibn al-Qayyim critically engages with the Muʿtazilites only 
to agree with them that some actions have essential and attributable characteristics of good and 
evil, which are inherent and are known by reason. Nonetheless, following on from Ibn 
Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim also upholds that the ontological and epistemological values of some 
actions are derived from revelation; in this instance, he differs from the Muʿtazilites. Similarly, I 
have demonstrated how Ibn al-Qayyim also critically engages with the Ashʿarties and agrees that 
religious duty and accountability are only justified by revelation; that God is not obliged by the 
human criterion of moral judgment. However, Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Ashʿarites on the 
essential and attributable characteristics of good and evil which are known independently of 
revelation. As such, I have revealed how Ibn al-Qayyim develops a position which can be 
considered a middle way (waṣaṭ) position between that of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. 
Lastly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a double sided approach on the debate on meta-
ethics. Firstly, his employment of rationalistic ad hominem arguments which are very Rāzian in 
style; secondly, his introduction of Sufi aspects, such as rational morality being a legal 
conveyance and piety a strengthening tool of one’s rational morality. In the next chapter, I will 
investigate Ibn al-Qayyim’s position on whether divine acts take into account human 
comprehension of moral values or whether divine acts transcends such values.          
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5- IBN AL-QAYYIM ON WISE PURPOSE AND CAUSATION IN DIVINE ACTS 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will analyse Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement with both the Muʿtazilites and 
the Ashʿarites - in particular al-Rāzī. I will argue that Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a position, similar to 
the Muʿtazilites, of wise purpose and causation inherent to the nature of divine acts. I will 
illustrate how this position opposes that of the Ashʿarites, who hold that God acts by pure divine 
volition, a concept which Ibn al-Qayyim refutes extensively by employing rational and linguistic 
based arguments. I will also demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim differs with the Muʿtazilites on 
their belief in the extrinsic nature of divine attributes, such as divine wise purpose and their 
employment of non-scriptural terminologies in this debate.  
Defining the Debate 
Ibn al-Qayyim explains that wise purpose (al-ḥikma) is to do what is required, in the most 
suitable manner and at the required time.1 As such, he also believes that wise purpose involves 
praised objectives that are required in God’s creation and commands as He creates, determines 
and commands due to these praised objectives. It is also an intrinsic attribute of God, similar to 
His other attributes such as: His hearing, sight, power, will, knowledge, living and speech.2  
                                                          
1 Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij al-Sālikīn bayn Manāzil iyāka naʿbud wa iyāka nastaʿīn, ed. Muḥammad al-
Baghdādī, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1996, vol. 2, p. 449. 
2 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 501-502; Also, Muhammad ʿAbduh deﬁnes wise purpose as, all actions that result in 
preserving order and refraining harm, whether it be specific or general. If it were revealed to any 
rational person, he will understand it and consider the action to be free from aimlessness and jest. Thus, 
it is an intended act that causes benefit and is non-arbitrary. See, Risāla al-Tawḥīd, Dār al-Naṣr, Cairo, 
1969, p. 50; Muḥammad Rabīʿ al-Madkhalī, al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl fī Afʿāl Illah taʿālā, Maktaba Līna, n.d., 
p. 23. 
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 Similarly, al-Jurjānī explains that a ʿilla (cause), according to the philosophers, is that 
which the existence of something is dependent upon; what is needed for a thing to exist.3 For 
example, the existence of a bed depends on the material wood and a carpenter. In addition, the 
meaning of cause in this debate is a teleological cause, which means that actions have an 
intended objective and, because of this, the agent acts.4   
 Muslim theologians generally agree, unlike Muslim philosophers5, that God’s acts come 
from His divine will and knowledge; thus He has free choice. They also agree that God is wise 
(ḥakīm) in His actions and hence, His actions are free from being considered aimless (ʿabath).6  
 However, they differ with regard to the nature of this wise purpose (ḥikma); is it 
something intended by God, or is it just a natural consequence of the action? Similarly, they also 
differ with regard to the causality of His actions (taʿlīlu afʿālihi). Are His actions the cause of 
wise purpose and benefits (maṣāliḥ)? The latter was an inevitable difference born of the former, 
because if God intends wise purpose in His acts then as a result His acts will be the cause of the 
wise purpose and benefits in His creation.  
 On the other hand, some hold that God is by essence obliged to act and hence God does 
not act for a particular purpose;7 instead He acts by necessity. This is also known as the natural 
                                                          
3 Al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, al-Taʿrīfāt, Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥulbā, 1357AH, p. 134.  
4 ʿAbd Allah al-Shihrī, al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl fī Afʿāl illah taʿālā ʿinda Ahlu al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, MA 
Thesis, Umm al-Qurā University, Mekka, 1422-3AH, vol. 1, p. 11; Also see Ibn Taymiyya, Mujmūʿ al-
Fatāwā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim, Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahad, Madīna, 1995, vol. 8, p. 
187. 
5 Such as, Ibn Sīnā in his theory of natural necessity, as we shall see in the next two chapters.  
6 Muhammad ʿAbduh, op. cit., p. 48; ʿAbd Allah Muḥammad Jār al-Nabī, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya wa 
Juhūdahu fī al-Difāʿ ʿan ʿAqīdat al-Salaf, PhD Thesis, Umm al-Qurā University, Mekka, 1404-05AH, vol. 1, 
p. 190. 
7 Ibn al-Qayyim commonly attacks Ibn Sīnā on the natural necessity theory because this theory, 
according to Ibn al-Qayyim, entails that God acts without a wise purpose. However, this is perhaps only 
true if the necessities in God’s acts are the same as a cause and effect, in that there is neither choice nor 
wise purpose. On the other hand, if the necessities in God’s acts are dictated by His essence, then I do 
not see why there is no wise purpose in such acts since His essence can also entail a divine wise purpose. 
In this respect, the perceived differences between Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Sīnā, is a terminological one 
(khilāf lafẓī). Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya fī Naqḍ Kalām al-Shīʿa al-Qadariyya, ed. 
Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1986, vol. 1, p. 
406.   
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necessity theory as is the position of the philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā8, who Ibn al-Qayyim will 
analyse at length in the last chapter of this research.9  
 In this debate, Ibn al-Qayyim tends to categorise the various positions as the ‘Deniers’ 
(al-nufāt) of divine wise purpose, namely the Ashʿarites and those who agree with them, and the 
‘Affirmers’ of divine wise purpose, namely the Muʿtazilites and the Traditionalists, including Ibn 
al-Qayyim.  
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Muʿtazilites 
The Muʿtazilites hold that God began creation for a cause (li ʿilla). Cause here signifies that God 
created for a wise purpose, which is created and is extrinsic to Him, but at the same time this 
wise purpose reflects His gracefulness to His creation.10  Moreover, according to the 
Muʿtazilites, it is false to state that God did not create for a cause, since this implies that God 
creates aimlessly and without any wise purpose. Thus, to say that one acts without wise purpose 
is akin to saying that one acts aimlessly.11   
 Ibn al-Qayyim differs from the Muʿtazilites on this debate on three points. Firstly, their 
position that God’s wise purpose is extrinsic to Him and reflects solely on His creation.12 This 
belief results from their denial of God’s divine attributes, which they deny because of their 
anthropomorphic implications.13 As a result, God does not benefit from His divine wise purpose 
                                                          
8 Ibn Sinā, al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, Cairo, 1366AH, 
vol. 3, p. 150-55; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wa al-Masāʾil, ed. Muḥammad Rāshid Riḍā, al-
Manār, Cairo, 1922-30, vol. 1, p. 326-29; al-Madkhalī, op. cit., p. 32. 
9 See the Principles to Ibn al-Qayyim’s Four-Fold Theodicies in chapter seven. 
10 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, ed. Dr. Aḥmad al-Ahwānī, Maṭbaʿa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 1382AH, vol. 6, p. 48; 
ibid, vol. 11, pp. 92- 93; ʿAbd al-Raḥman Ṣāliḥ al-Maḥmūd, Mawqif Ibn Taymiyya mina al-Ashāʿira, 
Maktaba al-Rushd, Riyadh, 1995, vol. 3, p. 1311. 
11 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 11, pp. 92- 93; Aḥmad Muḥammad ʿUmar, al-Muṣṭalaḥāt al-Kalāmiyya fī 
ʾAfʿāl illāh, Umm al-Qura, Mekkah, 1414AH, p. 127. 
12 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, Dār al-
Maʿrifa, Beirut, 1978, p. 207; Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 98- 99. 
13 See, Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, Jāmiʿa al-Imām 
Muḥammad Ibn Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Riyadh, 1991, vol. 2, pp. 10- 12. However, this seems like an over-
simplification as not all Muʿtazilites deny all alributes. For example, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, Abū Hāshim al-
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unlike His creation.14 Secondly, their stance that God is obliged to act according to the human 
criterion of wise purpose, which we discussed in the previous chapter.15 Thus, God must do only 
that which man sees as wise. Lastly, their employment of the term gharaḍ (motive) with regard 
to divine acts; this term carries negative connotations in the Arabic language, such as to oppress 
in order to gain a motive16. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that we should only describe God 
according to divine scripture - and nowhere does He mention gharaḍ.17    
 On the first point of difference, Ibn al-Qayyim employs a fortiori analogy against the 
Muʿtazilites; this was also employed by his teacher, Ibn Taymiyya, for the same purpose as we 
shall see shortly. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that any action which has no purpose - from the agent’s 
side - nor benefit, is not worthy of thanks-giving even if there were some sort of unintended 
beneficial outcome. Rather, the one who intends a benefit, wise purpose and praised objective, 
but is unable to execute his will, is worthier of thanks-giving than someone who is able to 
execute his will who acts without wise purpose, benefit or good intent. Thus, we can deduce that 
there is no one worthier of thanks-giving than God, because He acts for a wise purpose which 
demands His praise. So, whosoever is wiser in purpose is also worthier of greater thanks-giving; 
if there is no intended wise purpose then there is no justified thanks-giving.18   
 This type of analogical reasoning is also quite common in the works of Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
teacher, Ibn Taymiyya. Furthermore, it is perhaps one of the more strict forms of analogy, 
namely, qiyās al-awlāwī, or a fortiori analogy. Ibn Taymiyya employs this same analogy: God is 
all the worthier (awlā) of whatever judgment of perfection is applied to creatures than are the 
creatures themselves19 in order to refute the Mu’tazilites: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jubbāʾī, and ʿAbd al-Jabbār, all affirm four attributes that God is worthy of in His essence. See, ʿAbd al-
Jabbār, Sharḥ Usūl al-Khamsa, ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-Karīm Uthmān, Maktaba Wahba, Cairo, 1996, pp. 183 ff; 
Dr. Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyīn, Dār al-ʿilm lil-Malāyyīn, Beirut, 2008, p. 412. 
14 See, al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya al-Iqdām fī ʿIl al-Kalām, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī, Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 1425AH, p. 222.  
15 In the Muʿtazilites’ stance that God is obliged to act according to the human moral criteria, in the 
previous chapter.   
16 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna, vol. 2, p. 314.  
17 Ibn Qayyim, Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda, vol. 2, p. 66.  
18 Ibn Qayyim, Shifāʾ, p. 221.  
19 See, Jon Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism, Brill, 2007, p. 58.  
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The people said to [the Muʿtazilīs], “You are contradictory in this view because beneficence to 
another is praiseworthy by virtue of the fact that a judgment from it returns to its agent on account 
of which he is praised. [This is] either because [he is] perfecting himself through this, because he 
is pursuing praise and reward through this,  because of gentleness and pain that he finds in 
himself-he drives this pain away through beneficence-or because of his pleasure, his gladness, 
and takes joy in beneficence. For the generous soul rejoices, is glad, and takes pleasure in the 
good that proceeds from another. Beneficence to another is praiseworthy by virtue of the fact that 
a judgment comes back to the beneficent from his act on account of which he is praised. 
 If it were supposed that the existence of beneficence and its non-existence relative to the 
agent were equal, he would not know that the likes of this act would be good coming from him. 
Moreover, the likes of this would be considered aimless in the minds of the people endowed with 
reason. Anyone who commits an act in which there is no pleasure, benefit, or profit for himself in 
any respect, sooner or later, is aimless and not worthy of praise for this. You [Muʿtazilīs] have 
ascribed causes to His acts in order to flee from aimlessness, and thus, you have fallen into 
aimlessness. For aimlessness is an act in which no benefit, profit, or advantage returns to the 
agent.”20    
 
As a result, according to Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Tayimyya, God also benefits from his acts as 
well as His creation. Hence, divine wise purpose subsists in God’s essence. This intended wise 
purpose can be seen as a perpetual utilitarian ethical effect of God’s acts, where every living 
thing benefits and continues to benefit from His divine acts.    
 Lastly21, following on from Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the term gharaḍ 
(motive) is a heresy (bidʿa) since it was not used in scripture, nor is it used by anyone from 
amongst the Salaf.22 Therefore, one should avoid using such terms in relation to divine acts.23  
                                                          
20 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 8, pp. 89- 90. The translation is taken from Jon Hoover, An 
Islamic Theodicy: Ibn Taymiyya on the Wise Purpose of God, Human Agency, and Problems of Evil and 
Justice, PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2002, p. 110. 
21 Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments against the Muʿtazilite stance that God is obliged to act according to the 
human criterion of wise purpose, is very similar to his arguments in the previous chapter against the 
stance that God must act according to the human moral criterion.  
22 Ibn Qayyim, Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda, vol. 2, p. 66. 
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 In addition, Ibn Taymiyya emphasises that the term ḥikma should be used instead of 
gharaḍ, since it is commonly used in divine scripture; whereas, gharaḍ with respect to God’s act, 
may connote injustice and need in common usage. Ibn Taymiyya explains: When people say, 
‘So-and-so did that for a gharaḍ’ and ‘So-and-so has a gharaḍ toward someone’, they often 
mean by this some blameworthy intention such as injustice, abomination, etc.24 
 
  
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarites 
The Ashʿarites uphold that God acts by pure volition (maḥḍ al-mashīʾa) and will (irāda); but not 
for a cause (ʿilla), motive (dāʿ), objectives (ghāyāt), nor a reason (bāʿith).25 al-Āmadī states: 
The position of the People of Truth (mudhab ahl al-ḥaq) is that the Creator created the world and 
originated it, not for an objective in that His origination may be ascribed to [that particular 
objective]; and not for a wise purpose in that His creation may be conditional upon [that 
particular wise purpose]. But rather what He originates of good and evil, benefit and harm, is 
neither from a derived objective nor an intention that obliged Him to act.26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 The term ‘motive’ (gharaḍ) is used by al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, ‘Whoever acts outside of the realms of 
good and evil is considered an inattentive (al-sāhī) agent and God is far above that, thus, He acts for a 
motive (gharaḍ). See, al-Mughnī, vol. 14, p. 7; Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsa, pp. 39- 41; al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-
Islāmiyīn, ed. Ritter, Dār Iḥyā Turāth al-Arabī, 2005, vol. 1, pp. 252- 253, 391.  
24 Jon Hoover, op. cit., p. 114; Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-Sunna, vol. 2, p. 314; ibid., vol. 1, p. 455. 
25 This was also the position of the Jahmites and the Ẓāhirites. See, al-Juwaynī, Kitāb Al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭiʿ 
al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-īʿNqād, eds. Muḥammad Y. Musā and ʿAlī ʿA. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Maktaba al-Khānijī, Miṣr, 
1950, p. 267; al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., pp. 222 ff; al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddīm wa al-
Mutaʾakhirīn min al-ʿUlamāʾ wa al-Ḥukamāʾ wa al-Mutakallimīn, ed. Ṭahā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿīd, Dār al-
Kitāb al-ʿArabī, Beirut, 1984, p. 205; Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣal fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwāʾ wa al-Niḥal, eds. 
Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Naṣr and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, Dār al-Jīl, Beirut, 1996, vol. 3, p. 174; ʿAbd al-
Raḥman Ṣāliḥ al-Maḥmūd, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1311.    
26 Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmadī, Ghāyat al-Marām fī ilm al-Kalām, ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, Cairo, 1971, 
p. 224. 
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Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this position is problematic; in the Quran the causes to certain actions 
are clearly indicated in the linguistic structure of lām al-taʿlīl (Purpose lām prefix).27 An 
example of this can be seen in the following verse: ‘And I created not the jinns and mankind 
except that they should worship Me (illā liyaʿbadūn)’28. In this verse, the ‘Purpose lām prefix’ 
clearly indicates that the cause to the creation is to establish God’s worship.   
 The Ashʿarites deal with this potential problem by negating any ‘Purpose lām prefix’ in 
the Quran and instead claim it to be ‘Consequential lām prefix’ (lām al-ʿāqiba)29, as is found in 
the following verse:30 ‘Then the household of Pharaoh picked him up, that he might become for 
them an enemy and a (cause of) grief.’31 That is to say, Pharaoh had no knowledge that Moses 
would become his enemy and cause of grief; these were the consequences of taking Moses into 
his household. Hence, the term ‘Consequential lām prefix’ is derived.  
 It must be remarked that the Ashʿarites completely deny any form of personal aims (al-
aghrāḍ) and absolute causes for God’s actions. As for wise purpose, they only deny that His 
actions are conditional upon it. Thus, wise purpose is an unintended consequence of His actions. 
From this, we can observe the point of difference between the Affirmers of divine wise purpose32 
and the Deniers of divine wise purpose33; the latter hold that divine wise purpose is not intended 
by God nor is it conditional for His actions, whereas the former hold the contrary.  
 Al-Rāzī, the best of the later Ashʿarites, as Ibn al-Qayyim puts it,34 presents five 
arguments in defence of the anti-divine wise purpose and anti-causality position. Firstly, al-Rāzī 
argues that if God acts in order to benefit himself, this necessitates that He is imperfect and is 
thus perfected by this benefit. He states: 
                                                          
27 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. Dr. Aḥmad 
al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 3, pp. 1028- 1030. 
28 Quran 51: 56. 
29 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. 
30 al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., p. 402; ʿAbd Allah Muḥammad Jār al-Nabī, op. cit., vol. p. 192. 
31 Quran 28: 8.  
32 As is represented in this chapter by the Muʿtazilite and Ibn al-Qayyim.  
33 As is represented in this chapter by the Ashʿarites.  
34 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1089.  
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Anyone who acts in order to achieve a benefit or to ward off harm, if that achievement of benefit 
is better than not achieving it, then the agent of such action has indeed benefited from it. Thus, if 
this is the case then such person is imperfect in essence and becomes perfected [by something] 
external of His essence, and this is impossible for God.  
 And if the achievement and non-achievement is equal, then there is no out weighing 
preponderance (al-rujḥān), thus there is no achievement [of such benefit].35 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim counterattacks this argument thoroughly with sixteen arguments.36 Firstly, Ibn al-
Qayyim seeks clarification by posing two questions: 37 do you mean that the necessary divine 
wise purpose in God’s acts is obtained by God from something external to Him? Or do you mean 
that it is independent of Him and at the same time He is perfected by it?38 The first possibility is 
void since there is no God or Creator save Him. Thus, He does not benefit from something 
external to Him, rather the entire universe benefits from His perfection and His perfection is in 
no way the result of Him benefiting from the universe.39 
 The second possibility is that the wise purpose is His attribute and this attribute is not 
independently external to Him (ghayrun lahu). But instead, His wise purpose is a part of Him, in 
that He is the all-Wise who possesses wise purpose, just like He is the all-Knower who possesses 
knowledge. Thus to affirm His wise purpose does not necessitate that He is perfected by 
something external to Him. Similarly, His perfection by His divine attributes does not in any way 
benefit from something external to Him.40 
 Ibn al-Qayyim further argues that if God acts to fulfil something that He loves and also if 
the existence of it is as much beloved to Him as its non-existence, then the imposition of such an 
act indicates the highest of perfection and the non-existence of such an act indicates 
                                                          
35 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā, Maktaba al-Kuliyyāt al-
Azhariyya, Cairo, 1986, vol. 1, pp. 350 ff; Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1089. 
36 See Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1090- 1098. 
37 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1090- 1091. 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid. But sometimes Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God benefits from being praised, see, Ibn al-Qayyim, 
Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, Dār al-Maʿrifa, Beirut, 1978, pp. 
202, 220- 221. 
40 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. Dr. Aḥmad 
al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 3, pp. 1090- 1091. 
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imperfection. He is able to achieve what He loves, at the time He loves, and by the means He 
loves. Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that this is perfection in a true sense. Unlike the one who has 
no love, or has love but is unable to act accordingly.41  
 
Secondly, al-Rāzī argues: 
 
If God acts only for a wise purpose, then this wise purpose is either pre-eternal or originated. If it 
is pre-eternal, then this either necessitates the action [also] being pre-eternal or does not 
necessitate it. If it is necessitated [the action being pre-eternal] then this is impossible; since, pre-
eternality and an action is contradictory. And if the pre-eternity of the wise purpose does not 
necessitate the pre-eternity of the action then it [the wise purpose] existed without the action. And 
if it [the wise purpose] does not necessitate the pre-eternity [of the action] and the action existed 
without it, then the wise purpose is not gained by the action since, it existed without it. Thus the 
wise purpose is not conditional upon the action and therefore, the action is not conditional upon 
the wise purpose and this is what was intended.  
 And if the wise purpose is originated by the originated action, then it [the action] either 
requires an agent or does not require an agent. If it does not require an agent then this necessitates 
the origination (ḥadūth) of [something] originated (ḥādith) [namely, the action but] without an 
agent and this is impossible. And if it requires an agent then this agent is either God or other than 
Him and it is [clearly] not permissible to be other than Him since there is no Creator except God. 
So, if it is God, then either His action has a personal aim (gharaḍ) or there is no personal aim in 
it. So, if it is the former then it is the same as the beginning part [of this whole argument] which 
entails an infinite regression (tasalsul). And if it is the latter, then verily, His action is free from 
personal aim and this is what was sought after.42  
 
In this argument, we witness al-Rāzī paving the way to two dead ends for his opponent. The first 
part of the argument is designed for his opponent to fall into an infinite regression, arguing that 
every cause must have a cause. The second part is designed to prove that God does not, 
                                                          
41 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1091. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutations of this argument, see, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 
1090- 1098. 
42 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1090-1100. 
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conditionally, act for a personal aim; since this personal aim will suffer the same manipulation as 
the ‘wise purpose’ in the first part of the argument. Hence, it either falls into an infinite 
regression or is proven that divine acts are not conditional upon something in order for it to be 
executed.     
 Ibn al-Qayyim presents ten refutations43 against al-Rāzī’s argument. In his third 
refutation, he argues against the infinite regression conclusion that the origination of a cause 
must have another cause and states it to be void. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, this will only 
prove true if we were to say that everything that is originated must have a cause, which he does 
not agree with. Rather, he says that God acts for a wise purpose in that the object, namely the 
wise purpose, is intended (murād) and loved by the agent, namely God. The meaning of love 
here is that, at times, it is intended for the agent Himself and at times it is intended for His 
creation. Nonetheless, whatever is intended for His creation is ultimately going to be intended for 
Him.44 This consequently denies any form of infinite regression because it leads to His divine 
will, a divine attribute that has no cause as it is a part of God’s essence. Ibn al-Qayyim further 
clarifies this as follows: 
 
This also applies to Him creating for causes (asbāb), that is to say, he creates such and such for 
such and such cause and also for such and such cause until it ends to a cause that has no cause 
other than His divine will. Likewise is the case, when He creates for a wise purpose and that wise 
purpose for another wise purpose until it ends up with a wise purpose that has no wise purpose 
above it.45 
In his fourth refutation, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this case is not simply ‘black and white’, 
where God either acts for Himself or for others, or like al-Rāzī puts it, for a personal aim or no 
personal aim. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that there is no harm in saying that some of His acts are 
intended for his creation and also intended for Him, perhaps to avoid an infinite regression. 
Consequently, one may conclude that God acts for multiple causes, which are intended for both 
                                                          
43 See, Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1099-1110. 
44 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1102. 
45 Ibid 
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Himself and His creation. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that this is more probable (awlā bi-jawāz) than 
the claim that all of His creation or acts are solely intended for Himself. The same applies for His 
divine love, where the loved things are loved by His creation and at the same time loved by 
Him.46      
Thirdly, al-Rāzī states that:  
The obtainment of all personal aims (al-aghrāḍ) boils down to two things: to obtain pleasure and 
delight, and to ward off pain, grief, and depression. God –the exalted- has the power to obtain 
these two things without intermediaries (al-wasāʾiṭ) and whosoever has the power to obtain an 
aim without intermediaries then the obtainment via an intermediary becomes aimless (ʿabath); 
and this is impossible for God.47 
This argument is an attempt at establishing that God - the All-Powerful - can create without any 
causes, that is to say whatever He wants; He can just say ‘be’ and it is. Thus, for Him to use an 
intermediary in such a case is aimless. Ibn al-Qayyim disagrees with this idea of non-causal 
creation and contests it in eleven refutations.48    
 Firstly, Ibn al-Qayyim highlights that God is the All-Powerful (ina allah ʿalā kuli shayʾin 
qadīr). However, this does not imply that whatever is possible (mumkin) to exist can exist 
without the wise purpose that was intended for its existence. Or more simply, an object cannot 
exist without its cause. One cannot get a son without his father. Hence, the necessary object (al-
malzūm) is solely dependent upon the necessary cause (al-lāzim) and without it, it is impossible 
in the sense that combining two contradictions is impossible. Ibn al-Qayyim clarifies what he 
means by impossible, which is not to say that He is unable to do (al-ʿajz). Since, impossible (al-
muḥāl) translate as non-existence, and hence, does not concern His power.  On the other hand, 
God’s power over everything includes only that which is possible (mumkin).49 It is similar to 
                                                          
46 Ibid. For more on Ibn al-Qayyim’s refutations of this argument, see, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1099-1110. 
47 Ibid  
48 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1110-1116. 
49 Ibid 
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asking: can God create a square circle? This does not concern God’s power because a square 
circle is non-existent.   
 Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim states that al-Rāzī was wrong to claim the aimlessness of using 
intermediaries to obtain a personal aim; even more so when the intermediary is a cause (sabab) 
or condition (sharṭ). Aimlessness is that which has no benefit. Contrary to this, the intermediary 
condition, cause or substance (al-māda) has a benefit in that it originates objects and is thus far 
from aimless.50            
Lastly51, al-Rāzī argues:  
Verily, the evidence has been established that He is the creator of everything, so what is the wise 
purpose or benefit in creating disbelief (al-kufr), immorality (al-fasūq), and disobedience (al-
ʿiṣyān)? And what is the wise purpose in creating a person who [God] knows will disbelieve, be 
immoral (yafsuq), oppress, and corrupt the world and religion? And what is the wise purpose in 
creating poison and harmful things? And what is the wise purpose in creating Iblīs (Satan) and the 
devils? And if there is a wise purpose in their creation then what would the wise purpose be in 
leaving him [Iblīs] until the end of time; and the deaths of the Prophets and Messengers? And 
what is the wise purpose in expelling Adam and Eve from paradise and their children being 
exposed to great tribulations while it is possible for them to be in the best of health? And what is 
the wise purpose in the suffering of animals? Even though there is a wise purpose in the suffering 
of the mukallafīn (those accountable for religious duty); so what is the wise purpose in the 
suffering of other than the mukallafīn, such as the animals, children, and the insane? And what is 
the wise purpose in creating a creation that He will eternally punish [in hell] and it will not come 
to an end? And what is the wise purpose in empowering His enemies over His pious slaves 
(awliyāʾihi), afflicting them with horrible torment, killing, imprisonment, punishment, and 
enslavement?52 
                                                          
50 Ibid 
51 Ibn Qayyim emphasises that al-Rāzī’s fourth argument is the exact same as is encompassed in his 
second argument, hence, he will not cite it; so this is al-Rāzī’s fifth argument. See Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1111. 
52 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1111, 1118-1119. 
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Ibn al-Qayyim considers this argument extensively, as it contains many points. He dedicates 
forty arguments, which take up one hundred and ninety pages,53 to refute al-Rāzī’s argument. 
Due to the length, I shall only focus on a few points which I believe are most relevant to this 
chapter.54  
 Before Ibn al-Qayyim answers any of al-Rāzī’s thought provoking questions, he starts off 
by stating that these objections (iʿtirāḍāt) are in no way stronger than the Atheist’s (Ahlu Ilḥād) 
objections towards the existence of God55 and also the eighty arguments against Prophet-hood, 
which al-Rāzī himself cites.56 Likewise, the arguments against God’s perfect attributes and also 
the Jahmites arguments which attempt to refute God’s highness (ʿalūwihi wa istiwāʾhi) and His 
divine speech.57    
 Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim implies that al-Rāzī is familiar with these arguments and 
refutations, since he cites them himself in his works. Despites this, Ibn al-Qayyim still 
summarises what he believes to be the divine wise purpose behind the existence of apparent evil 
within God’s creation. For example, disbelievers exist so that God may establish His perfect 
attributes. The establishment of His perfect attributes is evident when exercising His divine will 
with regard to the disbelievers. God judges between His slaves by His divine rule (ḥukum) and 
differentiates between them by means of His divine knowledge. So, when evil comes into 
existence by man, certain attributes of God become apparent; thus, making God alone worthy of 
praise for His perfect attributes58.  God says: They will be judged by the truth, then it will be 
proclaimed all-praise and thanks to God the Lord of the universe.59   
                                                          
53 See, Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1123-1313 
54 I will discuss al-Rāzī’s points at length in the last chapter, Ibn al-Qayyim’s Fourfold Theodicy of 
Optimism.  
55 Ibn Qayyim mentions that there are forty arguments that attempt to disprove the existence of God. A 
possible research avenue would be to trace and analyse these forty arguments. See, Ibn al-Qayyim, 
Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, Dār al-Maʿrifa, Beirut, 1978, p. 
217. 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. Dr. Aḥmad 
al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 3, pp. 1122- 1123. 
59 Quran 39: 75. 
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 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s wise purpose concerns that which exists and is 
originated. As for disbelief, evil and sin, these are all the result of disobeying God’s commands, 
thus they are nothing to do with God’s acts. Ibn al-Qayyim holds that God’s acts have a wise 
purpose and intended objective. As for what God eschews,60 this is not a concern of Ibn al-
Qayyim’s position.  
 Also, Ibn al-Qayyim shows that evil is in no way attributable to God61 since it is the non-
existence of good and its causes (ʿadam al-khayr wa asbābihi); and non-existence is nothing just 
like the noun indicates.62  
 Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that God avoids creating anything that has no wise 
purpose. Hence, He abandons it because He has no love for its existence, or its existence would 
mean the loss of something more beloved to Him. As a result, the wise purpose for its non-
existence outweighs the wise purpose for its existence and to combine the two is incompatible. 
Thus, the preponderance (tarjīḥ) of a greater wise purpose is of utmost wisdom (ghāya al-
ḥikma). Ibn al-Qayyim demonstrates that God’s creation and commands are based on utilitarian 
criterion,63 that is, they are based on obtaining the absolute benefit (taḥṣīl al-maṣāliḥ al-khāliṣa). 
Consequently, these divine acts, which are utilitarian in nature, are clear evidence of God’s wise 
purpose.64     
 Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that he does not claim that God’s wise purpose and 
its detail (tafṣīl) must be - or is able to be - comprehended by man. This is what is perhaps 
implied in al-Rāzī’s argument. For Ibn al-Qayyim, it is not a necessary feature for God’s wise 
purpose to be understood. For that reason, there is no harm in there being a wise purpose for 
every point that al-Rāzī mentioned and at the same time man being unaware of it. This implies, 
as Ibn al-Qayyim argues, that only God has knowledge of the wise purpose. As He said to His 
                                                          
60According to Ibn Qayyim, there is also a wise purpose for that which God abandons; see, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, 
p. 1123.    
61 See chapter 21 and 25 of Shifāʾ.  
62 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1123. 
63 Ibn Taymiyya argues something similar to this, that ‘only a God who acts according to utilitarian 
criteria and His own self interest is rational and worthy of praise.’ See, Jon Hoover, An Islamic Theodicy, 
p. 111.  
64 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1123- 1124. 
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angels regarding the creation of man: Verily, I know that which you know not.65 Thus, those who 
hold the view that divine acts and commands have a wise purpose, do not necessitate that the 
creation must have knowledge of God’s wise purpose.66  From this refutation, we can deduce 
that not only does Ibn al-Qayyim uphold that God’s acts are universally wise in their purpose, 
but also is sometimes agnostic with regard to comprehending such divine wise purpose. So, he 
argues that just because we do not understand the divine wise purpose, this does not necessarily 
mean that it does not exist. Ibn al-Qayyim’s agnostic approach is further developed in the 
following:  
 
Surely there is nothing like God’s essence, attributes, and acts. Hence, there is a wise purpose in 
everything you [al-Rāzī] mentioned and other things; however, it is not the same kind of wise 
purpose [known to] man. Just like His actions are not similar to the actions of man, nor are His 
power, will (irāda), volition (mashīʾa), love, pleasure, and anger similar to that of man’s 
attributes67   
Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim is agnostic when seeking to understand God’s wise purpose or any of His 
attributes. Furthermore, he puts forward an interesting argument which implies that whatever 
God does is good and wise in purpose, regardless of man’s perception. However, elsewhere68, 
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that evil and aimlessness do not come from God’s actions. As such, Ibn al-
Qayyim avoids both the Ashʿarites’ ethics of ‘subjective theistism’69 and the Ashʿarite theodicy 
which we will look at in the next chapter. 
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim states that divine wise purpose follows from divine knowledge and 
power. Thus, whosoever is more knowledgeable and powerful has the utmost wise purpose and 
perfection in His actions. So if God has the most perfect knowledge and power; the same then 
                                                          
65 Quran 2: 30. 
66 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1124. 
67 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1124- 1125. 
68 See, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, chapters: twenty one, twenty two and twenty five. 
69  This means that all values are determined by the will of God; see, George F. Hourani, Reason and 
Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 57 ff. 
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goes for His divine wise purpose which accords to His divine knowledge and power. Ibn al-
Qayyim states: 
   
So if the deniers of divine wise purpose agree that God has the most perfect knowledge and 
power, then they must also agree that His actions have the most perfect wise purpose since it is in 
accordance to His divine knowledge and power.70    
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on Causality 
From Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement with both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, we can 
gather that he was an affirmer of causality in divine acts. That is, divine acts encompass a cause 
which has a divine wise purpose as is reflected in God’s divine attribute al-ḥakīm (the All-
Wise).71 Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim holds that it is not a necessary requirement that humans should 
recognise God’s wise purpose72 nor is God obliged to act according to the human criterion of 
wise purpose.73 In addition, like Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim believes that divine acts are based 
on a utilitarian criterion of absolute benefit.74 Also, instead of using terms such as gharaḍ 
(motive) to describe the nature of divine acts, Ibn al-Qayyim opts to use scriptural terms such as 
ḥikma (wise purpose).75 This method of replacing non-scriptural terms with scriptural ones may 
be seen as a ‘Traditionalisation’ of kalām (rational theology), in particular the theology of the 
Traditionalists.   
                                                          
70 Ibid, p. 1125. 
71 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 466- 467. Before Ibn al-Qayyim, the Karramites held a very similar 
position, that God acts and commands for a praised wise purpose that is intrinsic to Him, subsisting in 
His essence, and in accordance to His divine knowledge. As such, God creates in order that He is praised, 
glorified, and exalted. See, Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 8, p. 39.   
72 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1124-1125. 
73 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 370. 
74 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1123-1124. 
75 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 66. 
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 Ibn al-Qayyim argues76 that scripture contains numerous examples of divine wise 
purpose in God’s acts and there is no way of grasping them all. For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim 
only cites twenty two examples and under each example he mentions various sub-examples, all 
of which are intended as arguments against those who oppose divine wise purpose in God’s 
acts.77 
 Firstly, he argues that God explicitly uses the word ḥikma (wisdom)78, such as: and We 
have sent down to you the book and wisdom.79 Additionally, He grants wisdom to whom He 
pleases, and he, to whom wisdom is granted, is indeed granted abundant good.80  
 Wisdom in this context, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, signifies beneficial knowledge 
which in turn leads to righteous deeds.81   
 Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God informs us of the given purpose behind his 
actions or commands.82 For example: Surely, We have sent down to you the Book in truth that 
you might judge between men by that which God has shown you.83 The purpose mentioned in this 
verse comes after the conjunction ‘that’.  Similarly, the same goes for the following verse: Thus 
did we show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens and the earth that he be one of those who have 
Faith with certainty.84  
                                                          
76 This section is based on the only available version of chapter twenty two of Shifāʾ, entitled The 
affirmation of God’s wise purpose in His creation, commands, and to mention the intended objectives for 
them, (fī ithbāt ḥikma al-Rubb taʿālā fī khalqihi wa amrihi wa dhkir al-ghāyāt al-muṭlūba lahu bi-dhālik). 
This chapter seems to be missing in all of the other publications of Shifāʾ, that I have come across. The 
only available version of this chapter, according to my knowledge, is the edition of, Dr. Aḥmad al-
Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008.   
77 See Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1025-1085. 
78 In this context of the Quran, I think the word ‘wisdom’ would be a more suitable translation of ḥikma 
than wise purpose.  
79 Quran 4: 113. 
80 Ibid., 2: 269. 
81 There seems to be a mistake in either the print or manuscript, since it reads that wisdom is beneficial 
knowledge and righteous deeds. This makes no sense in the context of the verse which would then 
imply that God sends down righteous deeds. There seems to be something missing or a mistake in either 
the manuscript or the publication. See, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1026.  
82 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1026-1028. 
83 Quran 4: 105. 
84 Ibid, 6: 75. 
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 The Ashʿarites claim that all the verses in the Quran which indicate some sort of purpose, 
these purposes are not intended since they are a direct consequence of God’s action. Thus, they 
hold that all the purposes mentioned in the Quran take the form of ‘Consequential lām prefix’ 
(lām al-ʿāqiba) rather than a ‘Purpose lām prefix’ as is held by the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-
Qayyim. Ibn al-Qayyim refutes this by arguing that a ‘Consequential lām prefix’ is for he who is 
unaware or unable to avoid the consequences of the action; such as in the case of Pharaoh in the 
following verse: the household of Pharaoh picked him up, that he might become for them an 
enemy and a cause of grief.85 Hence, we can clearly see that Pharaoh was unaware of the 
consequences of bringing Moses up, in that Moses was later to become Pharaoh’s enemy and 
cause of grief. Likewise, Pharaoh was also unable to avoid the consequences of his action. For 
this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this is certainly not the case with divine actions, which 
take the form of a ‘Purpose lām prefix’ in the Quran and as such imply that God has a wise 
purpose and cause for His actions.86 
 Thirdly, the explicit ‘prepositional cause of kay’, translated as ‘in order that’, in the 
Quran as is seen in the following verses: 
 
No calamity befalls in the earth or in yourselves but is inscribed in the Book of Decrees (al-Luwḥ 
al-Maḥfūẓ), before We bring it into existence. Verily, that is easy for God. In order that you may 
not be sad over matters that you fail to get, nor rejoice because of that which has been given to 
you.’87 
Ibn al-Qayyim explains that God informed us that He has decreed calamities in order that we 
may not be saddened over matters we fail to achieve or even be delighted over matters we 
achieve, since it was written before our existence. Thus, it was unavoidable and so we must be 
pleased with that which God has decreed for us.88  
 Similarly, the numerous ‘Adverbial Qualifications of Purpose’ (al-mafʿūl lahu) in the 
Quran, clearly indicate the cause of the actions. For example: 
                                                          
85 Ibid, 28: 8. 
86 See Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1028- 1030. 
87 Quran 57: 22-3. 
88 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1039-1041.  
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Then, We gave Moses the Book, to complete upon those who would do right, and explaining all 
things in detail and a guidance and a mercy that they might believe in the meeting with their 
Lord.’89   
So, everything mentioned after ‘the book’ is an Adverbial Qualification of Purpose, that is, God 
gave Moses the book so that He could complete His favour upon those who do righteousness, as 
a guidance, a mercy, and an aid so that they may also believe in Moses’ meeting with their 
Lord.90 
 Additionally, there are also verses where God explicitly mentions the cause for His 
commands, such as:  
 
Because of that We ordained for the Children of Israel that if anyone killed a person not in 
retaliation of murder, or to spread mischief in the land - it would be as if he killed all mankind, 
and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind.91 
 
This is because murder is such a great sin; the highest form of oppression and corruption (fasād). 
For this reason, it is greater than any other sin. Thus, to kill one person is like killing the whole 
of mankind; in both cases the agent is doomed to hell.92 
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim cites as part of his seventh example, numerous verses in the form 
of the ‘Purpose preposition as laʿlla’, which is translated as ‘so that’. For example: O mankind! 
Worship your Lord, Who created you and those who were before you so that you may become 
righteous.93 And likewise, Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those 
before you, so that you may become righteous.94 Hence, the cause of God’s actions comes after 
the phase ‘so that’, usually known in Arabic as the ʿilla (causal) laʿalla.95    
                                                          
89 Quran 6: 154. 
90 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol.3, pp. 1041-1042. 
91 Quran 5: 32. 
92 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1045- 1047. 
93 Quran 2: 21. 
94 Ibid, 2: 183 
95 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1048.  
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  In addition, Ibn al-Qayyim also states that everything God creates is by wise purpose and 
this wise purpose encompasses two things. Firstly, the wise purpose is an attribute that subsists 
in God which He loves and is pleased with. Secondly, the wise purpose that relates to His 
creation, such as His blessing which man is delighted with and finds pleasure in. These include 
God’s commandments and creation.96 Ibn al-Qayyim argues: 
  
Verily, sound reason and the perfect natural disposition (al-fiṭra al-salīma) indicates exactly that 
what the Qur’an and Sunna have both indicated, that He –the exalted- is Wise and does not act 
aimlessly; instead He acts for a meaning and a benefit. Wise purpose is the intended objective of 
His actions. Precisely, His actions –the exalted- proceed from an utmost wise purpose which is 
the sole reason He acts; [similarly,] just like it proceeds from causes (asbāb), which due to it He 
acts. Both of these are indicated in His words and the Prophet’s words in numerous places.97     
   
In summary, it was probably inevitable that the Ashʿarites would hold such position, given that 
they believe in a complusionist view of man’s actions: man’s power has no cause to anything but 
instead man’s capability is to be acquirer rather than cause. Likewise, there is predictability in 
the Muʿtazilites view on the debate at hand. They say that divine wise purpose is reflected in 
man rather than God, perhaps because man is the creator of his own actions. And lastly, Ibn al-
Qayyim holds that the divine wise purpose is reflected in both God and man, given that he 
believes in a dual agency of one act, namely God and man. 
 If there is a wise purpose and cause in divine acts, then there must be a theodicy for evil, 
but one based on and according to the positions on this debate, that is, if these positions are 
consistent. In other words, the Muʿtazilites and Ibn al-Qayyim, who both hold that divine acts are 
wise in purpose, must also hold that there is a wise purpose for the existence of evil, if they are to 
be consistent with their position of causality in divine acts. Whereas the Ashʿarites, who hold 
that divine acts exist according to arbitrary will, must perhaps hold that the existence of evil is 
also the result of arbitrary will. This is what I will be discussing in my next chapter.    
 
                                                          
96 Ibid, vol. 8, p. 35-36.  
97 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1025. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion I have analysed Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement with both the Muʿtazilites 
and the Ashʿarites - in particular al-Rāzī. I have argued that Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a position 
similar to that of the Muʿtazilites, supporting that wise purpose and causation are inherent to the 
nature of divine acts. I have also shown that this position is contrary to that of the Ashʿarites, 
who hold that God acts by pure divine volition, a concept which Ibn al-Qayyim refutes 
extensively by employing both rational and linguistic arguments. Although Ibn al-Qayyim agrees 
with the Muʿtazilites on this debate, I have also highlighted where he differs from them on their 
belief in the extrinsic nature of divine attributes, such as divine wise purpose and their 
employment of non-scriptural terminologies.  In the next chapter, we shall see how Ibn al-
Qayyim explains the existence of evil in view that wise purpose and causation are inherent to the 
nature of divine acts - as is demonstrated by God’s divine determination.
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6- DIVINE DETERMINATION TRANSCENDS EVIL 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will demonstrate how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of 
Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, in the debate on the source of moral evil. I will also discuss how Ibn al-
Qayyim wrestles with the positions of the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites in order to develop a 
Traditionalist position free from the difficulties and problematic implications found in the 
positions of his interlocutors. As a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I will show 
how he manages to introduce new distinctions to the debate and develop his position that divine 
determination transcends evil.  
Defining the Debate 
On the question of whether evil is inclusive in divine determination, both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī 
entitle their chapter: Showing the Manner of the Entry of Evil in Divine Predestination.1 Ibn al-
Qayyim, conversely, entitles his chapter: Showing the Transcendence of Divine Determination 
Over Evil and its Entry in the Determined.2 This implies that Ibn al-Qayyim was directly 
engaged with the theodicean texts of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, as his title seems to be in direct 
opposition to that of the latter two. Secondly, it shows us that Ibn al-Qayyim was very concerned 
with the adopted theological language as he seems to opt for the exclusion of evil in divine 
determination even while the discussion and arguments presented in the theodicean texts of Ibn 
Sīnā and al-Rāzī show great resemblance to the discussions and arguments of Ibn al-Qayyim. 
Thus, one may conclude that they were all discussing and arguing for the same concept of evil 
                                                          
1 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, tr. Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, 
2005, p. 339; al-Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashraqiyya, ed. Muḥammad M. al-Baghdādī, Dār al-Kitāb al-
ʿArabī, 1990, p. 547. 
2 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. Dr. Aḥmad al-
Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 3, p. 973. 
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but Ibn al-Qayyim opts for the exclusion rather than inclusion, perhaps due to his intended 
audience including the average layman. Nevertheless, although Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussions on 
evil are very similar to the discussions of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, his conclusions and principles are 
very different. Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim’s title - which mentions the exclusion of evil in divine 
determination - fits in well with his overall theodicean discourse which is very optimistic in 
manner, as we shall see.  
On the definition of natural evil, it is likely that Ibn al-Qayyim sought to avoid the 
difficulties inherent in al-Rāzī’s definition, which is: ‘evil is the privation of what is necessary to 
a being or beneficial to them’.3 Upon contemplation, one ascertains that this definition is prone 
to the problem of subjectivity; what may be beneficial to a being is subjective from one person to 
another. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim adds to the definition, saying that evil is the privation of what is 
necessary for existence, continuance, or perfection4, such as the privation of breathing, 
reproduction and good health5.  
 Similarly, Ibn al-Qayyim explicitly defines moral evil as suffering and the cause of 
suffering. He states that evil is sins and the effects of sins such as punishment.6 So, one may 
deduce that sins are also causes of suffering. Thus, evil can be both a cause and an effect - like 
sin and consequential punishment. Hence, there is no inconsistency between the two definitions 
of moral evil offered. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that evil can be both a cause and 
an effect, given that the effect is a necessary result of the cause, unless something prevents it 
from occurring, such as faith and good deeds - both of which prevent the punishment of sins.7 
Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
                                                          
3 See, al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol.  2, p. 548; also see Ibn Sinā’s al-Shifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, eds. Georges C. Anawātī, 
and Saʿīd Zāyid, Cairo, 1960, p. 417, which mentions the same definition.  
4 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 987. This is the definition of accidental evil of privation. 
5 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 988. 
6 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn wa bāb al-Saʿādatayn, ed. Muḥammad Ajmal al-Iṣlāḥī, Dār ʿĀlim al-
Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1429AH, vol. 1, p.200. 
7 Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, ed. ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad al-ʿUmrān, ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 
n.d., vol. 2, p. 711. 
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Evil is suffering and its causes (asbābihā). So sins, disbelief, associationism, and the types of 
oppressions8 are all evils; regardless if the person has a motive or pleasure in them- they are all 
evil. Since they are causes to suffering and lead to it just like all causes lead to their effects. As a 
result, the consequence of suffering to its cause is like the consequences of death after taking 
deadly poison.9  
 
Therefore, if Ibn al-Qayyim locates moral evil in sins and subsequent punishment, where both 
the cause and effect are evil, this then leads us to question: what is the source of sins? This 
source must also be evil - given that it is a cause of evil.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim establishes this infamous source as two central features of man. Firstly the 
‘appetitive self’ (nafs), which is the hidden internal disposition of man and, secondly, the 
apparent and external actions of man.10 These two features are derived from the Prophet’s 
sermon- as Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
 …evil is none other than sins and its punishment just as is mentioned is his sermon, ‘All praise is 
due to God, we seek refuge with Him and seek His forgiveness; and we seek refuge with God 
from the evil of ourselves and from the evil of our actions.11  
 
Consequently, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, the source of moral evil - being ourselves - is also 
evil. But it does not necessarily represent that this evil of ‘ourselves’ is detestable. In fact, it 
could be desirable and at the same time still have an evil effect, such as suffering. It is similar to, 
as Ibn al-Qayyim puts it, delicious12 food that is desired but contains poison, when the person 
                                                          
8 Ibn al-Qayyim also defines evil with the same definition as oppression which is, ‘to place things in other 
than their correct place’ (cf. Shifāʾ vol. 3, p. 976). Thus, to place things in other than their correct place 
results in suffering and sins; such as, oppression. I will talk about this definition further in section: Ibn al-
Qayyim on Divine Justice, of this chapter and Theodicy of Divine Names and Attributes, in the next 
chapter. 
9 Ibid  
10 The two central sources of moral evil is also mentioned by Ibn Sināʾ, cf. Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sinā’s Theodicy, State University of New York, New York, 2000, pp. 106- 107, 125.  
11 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 200. 
12 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, vol. 2. pp. 711- 712. 
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eats it, he fulfils his desire for a while until the effect takes place, namely death. Ibn al-Qayyim 
argues that this is the case with all sins, the effect must occur even if God did not inform us of its 
evil nature, since reality and experience are witness to it.13  
 Ibn al-Qayyim finds support for his definition of moral evil within the supplications of 
the Prophet, more specifically, in the things that he sought refuge against. Ibn al-Qayyim argues 
that everything the Prophet sought refuge against falls within the boundaries of these two 
principles, namely suffering or the causes of suffering. He gives the example of the four things 
which the Prophet famously sought refuge from after every prayer: the punishment of the grave, 
the punishment of hell (both of which are sufferings), and the trials and tribulations of life and 
death, along with the trials and tribulations of the Masīḥ al-Dajjāl;14 again, both of which are 
causes to sufferings.15  
 We know that the evil of ‘ourselves’ is the cause of the evil of our acts, such as sins; but 
how does this occur? What does evil of ‘ourselves’ actually mean? Is it something intrinsic or 
extrinsic? Also, is it a voluntary or involuntary quality? 
 The source of moral evil, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is man’s nafs (self) which is 
something intrinsic to him.16 The nafs can be made up of good characteristics, such as knowledge 
and wisdom; it can also be made up of evil characteristics, such as ignorance and oppression.17 
These two types of characteristics which are a part of man’s nafs are either the result of God’s 
favour - when man’s good characteristics are present - or it could be the result of God’s 
abandonment - when man’s evil characteristics are present. Therefore, one can assume that evil 
is a natural characteristic of man, given that if God abandons him, he is then left to his natural 
                                                          
13 Ibid  
14 The Antichrist in the Muslim traditions. See, al-Dad̲jd̲̲jā̲l  in Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition and 
Second Edition, Brill. 
15 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 713.   
16 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p.201; idem., al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, vol. 2, pp. 717-718. 
17 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 202. 
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state.18 Ibn al-Qayyim adds that God knows best who is worthy of His favour and is able to 
accept it. He states: 
 
So the essence of God is a necessary requirement (mustalzima) of wisdom, good, and generosity; 
and the essence of the slave [man] is a necessary requirement of ignorance and oppression. And 
what it [essence of man] contains of knowledge and justice is attainted by the favour of God upon 
him; hence, this is something external of his self. So, whomsoever God wants good for, He gives 
him this favour after which the necessary acts occurs from him such as benevolence, dutifulness, 
and obedience. And whosoever God wants evil for, He withholds such favours and abandons him 
to the desires of his self, attributes, and its outcomes. Hence, all sins and disgraceful acts proceed 
from the necessary ignorance and oppression [of his self]. And this is not to say that God’s 
prevention is oppression, since it is [also] His favour, and the prevention of His favour is not 
oppression especially when the object (maḥal) cannot accept it and is not worthy of it.19  
 
So does this mean that moral evil is to be attributed to God, since, He is the creator of 
everything?  
On the question of whether the prime source of moral evil is attributed to God or not, Ibn 
al-Qayyim engages with three positions which often arise in his theodicean writings. Firstly, the 
Muslim Peripatetic, Ibn Sīnā, who upholds that God acts by His essence, which is neither by 
motive nor choice20; rather it is like the beams of light rays emitted from the sun, the hotness of 
fire and coolness of water.21 This position is famously known by Muslim theologians as 
mawjiban bi-dhāt (necessary by essence), or the natural necessity theory.22   
                                                          
18 This seems to be inconsistent with Ibn al-Qayyim’s view on natural disposition (fiṭra) where he argues 
that man is created with a natural inclination to do good deeds and worship God. Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, 
Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1401, 1414- 1415, 1455 ff. 
19 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 202. 
20 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1005. 
21 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 310.  
22 This position is also held by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his al-Mabāḥith al-Mashraqiyya, vol. 2, pp. 550-551. 
Ibn al-Qayyim criticises al-Rāzī for alternating his position on the natural necessity theory; sometimes he 
adopts the positions of the theologians and sometimes he opts for the position of the philosophers. See, 
Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 340. For a study on Ibn Sīnā’s influence on al-Rāzī’s al-Mabāḥith al-
Mashraqiyya, see, Jules Janssens, ‘Ibn Sīnā's Impact on Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's Mabāḥiṯ al-Mašriqiyya, with 
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 Secondly, the Muʿtazilies affirm a divine wise purpose that is extrinsic of the agent, 
namely God. Hence, God acts by a wise purpose that does not reflect in Him but rather in man. 
Similarly, they placed an obligation on God to observe providence (riʿāya maṣāliḥ) – a position 
which likens God to man, regarding such interests. They also legislate using their reason by 
obliging and prohibiting certain acts upon God, according to their rational legislation.23 So, 
whatever is considered good to man is also considered good to God and whatever is considered 
evil to man is also evil to God.24 Hence, God only acts according to human moral standards. 
Nevertheless, they affirm that God acts freely fāʿilan bi-ikhtiyār (acts by choice) and that God 
does not create, will, determine nor act evil.25   
 Thirdly, the Ashʿarites deny that God creates in accordance with purposes and motives 
(taʿlīl). Instead, He acts purely by His arbitrary divine volition. Therefore, God is not to be 
deemed far above acts of evil but rather all determined acts are possible for God.26 Thus, God can 
perform an evil act that is seen as evil according to human standards; however, such an act would 
not be considered evil by God. Likewise, God creates and wills evil given that evil exists and 
God is the creator of all that exists.27 They also hold that God acts freely; both the Mu’taziltes 
and Ash’arites differ with the philosophers on this point.28 
 
The Muʿtazilites on Evil 
The Muʿtazilites undertake the problem of evil based on their second principle, divine justice, 
which means that divine acts are all good and free from evil.29 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Particular Regard to the Section Entitled al-Ilāhiyyāt al-maḥḍa: An Essay of Critical Evaluation’, in 
Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, vol. 11, 2010, pp.259-285.  
23 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 312. 
24 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 324.   
25 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 550- 551. 
26 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 324.   
27 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1324; ibid, vol. 2, pp. 550- 551. 
28 Ibn al-Qayyim’s position also holds that God acts by choice; see, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p.310.  
29 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Usūl al-Khamsa, ed. Dr. ʿAbd al-Karīm Uthmān, Maktaba Wahba, Cairo, 1996, p. 
132. 
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 Furthermore, the Muʿtazilites have a specific understanding of evil which is defined as 
‘harmful evil’ (al-ḍarar al-qabīḥ) and whatsoever leads to it.30 The opposite, which is good, is 
defined as ‘beneficial good’ (al-nafʿ al-ḥasan) and whatsoever leads to it.31 As we can see, the 
two definitions of good and evil are of a consequential nature in that it is concerned with either a 
beneficial consequence in the case of good, or a harmful consequence in the case of evil. 
Similarly, the consequence should be within the framework of a good (ḥusn) or evil (qubḥ) act. 
One must bear in mind that the Muʿtazilites use the terms ḥusn and qubḥ for good and evil 
instead of the terms khair and shar, as the latter two are relative terms, unlike the former two 
which are deemed intrinsic to an act regardless of its consequences.32   
 So if evil is defined as ‘harmful evil’, according to the Muʿtazilites, then can such evil be 
attributed to God’s divine determining? The answer to this question will be clear after 
considering the categorisation of acts by the Muʿtazilites into two types: divine acts and human 
acts.  
 
The Muʿtazilites on Divine Acts 
Divine acts according to the Muʿtazilites are all good (ḥasana) and free from evil (qabīḥ). This is 
known by drawing an analogy between the unseen world and the seen world.33 ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
says: 
  
What indicates that whosoever is upon such state does not choose evil whatsoever, that is, we 
know by way of necessity in the present [world] that if one of us knows the evilness of evil and is 
                                                          
30 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mukhtaṣr fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, in Rasāʾil al-ʿAdl wa al-Tawḥīd, ed. Dr. Muḥammad ʿAmāra, 
Dār al-Hilāl, n.d., vol. 1, p. 211; Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering In The Muʿtazilite Theology: ʿAbd al-
Jabbār’s Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice, Brill, 2000, p. 114. 
31 Ibid, ʿAbd al-Jabbār.  
32 Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid, Qaḍiyya al-Khair wa al-Shar fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī, Muṭbaʿa al-Ḥalabī, 
Cairo, 1981, p. 28- 29. 
33 See, Margaretha T. Heemskerk, op. cit., p. 112-4; Daniel Gimaret, Théorie de l'acte humain en 
théologie musulmane, Vrin, Paris, 1980, (Etudes Musulmanes: Book 24), pp. 281- 283. 
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in no need of it and [he also] knows of his self-sufficiency, then this person will never choose 
evil. For surely, he does not choose it because he knows that it is evil and he is in no need of it.34 
 
Consequently, divine acts are free from evil, as in ‘harmful evil’ and oppression (ẓulm), which is 
every harm that has no benefit, nor can one repeal it and it is undeserving…35 Hence, it is not 
befitting of God to do injustice, even though  He is capable of it.36 However, due to His divine 
justice and wise purpose, He eschews it.37 
 Secondly, God is all wise and this indicates that evil (shar) in the world must be 
perceived in light of divine wise purpose. Consequently, this means that divine acts must have an 
objective (ghāya), since acts that are aimless are described as vain (ʿabath) acts and God is free 
from vain acts. According to the Muʿtazilites, the objectives of divine acts must not benefit God; 
rather it is for the benefit of man.38 ʿAbd al-Jabbār says: 
 
If an agent is aware of his act, then such act must be for a motive. If such is the case, then this 
motive is either free from evil (qubḥ) hence making it good; or either, it is not free from evil and 
hence making it evil… If God is aware of everything then His act must have a motive that is good 
(al-hasan), since, if His act were motiveless then it would be defined as vain (al-ʿabath) which is 
evil (qubḥ).39 
 
Thus, God creates for a wise objective which ultimately benefits man. As a result, the presence 
of evil in the world is justified by the Muʿtazilites through this wise objective and its benefit or 
                                                          
34 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 302; Abū Muḥammah Ibn Mattawayh, Kitāb al-Majmūʿ fī al-
Muḥīṭ bi-l-Taklīf, ed. Jan Peters, Dār al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1999, pp. 254, 256, 258.  
35 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., p. 351. 
36 The majority of the Muʿtazilites hold that God is capable of injustice, but, Naẓẓām, al-Jāḥiẓ and al-
Aswārī differ in that God is not to be described as being capable of acting unjust or evil (qabīḥ). Cf. ʿAbd 
al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 313; al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. Ritter, Dār Iḥyā Turāth al-
Arabī, 2005, pp. 554- 555; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Dār Maktaba al-Mutanabbī, Beirut, 1992, 
p. 24. 
37 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī: al-taʿdīl wa al-tajwīr, ed. Dr. Aḥmad al-Ahwānī, Maṭbaʿa al-Qāhira, Cairo, 
1382AH vol. 6, p. 128; idem., Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 313-4. 
38 al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya al-Iqdām fī ʿIl al-Kalām, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
Beirut, 1425AH, pp. 397- 398.  
39 Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p. 260.  
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compensation for man. As such, trials, tribulations and all types of sufferings, are attributed to 
God,40 but these sufferings are not really evil (qubḥ). Rather, they are good and beneficial for 
creation.41 In fact, the real evil according to the Muʿtazilites, is moral evil such as sins and 
disobedience, which are performed by the will and power of man42 and not from divine 
determination.43 ʿAbd al-Jabbār says: 
     
It is correct in saying that God creates good (al-khair) and evil (al-shar) if what is meant is harm 
(al-ḍarar) only. But if what is intended is the apparent meaning of ‘harmful evil’ (al-ḍarar al-
qabīḥ) then it is not correct to attribute this to God.44 
 
The Muʿtazilites also say: 
 
If what you mean [by evil] is that immoral acts (al-fujūr), sins (al-fusūq), lies, deception, 
oppression, disbelief, indecent acts (al-fawāḥish) and evils (qabāʾiḥ) are all from God, then we 
seek refuge in God from saying this.45 
 
As a result, the Muʿtazilites have no problem with attributing natural evil to God as this type of 
evil is metaphorical46, given that the suffering from it has a wise and just objective that is of 
benefit to man.47 In fact, it is moral evil that is evil in reality and hence should not be attributed 
                                                          
40 Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid, op. cit., p. 8; Ayedh al-Dosari, Minhaj Ibn al-Qayyim fī Taqrīr Masāʾil 
al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar min Khilāl Kitābihi Shifāʾ al-ʾAlīl, MA Thesis, King Saʿūd University, Riyadh, 2002-
2003, p. 504.  
41 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 484. 
42 Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Sayyid, al-Khair wa al-Shar ʿinda al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Maktab al-Thaqāfī, 
Miṣr, 1989, p. 137. 
43 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Saqā, vol. 14, p. 41. 
44 Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p. 420. 
45 al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, Inqādh al-Bashr min al-Jabr wa al-Qadar, in Rasāʾil al-ʿAdl wa al-Tawḥīd, ed. Dr. 
Muḥammad ʿAmāra, Dār al-Hilāl, n.d., vol. 1, p. 271.  
46 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, eds. Dr. Tawfīq al-Ṭawīl and Dr. Saʿīd Zāyid, vol. 8, p. 322. 
47 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ, Kitāb al-Intiṣār wa al-Rudd ʿalā Ibn al-Rawandī al-Mulḥid, ed. Dr. H. S. 
Nyberg, Maktaba al-Kuliyyāt al-Azhariyya, Cairo, 1987, p. 100.  
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to God48, since moral evil is the result of man’s agency49 which does not come under divine 
determination.50    
 Lastly, the Muʿtazilite stress that God’s purpose is to benefit mankind.51 This is apparent 
from their two concepts of divine assisting (al-luṭf al-ilāhī)52 and compensation for pain (al-
ʿiwaḍ ʿalā al-ālām),53 both of which further emphasise the goodness and justice of God. Divine 
assistance means that God assists man in choosing obedience and eschewing evil (qubḥ) and 
sins. Likewise, divine compensation of pain means that God will compensate man for any pain, 
suffering or illnesses that are caused. Thus, such compensation is good and beneficial to man and 
at the same time it shows that God is free from oppression or real evil - such as qubḥ.    
 
The Muʿtazilites on Human Acts 
According to the Muʿtazilites, divine justice implies that man is the agent of his own acts, which 
include moral evil. As a result, man is deserving of reward or punishment.  
 The Muʿtazilites categorise human acts into three types: good acts, permissible (mubāḥ) 
acts and evil (qabīḥ) acts, all of which relate to divine moral judgment. Good human acts include 
the legally obligatory and recommended acts, all of which God commands, wills, loves and 
dislikes their omission.54 Permissible acts are those that have no additional attribute of good. 
These kinds of acts are neither willed nor disliked by God.55 Lastly, evil human acts which have 
a ‘harmful evil’ (al-ḍarar al-qabīḥ) attribute, are not willed by God; He dislikes it. Hence, they 
are legally prohibited (ḥarām) and disliked (makrūh).56 As a result, the Muʿtazilites maintain that 
                                                          
48 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 8, p. 322; Ibn Mattawayh, op. cit., p. 420. 
49 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, op. cit., vol. 14, p. 41; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 137. 
50 Ibid 
51 Margaretha T. Heemskerk, op. cit., p. 159; Ayedh al-Dosari, op. cit., p. 506. 
52 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 519; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 143; Muḥammad 
al-Sayyid al-Julaynid, op. cit., p. 138; Margaretha T. Heemskerk, op. cit., p. 149-155.  
53 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 494, 500; Margaretha T. Heemskerk, op. cit., p. 157- 190. 
54 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, ed. Qanawātī, vol. 6:2 pp. 218, 224- 233; idem., Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 
457.  
55 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, ed. Qanawātī, vol. 6:2 pp. 225; idem., Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 457- 459.  
56 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, ed. Qanawātī, vol. 6:2 pp. 220, 224- 225; idem., Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 
457. 
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divine will is necessitated by divine command, that is, divine command indicates divine will. So 
whatever God commands is also what He wills. Similarly, divine will also necessitates divine 
love and favour, which means that what God wills, He also loves and favours.57 Consequently, 
this is how human acts, such as moral evils, are excluded from divine determination.58 
    
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Mu’tazilites 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s main concern with the Muʿtazilites on the problem of evil is three-fold: the 
consequences of their concept of divine justice, their conception of divine compensation and 
their understanding of divine will.   
 According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the Muʿtazilites’ concept of divine justice undermines 
divine omnipotence, as divine justice is preserved by excluding human acts of moral evil from 
divine power, will and creation,59 so that these moral acts are not attributed to God.60 That is, the 
Muʿtazilites argue for a purely human agency of moral evil that is independent of God’s power, 
will and creation. As a result, the Muʿtazilites’ concept of divine justice opposes the perfection 
of God’s divine power and will; hence, it undermines divine omnipotence, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim.61  
 The Muʿtazilites were led to this conception of divine justice, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim, by two fallacies. Firstly, the fallacy of what Ibn al-Qayyim labels as ‘human legislation 
applied to God’ (al-tashrīʿ alā allah)62, such as obliging that God acts for the benefit of man, 
which is known by the Muʿtazilites as divine observance of providence (riʿāya al-maṣāliḥ). 
Hence, divine justice requires that God must act for the benefit of man which is according to the 
                                                          
57 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, ed. Qanawātī, vol. 6:2 pp. 51; idem., Sharḥ Uṣūl al-khamsa, p. 464; Ibn 
Mattawayh, op. cit., pp. 289- 291. 
58 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 621. 
59 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 13. 
60 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 314. 
61 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 456- 457. 
62 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 312. 
166 
 
 
human moral criteria. That is, whatever is considered good or evil, right or wrong by man, God 
must abstain or act according to this human criterion;63 otherwise, God would be unjust.  
 The second fallacy is their analogy between the unseen world and the seen world, which 
again likens divine acts to human acts. So, the human conception of good and evil is also the 
divine conception. Thus, the Muʿtazilites are referred to as mushabbahat al-afʿāl (the ‘Likeners’ 
of acts)64, due to their false analogy.65  
 As for the Muʿtazilite conception of divine compensation, this means that God must 
compensate those afflicted by natural evil, such as undeserved suffering, otherwise there would 
be no benefit and God would be unjust.66 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the problem of suffering 
really troubled and confused the Muʿtazilites.67 Ibn al-Qayyim talks about a three-fold 
Muʿtazilite theodicy of suffering,68 whereas I have come across a two-fold Muʿtazilite theodicy 
of suffering, as is mentioned in Muʿtazilite primary and secondary sources.69  
 Ibn al-Qayyim’s readings of the Muʿtazilite three-fold theodicy of suffering is 
categorised into three points. Firstly, the presence of evil which is labelled as deserved suffering 
- for example, punishment. Secondly, suffering that results in a compensation for the ‘sufferer’. 
Lastly, suffering that has a consequential preponderant benefit. Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
They [the Muʿtazilites] say: the sufferings that God does is either deserved, such as punishment in 
this life or the hereafter, or either for compensation (taʿwīḍ), or either for a preponderant benefit 
(maṣlaḥa rājiḥa).70  
 
This means that the three-fold Muʿtazilī theodicy of suffering only applies to the present world.71 
As for the unseen world, all sufferings are deserved, according to the Muʿtazilites.72 However, 
                                                          
63 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 324. 
64 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 451. 
65 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 452. 
66 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 315. 
67 Ibid vol. 1, p. 314. 
68 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 314- 330; idem., Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 999- 1000. 
69 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ uṣūl al-Khamsa, p. 494, 500; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Sayyid, op. cit., p. 146.  
70 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 318.  
71 Ibid 
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saying this, Ibn al-Qayyim does cite73 a potential weakness in this claim: deserved sufferings are 
only good (ḥasan) in the present world as the victim is only content once he has gained revenge. 
Consequently, to draw equivalence between this deserved suffering and the deserved suffering in 
the unseen world is not possible.74 But then again, in the researcher’s opinion, God can punish 
man for his evil actions by way of justice rather than revenge, hence making the analogy sound.  
 As for sufferings that are for a preponderant benefit, Ibn al-Qayyim cites an example of 
child suffering, where the benefit could be in the development75 of that child. This is similar to 
the Muʿtazalites’ concept of suffering for a beneficial lesson (al-ʿitibār).76 Ibn al-Qayyim 
mentions77 a potential weakness in this concept: if a child sees his teacher disciplining another 
student because of his carelessness and playing. There is no doubt that there is a lesson and 
benefit for the first child when witnessing the student being disciplined. Moreover, perhaps the 
first child would benefit from this incident more than the student who is being disciplined. 
However, this is only good (ḥasan) if the student being disciplined deserved it. This example 
ends with a rhetorical question: ‘so where is the deserved suffering of children and animals?’78 I 
think this potential weakness argued by Ibn al-Qayyim is also weak; one can easily say that the 
student’s disciplining was deserved because of his carelessness at the wrong time and place.   
 As for animal sufferings in the present world, this is for the benefit of humans,79 since 
humans sacrifice animals for consumption. However, I think that this preponderant benefit would 
not apply to animals that suffer, for example, in forest fires. 
  As for the sufferings of humans, the Muʿtazilites draw likeness between the benefits 
gained from an employer and a worker. The worker suffers but gains financially from the work 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
72 Ibid 
73 This citation perhaps belongs to the Ashʿarite School, since Ibn al-Qayyim quotes it in the third person, 
‘they said’. 
74 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 320- 321. 
75 This shows resemblance to Ibn al-Qayyim’s theodicy of divine wise purpose, where some sufferings 
are necessary for the spiritual and educational development of man. (see, Ibn al-Qayyim’s Theodicy of 
Opposites, in chapter seven).  
76 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsa, p. 494, 500. 
77 This citation perhaps belongs to the Ashʿarite School, since Ibn al-Qayyim quotes it in the third person, 
‘they said’. 
78 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 321. 
79 Ibid, p. 316. 
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he is carrying out for the employer and vice-versa.80 However, Ibn al-Qayyim names another 
potential weakness with this analogy: God could grant benefit without the medium of suffering. 
This also clearly opposes the worker/ employer analogy, since the employer gains benefit via the 
worker’s suffering; whereas, in the case of God, He is far exalted from benefiting via the 
sufferings of His creation.81  
 In addition, good health is the property of God, which he loans to humans. Hence, He can 
withdraw it whenever He wills and, as a result, sufferings would necessarily replace it.82       
 As for my readings of a Muʿtazilite two-fold theodicy of suffering, this can be 
summarised into two points: deserved sufferings and sufferings that have compensation. These 
two points are the preponderant benefits of sufferings that apply to the creation and not to God.   
 Therefore, according to the two-fold theodicy, Ibn al-Qayyim83 shows the weakness in 
the idea that God must compensate on the Day of Judgment those who have suffered, by 
applying this to animals. Since, according to divine law, animals are not legally responsible, 
hence they are neither rewarded nor punished.84 However, Ibn al-Qayyim cites that some of the 
Muʿtazilites uphold that God will, in the unseen world, bring forth the animals that have suffered 
in order to compensate them.85       
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim deals at length with the Muʿtazilites’ theodicy of suffering by 
engaging and refuting the differences of opinion on sufferings within the Muʿtazilite School.86 
 The Muʿtazilites’ understanding of divine will dictates that God cannot will evil since He 
would be evil. Hence, human moral acts are excluded from the divine will and determination.87 
                                                          
80 Ibid, p. 316. 
81 Ibid, p. 320. 
82 Ibid, p. 318. This is similar to Ibn al-Qayyim’s concept of evil as privation of what is necessary for 
being, continuance, and perfection, (see, Ibn a-Qayyim’s Categorisation of Evil, in chapter seven). 
Likewise, it is similar to his theodicy of necessary opposites, as suffering is a necessary opposite of good 
health. (See, Theodicy of Opposites, in chapter seven). 
83 It seems that Ibn al-Qayyim is citing refutations of another school, perhaps the Ashʿarites, against the 
Muʿtazilites, because he men7ons at the beginning of each refutation ‘qālū’ (they said). Cf. Ibn al-
Qayyim, Tarīq al-hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 318- 322.  
84
 Ibid, p. 16; Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 454. 
85
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 16; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, vol. 13, pp. 520, 9-10; 
Margaretha T. Heemskerk, op. cit., p. 180.  
86
 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 314- 330.  
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The reasons for this incorrect understanding, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, are two fallacies. 
Firstly, the Muʿtazilites claim that divine acts are the same as the objects of His acts (fiʿl Allah 
ʿin mafʿūlahu).88 This very obscure and not straight forward concept can be simplified as 
follows. Divine acts such as ‘God wills good’ are the same as the objects of His acts (mafʿūlahu), 
such as good human acts. Similarly, divine acts such as God wills, creates and commands charity 
and prayer, is the same as the objects of His acts, as such charity and prayer exist. Therefore, 
divine acts are also the objects of His acts; but, not all human acts are the objects of His acts and 
hence, divine acts. Evil acts, such as the existence of oppression, are not the same as divine acts; 
God does not create, will or command oppression.89  
 This is one of the fallacies, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, that led to the incorrect 
Muʿtazilite understanding of divine will. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that divine acts are not the same 
as the objects of His acts. For example, the act of creation - namely the divine act - is not the 
same as the act of the created: man’s act.90  
 The second fallacy which led to the incorrect Muʿtazilite understanding of divine will is 
that they failed to differentiate between universal divine will and legislative divine will, the latter 
of which entails divine commands and love; whereas the former entails only divine volition. Ibn 
al-Qayyim says: 
 
Whoever does not differentiate between divine volition and divine love91, will necessarily end up 
with two false conclusions. Either God loves moral evil, or either God did not will, determine, or 
decree moral evil.92   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
87 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 550. 
88 Ibid 
89 I will also talk about this concept in the section: A Potential Two-Fold Ashʿarite Theodicy; and for 
further detail see: Ibn al-Qayyim on the Divine Acts and Evil. Both sections are found in this chapter. 
90 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 550- 551. 
91 Divine will, volition, and love all mean the same thing according to the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites. 
92 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 621. The last conclusion seems to be inconsistent with Ibn al-Qayyim 
overall thesis of this chapter which is God did not will, determine, or decree moral evil. However, this 
inconsistency will become clear in Ibn al-Qayyim’s distinction between divine acts and the objects of 
divine acts where moral evil is from the latter as we shall see later on in this chapter. Similarly, the 
inconsistency will also become clear when considering Ibn al-Qayyim’s distinction between divine 
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Therefore, given that moral evil is neither loved nor commanded by God, according to the 
Muʿtazilites, they were led to believe that moral evil is excluded from divine will, power and 
determination.  
 However, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s divine love and commands necessitate divine 
legislative will; and does not necessitate divine universal will. God only loves and commands 
that which He wills legislatively and religiously. Whereas His universal will includes everything 
that exists, as well as evil.93      
  
The Ashʿarites on Evil 
The Ashʿarites are seemingly the school with which Ibn al-Qayyim contests at length, given their 
pre-dominance during his milieu and their direct rivalry for orthodoxy. However, on the 
attribution of evil, one must differentiate between the general Ashʿarite School on the one hand, 
and al-Rāzī on the other. The latter seems to shift towards the natural necessity theory in some of 
his works,94 unlike the former who hold that God acts freely.  
 Moreover, it is clear that the Ashʿarites main theological focus is to preserve divine 
omnipotence; hence, they focused on attributing everything that exists to God, including evil. 
This is manifested in the following debate between Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī - the Ashʿarī - and al-
Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār - the Muʿtazilī: 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
general will and divine specific will- as in chapter three- where natural evil is from God’s divine general 
will due to His creation of the laws of causation and privation.   
93 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 595.  
94 al-Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashraqiyya, vol. 2, p. 551. However, in most of al-Rāzī’s books, he holds the 
same position as the Ashʿarites- that God acts freely. Perhaps the reason he advocated the former 
position- natural necessity theory- was to elucidate the Eastern Philosophers’ position rather than the 
Ashʿarite School, (Cf. Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid, op. cit., p. 204). On the other hand, Ibn al-
Qayyim assumes that the natural necessity theory is the position held by al-Rāzī based on his book al-
Mabāḥith al-Mashraqiyya, (cf. Ibn al-Qayyim Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1003- 1005).    
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Al-Qāḍī said: exalted is He who is free from immorality (faḥshāʾ). al-Isfarāyīnī replied: exalted is 
He Who wills everything that occurs in His dominion. So al-Qāḍī said: Does our Lord will [that 
we] sin? al-Isfarāyīnī replied: Does our Lord force [us to] sin? So al-Qāḍī said: If [He] has 
prevented me from guidance and decreed for me destruction; has [He] wronged me or done me 
well? al-Isfarāyīnī replied: If He had prevented you from what is yours then He has wronged you; 
but if He has prevented you from what is His then He grants His mercy upon whom His wills.95   
 
This dialogue conveys the different divine attributes that each school emphasises when dealing 
with the problem of evil. The Ashʿarites’ primary emphasis is placed upon God’s omnipotence. 
Therefore, nothing can exist except that which God wills, otherwise it would undermine God’s 
omnipotence.  
 
The Ashʿarites’ All Encompassing Divine Will 
Throughout the different stages of the Ashʿarite School, different scholars argued that divine will 
is all encompassing. Hence, there seems to be a general consensus that God had created and 
willed all that which exists, including evil. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī says: 
  
It is obligatory to know that God had created all the originated entities (ḥawādith), beneficial, 
harmful, faith, disbelief, obedience, and sins… and it is [also] obligatory to know that all 
originated entities occur by the will of God. It is unimaginable that something occurs in this 
world or the hereafter without God willing it.96  
 
Similarly, al-Juwaynī says: 
                                                          
95 Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Saffārīnī, Lawāmiʿ al-Anwār al-Bahiyya wa Sawāṭiʿ al-Asrār al-Athariyya, al-
Maktab al-Islāmī, Beirut, 1411AH, vol. 1, p. 339.  
96 al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf fīmā yajib iʿNqādahu wa lā yajūz al-Jahl bihi, ed. Muḥammad 
Zāhid al-Kawtharī, Maktaba al-Kānijī, Cairo, 1413AH, p. 43. 
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Our school holds that God willed the origination of all originated entities and His divine volition 
is not specific to one particular type of originated entity. Rather, God wills all that which exists 
of: good, evil, belief, disbelief; since He is the originator and creator of everything.97 
 
Lastly, al-Rāzī emphasises the same point when he says: 
  
Verily God, the Exalted and Most High, wills the totality of existence such as disbelief, belief, 
obedience, disobedience, good, evil, benefit, and harm; all of this is by God’s divine decree and 
determination.98      
 
This is the general consensus of the Ashʿarites: that God creates and wills everything that exists 
in totality. However, when concerning the specification of things, the Ashʿarites differ; such as, 
does God will disbelief, sins and evil? Some Ashʿarites hold that it is permissible to specifically 
attribute evil to the will of God. Some abstain from this as people may think that whatever God 
specifically wills99, He orders and encourages.100 Some Ashʿarites say that when it comes to 
attributing specific evils to the will of God, one must add to such attribution - for the sake of 
clarity - that God wills disbelief for the disbeliever as a punishment or as an evil acquisition for 
man.101 Lastly, others stress that it is only permissible to attribute specific cases of evil to God’s 
will in an education setting; as for other settings, it is not permissible as it displays ill manners 
towards God.102  
                                                          
97 Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawāṭiʿ al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-īʿNqād, ed. Asʿad Tamīm, 
Muʾassasa al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, Beirut, 1405AH, p. 211.  
98 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Masāʾil al-Khamsūn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqā, Dār al-Jīl, Beirut & 
al-Maktab al-Thaqāfī, Cairo, 1990, p. 60.  
99 It is perhaps possible that Ibn al-Qayyim built on this differentiation of specific and general divine will 
in his two-fold universal and religious divine will? 
100 This distinction does not contradict the Ashʿarite posi7on that divine will necessitates divine love, 
because the distinction between specific and universal will was developed by the later Ashʿarites; so it is 
likely the position that divine will necessitates divine love is only common amongst the early Ashʿarites. 
101 ʿAbd al-Qahhār al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-Dīn, Maṭbaʿa al-Dawla, Istanbul, 1928, p. 146; Ayedh al-Dosari, 
op. cit., p. 515. 
102 Ayedh al-Dosari, op. cit., p. 515. 
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 It is clear that the Ashʿarites are not willing to compromise God’s omnipotence in that 
nothing occurs in the world except that which God wills. Hence, the Ashʿarites’ primary 
emphasis on divine omnipotence and divine will inevitably lead them to a different conception of 
divine justice. 
     
The Ashʿarite Conception of Divine Justice 
Although the Ashʿarites hold that God is the creator of all things and nothing exists except by the 
will of God, including evil, one must bear in mind that they do not label it as evil when it comes 
from God. They103 adhere to the principle that nothing proceeds from pure good except good’.104 
But this type of good, according to the Ashʿarites, is different from other theological schools. 
This is due to their conception of divine justice, which stresses the idea that everything which 
exists is within God’s dominion. Thus, whatever God does is good and just - as everything is 
rightly His. Al-Shahrastānī says:  
 
As for justice according to the Ahlu Sunna, it is that God is just in His acts, meaning that He is 
the conductor (mutaṣarif) in His universe and dominion; He acts and rules however He wills. 
Hence, justice is to place things in their [proper] places; and this is, to conduct in [ones’] 
dominion according to knowledge and volition. Oppression is opposite to this, thus it is 
unimaginable that He oppresses in His rulings and conduct.105   
 
Similarly, al-Baghdadī defines justice as: 
 
It is what the agent does. If it is said: this implies that all disbeliefs and sins are just, since you 
hold that they are from the acts of God and He can perform it. The answer is: everything from 
Him is just, and it is only transgression (jawr) and oppression from the acquirer [man].106      
                                                          
103 Most theological schools, including the Muʿtazilites and the Tradi7onalist, adhere to this principle; cf. 
Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 311.  
104
 Ibid.  Also see, William C. Chitticks, The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Cosmology, 
State University of New York Press, 1998, p. 94.  
105
 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, p. 20; Ayedh al-Dosari, op. cit., p. 516.  
106
 al-Baghdādī, op. cit., p. 131. 
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This means that human acts which comply with divine commands are just and human acts which 
comply with divine prohibitions are transgressive.107 Accordingly, God is not subjected to human 
moral criteria, as He is the sole creator of all things; He can do as He wills, create whatever He 
wills and as a result He would not be unjust. Injustice is to ‘act freely in someone else’s 
property’108 and in the case of God, everything is His property. Al-Rāzī says: 
  
There is no evil (qubḥ) in His actions nor is it permissible to described them as evil because He –
the exalted and high- is the universal owner of all things (mālik al-mulk). And whosoever is the 
universal owner of everything- when He acts- He acts in his dominion; and whosoever acts in His 
dominion, none of His acts are evil.109 
   
However, upon contemplation, this seems to deny all agencies other than God, as is consistent 
with the Ashʿarite view in chapter three. Likewise, it undermines the reality of good and evil 
since the human standards of good and evil does not apply to God. This is closely related to the 
Ashʿarites’ view of theistic subjectivism, that is, good is whatever God commands and evil is 
whatever He prohibits.110  
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarite Conception of Divine Justice 
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the concept of justice according to the Ashʿarites contradicts the 
reality (ḥaqīqa) of justice, since the Ashʿarite conception of justice is whatever is possible for 
God.111 That is, whatever God does is just, as everything in existence belongs to Him and He can 
act freely in His dominion. Therefore, according to this conception, injustice is impossible for 
                                                          
107 Ibid 
108 al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Seventh Edition, 2007, vol. 1, p. 88.  
109 al-Rāzī, op. cit., p. 61.   
110 Cf. Chapter Four, on debate of Meta-ethics. 
111 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 456. 
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God.112 Furthermore, injustice, according to the Ashʿarites, is to act freely within someone else’s 
property; in the case of God, everything is His property.113 
 Similarly, the Ashʿarites went on further to say that God acts purely by volition (mashīʾa) 
and not for a wise purpose or motive.114 Hence, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this consequential 
conclusion clearly undermines the concept of reward and punishment,115 since, God does not 
reward the good-doer for his pious deeds nor does He punish the evil-doer for his evil deeds, 
rather He acts purely by divine volition.116   
 Likewise, another Ashʿarite point that Ibn al-Qayyim refutes on justice is that they also 
deny the reality of good (ḥusn) and evil (qubḥ). Ibn al-Qayyim argues that there is no difference 
between truthfulness and lying, justice and injustice, according to the Ashʿarites, as good and 
evil are simply divine commands and prohibitions. So if God were to prohibit all that He has 
commanded and command all that He has prohibited, then such would define good and evil, 
since God sets the rules of morality.117  
 
Ashʿarites	on	Divine	Will	and	Divine	Love	
The majority of the Ashʿarites support that divine will necessitates divine love and divine 
contentment (riḍā).118 This implies that divine will, love and contentment all mean the same 
thing.  For example, If God wills X, then He also loves and is content with X. Similarly, if God 
loves X, He wills X and is content with X. This lack of differentiation was perhaps the result of 
puzzling questions on how God can will something that He does not love or is content with. 
Also, how can there exist something that God forbids?119 
                                                          
112 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 573. 
113 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 568. 
114 Ibid 
115 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 458- 459. 
116 Ibid, vol. 1, pp. 18- 19. 
117 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 18. 
118 al-Bāqillānī, op. cit., pp. 44- 45; Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad 
Ibn Qāsim, Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahad, Madīna, 1995, vol. 8, pp. 474- 475.  
119 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 621. 
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 We find that the early Ashʿarites either refrained from distinguishing between the 
meanings of divine will, love and contentment, or they supported that all of these attributes mean 
one and the same thing. The founder, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, did not differentiate between 
divine will, divine love and divine contentment.120 Similarly, al-Bāqillānī underlined that there is 
no difference between divine will, divine volition and divine love.121 Also, al-Juwanynī claims 
that divine love means the same thing as divine will and contentment; hence, God loves disbelief 
and is content with it, as it is a punishment for the unbeliever.122 The same stance is taken by al-
Shahrastānī; he argues that divine command indicates divine will.123 That is, whatever God 
commands, He is content with and hence He wills it.  
 Conversely, al-Ghazālī seemingly parts from the traditional Ashʿarite stance and 
mentions briefly that one can only avoid the baffling questions by adopting the view that divine 
command is distinct from divine will.124 That is, divine contentment does not necessarily mean 
divine will. Likewise, al-Āmadī goes further to imply a distinction between universal divine will 
and legislative divine will125, a concept that both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim profoundly 
emphasise126 and use against the Ashʿarites and the Muʿtazilites.   
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on the Ashʿarite Conception of Divine Will and Divine Love 
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that whoever fails to distinguish and differentiate divine will from divine 
love will consequently come to one of two false conclusions. Either that God does not love sins 
                                                          
120 Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, Majarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, ed. Daniel 
Gimaret, Dār al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1987, p. 51. 
121 al-Bāqillānī, op. cit., pp. 44-45; idem., Tamhīd al-Awāʾil wa Takhlīṣ al-Dalāʾil, ed. ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad 
Ḥaydar, Muʾassasa al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya, Beirut, 1407AH, pp. 47- 48. 
122 al-Juwaynī, op. cit., p. 239. For more on this topic cf. ʿAbd al-Bārī Muḥammad Dāwūd, al-Irāda ʿinda 
al-Muʿtazila wa al-Ashāʿira, Dār al-Maʿrifa al-Jāmiʿiyya, al-Iskandariyya, 1996, p. 151; ʿAbd al-Raḥman 
Ṣāliḥ al-Maḥmūd, Mawqif Ibn Taymiyya mina al-Ashāʿira, Maktaba al-Rushd, Riyadh, 1995, vol. 3, p. 
1316.  
123 al-Shahrastānī, Nihāya al-Iqdām fī ʿIl al-Kalām, p. 254.  
124 al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī al-IʿNqād, ed. ʿAbd Allah Muḥammad al-Khalīlī, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, 
2004, p. 65.  
125 Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmadī, Ghāyat al-Marām fī ilm al-Kalām, ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, Cairo, 1971, 
p. 66-68.  
126 Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, op. cit., vol. 18, pp. 131- 133; Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 621; Hoover, p.125-9.   
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hence He did not determine or will sins; this is the conclusion held by the Muʿtazilites. Or, all 
types of evils occur according to divine volition and will. Therefore, God loves it and is pleased 
with such evils. This is the Ashʿarites’ conclusion.127  
 It seems that al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī and al-Āmadī are the only Ashʿarites who differentiate 
between divine will and divine command128 - the latter of which entails divine love.  
 
A Potential Two-Fold Ashʿarite Theodicy 
Based on Ibn al-Qayyim’s works on the Ashʿarites, it is possible to derive a potential two-fold 
(maybe more) Ashʿarite theodicy. Firstly, the concept that God acts by pure volition (maḥḍ al-
mashīʾa). This concept perhaps resulted from the Ashʿarites’ denial that God acts for a cause 
(taʿlīl), wise purpose (ḥikma) or motive (gharad).129 The reason being is that if God were to act 
for a cause, wise purpose or motive, then He would be more complete and perfect if He achieves 
such cause, wise purpose and motive. Consequently, this implies that God would also be less 
complete and imperfect without such cause, wise purpose and motive. For this reason, the 
Ashʿarites opt that God acts out of pure volition instead of a cause, wise purpose or motive.130  
 This concept is in some ways similar to the natural necessity theory, as they both entail 
that God acts without purpose and that at the same time He is free from any responsibility of evil 
in the creation. Nonetheless, the natural necessity theory implies that God is without choice. 
Whereas, the Ashʿarites clearly emphasise that God acts freely.131 Then again, if everything that 
God does is by way of divine volition, then does He really have a choice to act freely? That is, 
                                                          
127 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 621. Also cf. ibid, vol. 1, pp. 302- 306. 
128 Muḥammad al-Sayyid al-Julaynid, op. cit., p. 212. Ibn Ḥazm is also mentioned in this list but I will have 
to disagree with al-Julaynid that Ibn Ḥazm was an Ashʿarite. In fact, Ibn Ḥazm seems to be much closer 
to the Traditionalists than the Ashʿarites if anything- given the numerous theological issues that he 
differs with the Ashʿarites based on his strict adherence to Tradi7on. See Ibn Ḥazm’s doctrinal creed in 
his introduction of al-Muḥallā; also see, Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwāʾ wa al-Niḥal, Maktaba 
al-Khānijī, Cairo, n.d., vol. 4, p. 157; Dr. Ibrahīm Madkūr, Fī al-Falsafa al-Islamiyya: Manhaj wa 
Taṭbīqahu, Dār al-Maʿārif, Cairo, 1976, vol. 2, pp. 32-33. 
129 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 204- 205. 
130 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 324; al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., p. 397. 
131 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 324. 
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can God act without divine volition? According to the Ashʿarites, this can never be the case as 
God always acts by His divine volition.132  
 Furthermore, such divine volition is above human laws of morality because God is so 
superior to human beings that He transcends moral law.133 Just as human moral judgments 
cannot be applied to volcanoes, perhaps it is the same with respect to God’s divine volition.134     
 Once more, the argument that human moral judgments cannot be applied to divine 
volition, or that divine volition is above human laws of morality, bears very similar traits to the 
natural necessity theory; in both cases, God is not accountable to human laws of morality.  
 The second facet of Ashʿarite theodicy that is clear through Ibn al-Qayyim’s discussion is 
the concept that divine acts are in fact the objects of His acts (mufʿūlātihī) - as is also supported 
by the Muʿtazilites. This concept was adopted in order to avoid the claim that God is evil, 
because the Ashʿarites clearly say that God created and willed evil. The Muʿtazilites imposed 
this consequential conclusion on the Ashʿarites as a counter attack. The Muʿtazilites argue that, 
linguistically, rationally and legislatively speaking, the agent of evil is evil just like the agent of 
oppression is an oppressor.135  
 In response, the Ashʿarites argue that God does will evil and He also acts (fiʿilahu) evil; 
given that evil exists, it must have been created, and there is no creator save God. Thus, God 
wills and acts evil. Moreover, God creates by His divine will, so whatever is created is also 
willed by God and it is His act. Hence, divine acts are the exact same as the objects of His acts 
(al-fiʿil ʿin al-mafʿūl) and the creation is the same as the created.136 As a result, evil is created by 
God and at the same time it is the object of His acts; that is, it is His act, His creation and occurs 
by His divine will.  
 As for the counter attack - whoever wills or acts evil, is evil - the Ashʿarites refute this 
conclusion in two ways. Firstly, they object to the premise that an evil person is he who acts evil; 
                                                          
132 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 324; al-Shahrastānī, op. cit., p. 397.  
133 G. Legenhausen, ‘Notes Towards an Ash'arite Theodicy’, in Religious Studies, vol. 24, No. 2, Jun., 
1988, p. p.264. 
134 Ibid., p.264. 
135 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 1323. 
136 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1324. 
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the act of evil is not done by the essence of God,137 because evil actions are not performed by 
Him - His essence - but rather they are performed by the objects of His acts - His creation. As a 
result, they argue names have been derived for them such as, adulterer, sinner,138 etc. Secondly, 
they argue that divine names are tawfīqiyya (formulated only by God and not man), and God 
named Himself only by the best of names - amongst which the name ‘evil’ or any of its 
derivatives are not found. At the same time, there is nothing within His dominion that He did not 
create or will; indeed God is the dominator and not the dominated.139 Thus, He is not evil, in His 
essence, but He is the creator of everything, including what man perceives as evil.  
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim believes the reason that both the Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites at 
times upheld incorrect theological positions was due to false rational principles that they adhered 
too and gave precedence over scripture.140    
 
Ibn al-Qayyim on Divine Acts and Evil 
Ironically, although God is the creator of all things, including evil, evil is not to be attributed to 
divine acts, according to Ibn al-Qayyim. Firstly, scripture alludes to the fact that all of God’s acts 
are good and, hence, evil is not to be attributed to His essence, His names, His attributes and His 
divine acts. God says: In Your hands is the good. Verily, You are able to do all things.141 
Similarly, a Prophetic tradition reads: I am at Your service, abundant happiness to You, all of the 
good is within Your hands and evil is not from You.142  
 Utilising the above quotes, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that only good is from God and evil is 
from some of His created objects.143 
 Secondly, Ibn al-Qayyim distinguishes himself from the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites 
by saying that the divine act (fiʿilahu) is not the same as the objects of His acts (mafʿūlātihi). 
                                                          
137 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 551. 
138 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1324. 
139 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 551.  
140 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 569.  
141 Quran 3: 26. 
142 Muslim, Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim, Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī, Beirut, n.d., vol. 1, p. 534, no. 771. 
143 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 173. 
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Similarly, the act of creation (khalq) is not the same as the act of the created (makhlūq); evil is 
only attributed to the latter. For Ibn al-Qayyim, this distinction between divine acts and the 
objects of His acts is important in order to avoid making the same error as the Muʿtazilites - in 
compromising God’s omnipotence - and the Ashʿarites - in attributing evil to God’s divine acts.  
 The Muʿtazilites fail to distinguish divine acts from the objects of His acts, hence they 
consequently concluded that, just as evil is not a part of divine acts, it is also not a part of the 
objects of His acts. Therefore, human moral acts are not created by God.144 Similarly, the 
Ashʿarites consequently concluded that as evil is from the objects of His acts, likewise it must 
also be from God’s divine acts, creation and will too.145 As a result, the Muʿtazilites excluded 
mans’ evil acts from God’s creation and will, whilst the Ashʿarites included it in God’s divine 
acts, creation and will.146  
 According to Ibn al-Qayyim, whatever God brings into existence (aḥdathahu) is separate 
from Him and is carried out by the created object; so, it is the objects of His acts and not His act. 
Similarly, whatever man brings into existence is his act and is carried out by him; hence, a noun 
is derived from his act as a result of it - for example the noun ‘killer’. If Tom killed John, then 
Tom’s act of killing John is the object of the divine act as it was brought into existence and 
carried out by Tom. Nevertheless, it was also brought into existence by God since it occurred by 
His divine will, determination, and initial creation - as it was God who created Tom and Tom’s 
ability. Regardless, Tom is the responsible agent as he carried out the act, not God. For this 
reason, Tom is named the ‘killer’.  
 Despite this, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s essence, names, attributes and acts are all 
pure good and perfection; whereas, the acts of the created beings or the objects of His acts are 
capable of evil.147     
 Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Aṣbahānī says: The [act of] creation (al-khalq) is not [the act of] the created 
(al-makhlūq). The [act of] creation is an attribute of God’s essence, whereas, the [act of] the 
created is originated (muḥdath).148    
                                                          
144 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 550. 
145 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 550; Ayedh al-Dosari, op. cit., p. 540. 
146 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 550- 551. 
147 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 461.  
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 Consequently, from Ibn al-Qayyim’s distinction between the divine acts and the objects 
of His acts – and also between the creation and the created - we can deduce that divine acts are 
good, even though there is perceived evil in existence. Sins, illnesses and natural disasters are 
part of God’s creation; however, they are not carried out by Him, rather they are carried out by 
objects of His acts. God only carries out that which is good, wise and beneficial (maṣlaḥa).149 
 We witness Ibn al-Qayyim wrestling with the positions of the Muʿtazilites and the 
Ashʿarites in order to develop a position which attempts to avoid the difficulties and problematic 
implications he sees inherent in their two positions. Hence, Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement 
helped him to draw a distinction between divine acts and the objects of divine acts - something 
that his interlocutors failed to distinguish.     
 In addition to making a distinction, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that evil is to place things in 
other than their proper places and God only places things in their most suitable places, which 
accord with His wise purpose.150 Thus, evil is excluded from God’s divine acts.  
 Similarly, as we mentioned earlier, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the cause of evil is the 
appetitive self (nafs) and the actions of man.151 Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that what man might 
perceive as evil such as illnesses and natural disasters is not pure evil. That is, it is not evil from 
all perspectives rather it is relative evil152 - as we shall discuss shortly.153     
  
Ibn al-Qayyim on Divine Will and Evil 
On the concept of divine will, Ibn al-Qayyim adopts a different stance to the Muʿtazilites and the 
Ashʿarites. Ibn al-Qayyim holds that it is incorrect to affirm that God wills evil - like the 
Ashʿarites154 - or to nullify it, as is the case with the Muʿtazilites.155 Such affirmation or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
148 al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Qāsim Ismāʿīl Ibn Muḥammad al-Aṣbahānī, al-Ḥujja fī Bayān al-Maḥajja wa Sharḥ ʿaqīda 
Ahlu Sunna, ed. Muḥammad Ibn Rabīʿ al-Madkhalī, Dār al-Rrāya, 1999, vol. 1, p. 421.  
149 Ayedh al-Dosari, op. cit., p. 540.  
150 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 183.  
151 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 200. 
152 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 986- 987; idem., Badāʿi, vol. 2, p. 719.  
153 Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim’s Theodicy of Relative Evil, in chapter seven. 
154 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 550- 551. 
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nullification is in danger of affirming an incorrect meaning or nullifying a correct meaning, 
given that divine will has various meanings. Therefore, the correct method, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim, is to go into detail and define exactly what is meant by divine will. This is necessary as 
the divine will can mean divine volition, divine love and divine contentment (al-riḍā).156  
 For example, God says: And when We will to destroy a township…157 The type of divine 
will used in this verse means divine volition. Similarly, when God says: God wills for you ease 
and He does not will for you hardship.158 The type of divine will referred to in this verse 
represents divine love and contentment.  
 According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the divine volition necessitates the occurrence of the action 
but, at the same time, it does not necessitate that God loves and is content with it. Whereas, the 
divine love and contentment does not necessitate the occurrence of the action but necessitates 
that God loves and is content with it.159 
 Furthermore, if God’s will relates to His own actions then such an action is good, loved 
and favoured. Whereas, if His will relates to man’s actions then such divine will would either 
mean the divine volition or the divine love and contentment160, as we have seen above.  
 Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that ambiguous terms need to be defined rigorously to 
avoid incorrect conclusions. Thus, the correct stance according to him is that evil is not to be 
associated to God, neither His acts nor attributes. Similarly, God is not to be named evil or a 
term derived from it; rather, evil is associated with the objects of His acts (mafʿūlātihi).161 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
155 Ibid 
156 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 551. 
157 Quran 17: 16 
158 Ibid 2: 185 
159 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, pp. 551- 552. 
160 Ibid 
161 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 553. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn 
Sīnā and al-Rāzī only to oppose them on evil being inclusive in divine determination. Similarly, I 
have demonstrated how Ibn al-Qayyim grapples with the positions of both the Muʿtazilites and 
the Ashʿarites, in order to harmonise the inconsistency of some divine attributes in relation to the 
existence of evil. Lastly, as a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I have revealed that 
he manages to introduce new distinctions, such as divine acts and the objects of divine acts, both 
of which helped him develop his position on the transcendency of divine determination over evil. 
In the next chapter, I will analyse how Ibn al-Qayyim outlines and develops a four-fold theodicy 
of optimism which is based on the doctrine that divine determination transcends evil. 
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7- IBN AL-QAYYIM’S FOUR-FOLD THEODICY OF OPTIMISM 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will illustrate how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn 
Sīnā and al-Rāzī, with regard to their categorisation of evil. Similarly, I will show how Ibn al-
Qayyim engages in philosophical inquiry - unlike contemporary Traditionalists - in matters 
concerning divine acts. Likewise, I will demonstrate that Ibn al-Qayyim engages with non-
Traditionalists, such as Ibn Sīnā, and that his conclusions were not always derived from scripture 
or the understanding of the Salaf. Lastly, as a result of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement, I 
will demonstrate how he develops a four-fold theodicy of optimism, which ultimately argues for 
optimism in creation and encourages the praise of God.      
Principles of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Four-Fold Theodicy 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicy consists of five principles.1 The first three are a direct 
refutation against Ibn Sīnā’s natural necessity theory2 - as is advocated by al-Rāzī3 - and the last 
two are aimed at the Ashʿarites’ position on divine acts. These principles clearly distinguish Ibn 
al-Qayyim’s theodicy from that of Ibn Sīnā; even though their metaphysical categories of evil are 
similar, as we shall see shortly. Ibn al-Qayyim deals directly with al-Rāzī’s stance that in order to 
avoid the problem of evil one must accept that God acts by essence, not by will or choice.4 Al-
                                                          
1 Cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ al-ʿAlīl fī Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar wa al-Ḥikma wa al-Taʿlīl, eds. Dr. 
Aḥmad al-Ṣamʿānī and Dr. ʿAlī al-ʿAjlān, Dār al-Ṣumayʿī, Riyadh, 2008, vol. 3, pp. 1006- 1021. 
2 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, tr. Michael E. Marmura, Brigham Young University, 2005, p. 
339; Frank Griffel, al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 141-143, 225-
226.  
3 Cf. al-Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashraqiyya, ed. Muḥammad M. Al-Baghdādī, Dār al-Kitāb alʿArabī, 1990, 
vol. 2, pp. 550- 551.  
4 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1004; idem., Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn wa bāb al-Saʿādatayn, ed. Muḥammad 
Ajmal al-Iṣlāḥī, Dār ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, 1429AH, vol. 1, p. 339. 
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Rāzī concluded as such as a means of answering such questions as: why does God allows the 
burning effect of fire to take place in undeserving circumstances? Forest fires which destroy 
animals, for example.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim says that one must, first and foremost, affirm divine omniscience.5 That is 
to say, God has knowledge of all things; nothing is hidden from Him. This principle is a direct 
refutation against both the philosophers,6 who claim that God has no knowledge of particulars, 
and the extreme Muʿtazilites7 who claim that God does not have any pre-knowledge of man’s 
acts, neither did He decree or will such acts. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the philosophers imply 
that God has no knowledge of existence; since everything that exists is a particular.8 Ibn al-
Qayyim resorts to divine scripture to support his first principle, which challenges the latter two 
positions based on scriptural arguments.9  
 Secondly, one must believe that God is the All-Living in reality (ḥaqīqatan) and His 
living (ḥayātahu) is the most perfect and complete living.10 Thus, this necessitates that He acts 
by choice, since everything that is living is an agent; the level of its agency depends on the 
completeness of its living. So the more complete one’s living is the more complete their actions 
become.  
                                                          
5 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1006. 
6 Such as Ibn Sīnā. See Alfred L. Ivry, ‘Destiny Revisited: Avicenna’s Concept of Determinism’, in Islamic 
Theology and Philosophy, Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. Michael E. Marmura, SUNY, Albany, 
1984, pp. 165, 167; Ian R. Netton, Allāh Transcendent, Routledge, 1994, pp. 161- 162; Also see, M. 
Marmura, ‘Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, in Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, vol. 83, iss. 3, 1962; Peter Adamson, ‘On Knowledge of Particulars’, in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 105, iss. 1, June 2005, pp. 257– 278; Binyamin Abrahamov, 
‘Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology’, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 20, iss. 1, 
1993, pp. 20- 32; idem., ‘Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, Oriens, vol. 33, 1992, 
pp. 133- 155.  
7 Such as the Wāṣiliyya, who are the associates of the early Muʿtazilī, Wāṣil Ibn ʿAṭāʾ, all of whom denied 
God’s attribute of knowledge; since, according to them, to affirm any divine attribute along with its 
meaning is tantamount to dualism. Al-Shahrastānī states that this position at this stage was 
undeveloped. See, al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Seventh Edition, 2007, 
vol. 1, p. 40.   
8 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1107. 
9 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1008- 1010. 
10 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1011. 
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 Thirdly, one must affirm divine choice, given that living (al-ḥayāt) rationally necessitates 
actions which are the result of choice, will and power (qudra).11 Someone who acts by essence is 
properly described as producing ‘effects’ (āthār) rather than ‘acts’ because acts that result from 
essence are not produced by power, nor by choice. Examples of effects rather than acts include 
the effect of burning from fire, or the effect of drowning from water, or the effect of heat from 
the sun.12 Nonetheless, Ibn al-Qayyim’s third principle is that divine acts are results of power 
and choice, which is a direct refutation against Ibn Sīnā and the conclusion of al-Rāzī.13  
 Fourthly, one is required to believe in causality, which affirms that God binds effects to 
their causes, legislatively (sharʿan) and universally (qadaran); both being the object of His 
divine wise purpose. 14 Lastly, to affirm God’s divine wise purpose, which means that God does 
not act vainly, rather He acts for a praised wise purpose. 
 Therefore, one may conclude that God’s wise purpose is grasped through the creation of 
causality. So, the burning effect of fire resulting from the laws of causality is the best of possible 
worlds from God’s choice of creation and He created it according to His general will.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim states that there are over ten thousand examples in support of causality 
(al-asbāb) in divine scripture.15 He clearly argues that causality does not undermine divine unity 
(tawḥīd). In fact those, namely the Ashʿarites, who consider causality to be metaphoric in divine 
scripture, have an incorrect understanding of divine unity.16   
 Lastly, it is evident that the principles of Ibn al-Qayyim’s theodicies are a direct result of 
his critical engagement with Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, the Muʿtazilites, and the Ashʿarites. The first 
three refute Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, and the extreme Muʿtazilites; while the last concentrates on the 
Ashʿarites.  
                                                          
11 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1012. 
12 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1012.  
13 Cf. al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 550- 551. 
14 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1013.  
15 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1016.  
16 See, Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1017- 1021. 
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Ibn al-Qayyim’s Categorisation of Evil 
On the metaphysics of good and evil, Ibn al-Qayyim builds on the logical categories mentioned 
by both Ibn Sīnā17 and al-Rāzī,18 which essentially argue that creation only contains essential evil 
of privation19 and existing evil which is accidental20 (henceforth, accidental evil); both of these 
categories imply that good is predominant.21  
 First and foremost, Ibn al-Qayyim categorises evil into two types: pure evil (shir maḥḍ) 
from all perspectives and relative evil (shir nisbī) from certain perspectives.22 The first type of 
evil is non-existent given that, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, there is no such thing as pure evil in 
existence.23 The second type of evil is the one that exists and has two sub-categories, evil of 
privation and accidental evil.24 As for evil of privation, Ibn al-Qayyim states that its privation is 
either25 [1] for the necessary (ḍarūrī) existence of something else, [2] for the necessary 
                                                          
17 Avicenna, op. cit., p. 341. For counter arguments against Ibn Sīnā’s theodicy of essential evil and 
accidental evil, see Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s refutations in Ayman Shihadeh, The Teleological Ethics of Farkh al-
Dīn al-Rāzī, Brill, 2006, pp. 160- 169.   
18 al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548. 
19 Essential evil (al-shr bi-dhāt) as privation (al-ʿadam) is a concept adopted by Ibn Sīnā (see, Avicenna, 
op. cit., p. 340) and was advanced by Aristotle and Plotinus (see, Physics 1.8 191b 14, Met. 12.4 1070b 
10; Enneads 2.4.14. Also see, A. M. Goichon, La Distinction de l’Essence et de l’Existence d’appres Ibn 
Sina, Paris, 1937, p. 387 ff. And cf. Muḥammad ʿĀṭif al-Iraqi, al-Falsafa al-Tabiʿiya ʿinda Ibn Sina, Cairo, 
1971, p. 144 ff.).  
20 Accidental evil (al-shir bi-al-ʿarḍ), cf. Avicenna, op. cit., p. 340; al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548; Ibn al-
Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 988- 989.  
21 Cf. Avicenna, op. cit., pp. 341, 347; al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 549- 550; Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, 
pp. 987, 995- 998.  
22 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 987. Ibn al-Qayyim also discusses a similar category on the existence 
of good and evil. It reads as follows: (1) Pure good which exists, (2) Good greater than evil which also 
exists, (3) Good equal to evil which is non-existent, (4) evil greater than good which is also non-existent, 
(5) Pure evil which is non-existent , (6) No good nor evil which does not exists too; cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, op. 
cit., vol. 3, pp. 995- 998. Ibn al-Qayyim seemed to have added the last category, no. 6, which is not 
mention by both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī. Cf. Avicenna, op. cit., p. 345-6 and al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 549.     
23 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 995. 
24 Accidental evil can also be read as incidental evil or relative evil.  
25 Compare this categorisation with Ibn Sīnā, in Avicenna, op. cit., p. 341 and al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 
548. However, the only difference is that Ibn al-Qayyim adds an extra category, no. 2, and uses different 
examples for each category- all of which differ from the original examples used by both Ibn Sīnā and al-
Rāz, cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 987- 988, idem., Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 334- 337. 
Perhaps, Ibn al-Qayyim is attempting to simplify the original categories with clear examples.  
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continuation of something else’s existence26, [3] for the necessary perfection of something else, 
or [4] it may not be necessary for the existence, continuation, or perfection of that something 
else, even while its existence is better than its non-existence. The first is like the privation of 
sense, movement, and breathing for animals.27 The second is like the privation of power to 
nourish, grow, and reproduce for animals.28 The third type is like the privation of health, hearing, 
sight and strength.29 The fourth is like the privation of knowledge that consists of detailed 
information30, where knowledge of it is better than ignorance, but at the same time it is not 
necessary.31  
 As for accidental evil, the term encompasses all that opposes life, continuation and 
perfection, such as illnesses and suffering and their causes (asbābihā). Similarly, the existence of 
impediments which prevent the obtaining and reaching of good to the place that accepts it and is 
ready to accept it; such as substances which prevent the nourishment of limbs within the body. 
Also, the false beliefs and corrupt intentions which prevent true beliefs and good intentions from 
reaching the heart.32 
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that accidental evil is a direct consequence of the evil of privation, 
in order to avoid attributing accidental evil to God. For example, the privation of knowledge and 
justice, necessarily results in ignorance and oppression; both of which exist. Similarly, the 
privation of health and moderation, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, necessarily result in suffering 
and harm; both of which exist.33 
                                                          
26 The second category here is what Ibn al-Qayyim added to al-Rāzī’s original categorisation, since the 
latter only mentions three categories. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim clearly sees a distinction between 
existence and continuation, perhaps the privation of the latter being long-term while the former is 
short-term. Compare al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 550- 551 with Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 987- 988, 
1004 and idem., Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 334- 337.  
27 Al-Rāzī’s example reads, the privation of life, cf. al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548. 
28 These examples belong to the additional category added by Ibn al-Qayyim.  
29 a-Rāzī’s example reads, blindness (al-ʿamā), cf. al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548. 
30 Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī both use philosophy as an example, in their last category. However, Ibn al-Qayyim 
clearly opts for detailed knowledge, instead of philosophy, perhaps to avoid a negative reaction from his 
contemporary puritan Traditionalists.   
31 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 987- 988. 
32 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 988, 187- 188. 
33 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 988- 989.  
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 So, the implication is that God is free from having agency over accidental evil, since it is 
the result of privation and privation has no agent because causal agency deals with things that 
actually exist. Thus, one cannot say accidental evil comes from God, bearing in mind that an 
agent is only necessary with things which have actual, external existence. This is why, Ibn al-
Qayyim explains, that some Muslims say: ‘whatsoever God wills is and whatsoever He wills not 
is not’, hence, everything in existence is due to the will of God and everything that does not exist 
is because God did not will it.34  
 Furthermore, it is in this same problem, namely, tracing the source of accidental evil, 
where we can appreciate an example of Traditionalist engagement in philosophical inquiry and 
employment of demonstrative arguments which are potentially an original contribution; such a 
demonstration is not found in either Ibn Sīnā or al-Rāzī’s theodicean works. Hence, this example 
clearly challenges the conception that all intricate Traditionalist doctrines are directly imported 
from scripture or from a utopian understanding of the Salaf. Ibn al-Qayyim demonstrates that the 
necessary consequence of accidental evil from privation is not by way of cause and effect, but 
rather by way of lack of condition (‘adam shart) or presence of an impediment (wujud mani’). A 
lack of conditions for acquiring knowledge, necessarily results in a person’s ignorance. This is 
by way of necessity (mulazama), as Ibn al-Qayyim argues, and not by way of effect (taʾthīr). 
Effect entails a cause, unlike necessity. So in short, the lack of condition necessitates the lack of 
necessary contingent (mashrūṭ),35 like the requirement of books and a teacher for the acquisition 
of knowledge. Hence, privation is not effected, but rather it is necessitated simply by the absence 
of its opposite.   
 For this reason, it is said that the cause of privation is the privation of a cause.36 In simple 
terms, if one were to ask: why is there privation of knowledge? The answer is because there is no 
cause. Or, why is there privation of faith? Once more, it is because there is no cause. So the 
reason man is deprived of perfection is due to his inaction and hence lack of cause.37 
                                                          
34 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 214- 215.  
35 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 215. 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid., p. 216.  
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 In this sense, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that just as an originated thing is attributed to the 
originator’s agency, will, and choice; the privation of a thing is attributed to the privation of 
agency, will, and choice.38 Thus, what God wills, exists and what He does not will, does not 
exist, due to the privation of divine will.39   
 So, examples of accidental evil, which is a necessary consequence (lawāzim) of the evil 
of privation, are false beliefs and corrupt intentions. That is to say, whenever man lacks 
beneficial knowledge and piety, the necessary result that takes its place is that of evil, ignorance, 
and its consequences. Man must be occupied with one of these opposites, either the pious 
beneficial opposite or the corrupt harmful opposite.40 Ibn al-Qayyim upholds that this type of 
accidental evil is created by God, since there is no creator save Him and He is the creator of all 
things. However, this is not inconsistent with the fact that accidental evil is a necessary 
consequence of the evil of privation and at the same time uncaused, as might be assumed. 
Consequently, this line of argument prompts a problematic question, that is, can God create 
something whilst at the same time not being the agent or cause of it? According to Ibn al-
Qayyim’s demonstration, God created accidental evil, such as ignorance, according to the laws 
of privation and necessity; contrary to the laws of cause and effect. Hence, God’s omnipotence is 
still intact since He is the ultimate Creator of the cosmos and the laws within it. Similarly, God’s 
justice is also intact since He is not the agent of accidental evil; rather it is a necessary 
consequence of privation, which is uncaused. As such, ignorance is not created directly; it is 
inherent within the laws of privation and necessity.  
Ibn Sīnā seems to be alluding to something vaguely similar, when he states:  
Hence, the good that are generated by these things have been primarily willed in the manner 
where it would be appropriate to say: ‘God, exalted be He, wills [all things], and evil was also 
willed in the way of what is accidental. Since, He knew that it exists by necessity, He paid it no 
                                                          
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid., p. 217. 
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heed.’ The good, hence, is necessarily required essentially, while evil is necessarily required 
accidentally- everything being by predetermination.41        
Nonetheless, everything that God creates must have a wise purpose behind it; He creates due to 
His divine wise purposes. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that had God not created the harmful opposites 
such as ignorance, then the wise purpose would have been missed (fāt).42 Similarly, he argues, it 
is not wise of God to omit a wise purpose that is more beloved to Him than the good that may 
exist due to its non-existence. So, indeed there is an even greater wise purpose and objective for 
the existence of this evil than the non-existence of it, universally. Thus, according to Ibn al-
Qayyim, this requires that He be praised. Also, it should be noted, that the existence of the 
obligated (malzūm) without its obligator (lāzimhu) is impossible (mumtaniʿ);43 thus the existence 
of ignorance is a necessary consequence of its deprived opposite, knowledge.      
 This then leads us to question why God created the world in such a way that the ‘evil 
necessities and opposites’ must occur? Why did God not create ‘good necessities and opposites’ 
instead of evil ones? Ibn al-Qayyim explains:  
We have shown that the necessities (lawāzim) of this creation, this origination, and this world 
must occur. If we imagine the non-existence of such necessities, then it would not be the same 
world, but rather another world, another origination, and another creation.44 
From Ibn al-Qayyim’s explanation one can deduce that the laws of privation and their necessities 
are a part of this world and that the creation would not be the same without them; thus, this is the 
best of all possible worlds, although Ibn al-Qayyim does not explicitly state this. Similarly, this 
creation is more beloved to God than the non-existence of ‘evil necessities and opposites’, since 
the creation has a great wise purpose.  
                                                          
41 Avicenna, op. cit., p. 345, 342; Catarina Belo, Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroës, Brill, 
2007, pp. 49- 51, 117- 119; Ivry, op. cit., p. 162; Shams C. Inati, The Problem of Evil: Ibn Sinā’s Theodicy, 
State University of New York, New York, pp. 9- 10, 144- 146; Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought: 
The Dispute Over al-Ghazālī’s Best of All Possible Worlds, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 196.  
42 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, p. 217 
43 Ibid 
44 Ibid, p. 218. 
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 Ibn al-Qayyim’s explanation here seems influenced by his engagement with Ibn 
Taymiyya; on the same topic he says:  
I said to Shaykh al-Islām: that it was possible [for God] to create such things free of these 
detriments and only entailing pure benefit. So he said: the creation of this nature without its 
necessities is impossible, for indeed, the existence of an obligated (malzūm) without its obligator 
(lāzim) is impossible; and if it were created in other than this way, it would be a different creation 
and hence it would be another world other than this one.45  
Ibn al-Qayyim then states to ask such question is like saying: why is it that rain and rivers are 
also able to cause drowning, obstruction, destruction and all types of harm? Why is the sun also 
able to cause burning, simoom and other types of harm to living beings? Why is it that the nature 
of being is not free from suffering, death, etc.? Why is it that giving birth is not free from the 
burden of pregnancy, labour (ṭalq) and the suffering of delivery? Also, why is man’s body not 
free from suffering, agony and the different natural dispositions that obligate the change of his 
state? Lastly, why is it that the different seasons of the year cause extreme cold, which is fatal, 
and extreme heat which is harmful? Does a rational mind accept these questions or even ask 
them?46 Ibn al-Qayyim again emphasises that such necessities and opposites are necessary 
(lawāzim) attributes in this world, if they were not, then it would be a different possible world. 
 Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, argues that a creation that is pure good and free from evil is 
only possible in absolute existence; only things that have emanated from the First Governor and 
come to exist in intellectual, psychological and celestial things.47 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s Four-Fold Theodicy 
All of the aforementioned principles and categorisations form the base of Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-
fold theodicy of optimism, which explains the necessity of some things that man may perceive as 
                                                          
45 Ibid, p. 214. Both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, also tackled this question, see, Avicenna, op. cit., pp. 346, 342-
343; also see George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 
2007, p. 234; al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 550.  
46 Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, p. 218. 
47 Avicenna, op. cit., p. 342- 343, 346. 
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evil by (1) Relativity (2) Divine names and attributes (3) Necessary Opposites and (4) Divine 
Wise Purpose. 
The Theodicy of Relative Evil 
In the theodicy of relative evil, Ibn al-Qayyim distinguishes between two levels of perception 
when dealing with evil.48 The first is that of God, which views everything within existence as 
having some sort of good for its existence. The second is that of man, who perceives evil within 
creation as evil only because he has been harmed by it; hence, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that it is a 
relative evil.49 But this does not mean everything that necessitates existence is good and 
everything that necessitates privation is evil - as is the position of Ibn Sīnā.50 Rather, the 
existence may necessitate the inferiority (marjūḥ) of evil and the privation may necessitate the 
preponderance (rājiḥ) of good. Examples of the former are fire, rain, heat, cold, ice and the 
existence of harmful animals. All of these exist and, at the same time, they entail relative evil, 
which goes unremarked, eclipsed by the vast good that exists from them. The example of the 
latter is like the privation of good deeds, which necessitates repentance; given that there is no 
repentance without sins. This is another crucial difference between Ibn Sīnā and Ibn al-Qayyim. 
Ibn Sīnā clearly adheres to the statement that ‘all good is everything in existence along with its 
necessities (lawāzimhu) and pure evil is everything in non-existence along with its necessities’.51 
On the contrary, Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that this statement is ambiguous and needs further 
clarification: 
 
If what is intended by this statement that everything God had created, brought into existence, and 
its existence is better than its non-existence; and also, everything that He did not create, nor 
willed, and remains in its origin of non-existent and thus there is no good in it. Since, if there 
were good in it, God would have created it, for verily, within His hands is good. Then yes, this 
meaning of the statement is correct; seeing that the ‘non-existing evil’ is the non-existence of 
                                                          
48 The two level perceptions is also found in the debate of free will and divine determinism.  
49 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 986- 987; idem., al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, ed. ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad al-
ʿUmrān, ʿĀlim al-Fawāʾid, Mekka, n.d., vol. 2, p. 719. 
50 Shams C. Inati, op. cit., p.66.  
51 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 986; Shams C. Inati, op. cit., pp. 65- 68. 
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good. On the contrary, if what is intended by this statement is that everything which necessities 
existence is good and everything which necessities non-existence is evil, then this is incorrect. 
Since, the existence may necessitate the inferiority (marjūḥ) of evil and the privation may 
necessitate the preponderance (rājiḥ) of good. The example of the first category is like fire, rain, 
heat, cold, ice, and the existence of all harmful animals. All of these exist and at the same time 
they entail relative evil that goes unnoted with regards to the [vast] good that exists from it.52  
 
In other words, people may suffer from the above mentioned but the suffering is minor compared 
to the vast good in them. Similarly, God’s commands may necessitate suffering and hardship but, 
according to Ibn al-Qayyim, this hardship is trivial in comparison to its consequential good.53   
 
Principles of Relative Evil 
Ibn al-Qayyim also emphasises that when one says God is the creator of good and evil, one must 
bear in mind two principles. Firstly, that what is perceived by man as evil or comprising of evil is 
in actual fact only the objects of His acts, which are separate from God and are not a part of His 
attributes or acts. Secondly, in spite of the fact that it is perceived as evil by man, this perception 
is subjective. Given that it is good when it is related to divine acts, creation and will; all of which 
result from a great wise purpose which God may allow some of His closest slaves to grasp. This 
view point can be understood as the divine perspective. Additionally, it is evil when it relates to 
the person who views it as evil, namely man’s perspective.54 An example of this can be seen in 
the creation of fire. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the burning effect of fire is the object of divine 
act, that is to say, it is not God specifically making it burn at that given moment; rather it was 
created with the nature of burning by God’s general will,55 just like the effect after a cause. Thus 
fire will always burn as long as the necessary conditions are present without impediment; as is 
                                                          
52 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 986- 987.  
53 Ibid 
54 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, vol. 2, p. 719; Ibn al-Qayyim states that he has simplified this 
matter in two of his works, al-Tuḥfa al-Mekkiyya (perhaps known as Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda) and the other 
al-Fatḥ al-Qudsī (lost) cf. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 720. 
55 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 2, p. 971.  
195 
 
 
also the case with the effect after its cause.56 So, it is the fire that is burning and it is God who 
created fire to burn as a result of His general will - perhaps at the moment of the first creation. 
Ibn al-Qayyim introduces the concept of general will in this debate, perhaps in order to distance 
God from both natural and moral evil. In both cases, the cause of evil by man or by fire is the 
result of God’s general will which he possibly created in pre-eternity according to the laws of 
‘cause and effect’ or ‘privation and necessity’. Nonetheless, fire is not evil from the divine 
perspective, given its many useful benefits to man,57 but it is seen as evil by the person who is 
harmed by it; thus its labelling as evil is subjective.58   
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the Traditionalists (Ahlu Sunna) do not see divine omnipotence 
and His praise-giving as conflicting.59 That is to say, both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites 
found the two problematic hence the former denied that evil is within His dominion and the latter 
implied the denial of His Praise-giving since He acts purely by His arbitrary volition and not for 
a wise purpose.60 
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that whatever God creates and legislates, He does so 
with a great wise purpose and a perfect blessing (niʿmatin sābigha); hence, He is worthy of 
praise. Just like God is praised for His beautiful names and attributes,61 He is also praised for His 
actions, which are the result of His wise purposes and praised objectives.62 Additionally, given 
that God is perfect in essence, names and attributes, He only performs acts that are 
compassionate and according to His wise purpose, which requires His praise and love;63 thus He 
would not have acted otherwise.  
                                                          
56 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1013. 
57 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 991, 998- 999. 
58 Ibid. Also see the example of fire as relative evil in both Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī’s discussions in Avicenna, 
op. cit., p. 346 and al-Rāzī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 548. 
59 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1132. 
60 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 1132- 1134. 
61 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 322. 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid, p. 323. 
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The Theodicy of Divine Names and Attributes 
According to this theodicy, all of God’s names and attributes are beautiful and free from evil. 
Some divine names and attributes require the existence of evil in order to manifest.64 
Furthermore, some evil leads to a greater good that is more beloved to God and hence reflects 
some of His attributes. However, the fact that all His names and attributes are beautiful and some 
require evil to manifest does not necessarily mean that His names and attributes conflict. God 
says in the Quran: 
 
Say: O God Possessor of the kingdom, You give the kingdom to whom You will, and You take 
the kingdom from whom You will, and You endue with honour whom You will, and You 
humiliate whom You will. In Your Hand is the good. Verily, You are Able to do all things.65 
 
Ibn al-Qayyim illuminates the above verse saying that complete dominion belongs to God alone 
and He conducts it how He wills. He conducts according to justice, wise purpose and benefit, all 
of which are good and thus He should be praised and thanked for it just as He is praised and 
thanked for being free from evil.66  
 Additionally, just as all of God’s names are beautiful67 (ḥusn) and free from evil, the 
same applies to His attributes, they are all free from imperfections. The same applies to His 
actions, none of which are without a wise purpose and benefit.68 Thus, God is described with 
good names and complete attributes, both of which also indicate that He is far above the opposite 
of His good names and perfect attributes, such as evil names and imperfect attributes.69     
                                                          
64 This notion of evil being necessary for God to manifest is also found in Ibn al-ʿArabī’s writings. See 
William C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Cosmology, State University of 
New York Press, 1998, pp. 53-53; idem., A Sufī Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Metaphysics of 
Imagination, State University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 3- 44, 289- 297.   
65 Quran 3: 26. 
66 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 975. 
67 ḥuṣn can also be translated as good.  
68 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 243. 
69 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 244. 
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 For example, His divine name al-Quddūs, which means the Most Holy who is pure and 
free from all evil, imperfections and deficiencies.70 The divine name al-Salām, who is the Giver 
of Peace, is also free from all deficiencies and imperfections.71 Interestingly, Ibn ʿArabī also 
mentions similar meanings to the divine names al-Salām and al-Quddūs, where the latter is free 
ab initio, namely, free of defects and imperfections while al-Salām is free of defects.72  
  Al-Ḥamīd, the Praiseworthy, to whom belongs all praises and the perfection of such 
praises, requires that evil, sins and imperfection are not attributed to Him. That is, such evils 
must not be attributed to His names, actions or attributes.73 
 Ironically, His beautiful names (asmāʾihi al-ḥusnā) prevent evil, sin and oppression from 
being attributed to Him, even while He is the creator of everything. He is the prime creator of 
man, man’s actions and speech. When man acts evilly, Ibn al-Qayyim says, he is described as 
sinning, despite it being God who allowed him (jaʿal)74 to act. Also, God allowing him to act is 
the result of His justice and wise purpose. Thus, God is good with regard to His acts and man is 
evil with regard to his evil acts. So, God allowing man to act is good, wise in purpose and 
beneficial; even while the deed may be imperfect and evil on man’s part.75 Similarly, God 
allowing man to act in such a way is simply placing things in their correct place, which is Ibn al-
Qayyim’s definition of justice.76 Ibn al-ʿArabī echoes similar lines, that al-Ḥakīm (the Wise) is 
He who brings down everything to its rightful place.77  
 An example of a person placing things in their correct place and who is thus considered 
good and just, is one who places rubbish in the bin; this displays wise purpose (ḥikma), motive 
                                                          
70 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 977.  
71 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 981.al-Ghazālī also states that al-Salām indicates that God is free from absolute evil, see, 
al-Ghazālī, al-Maqāṣid al-Asnā, ed. Nūr Muḥammad, Karachi, n.d., p.63. 
72 Qaiser Shahzad, ‘Ibn ʿArabī’s Contribution to the Ethics of Divine Names’, in Islamic Studies, vol. 43, 
No. 1, 2004, p. 27.  
73 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 983. 
74 The term jaʿal here literally means to make, however, I do not think the term ‘to make’ expresses the 
full and correct meaning in relation to Ibn al-Qayyim’s compatibilist position in chapter three.  
75 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 983- 984. 
76 Refer to the previous chapter. 
77 Muḥī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Mekkiyyah, Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, Beirut, 2002, vol. 3, p. 37; 
Shahzad, op. cit., p. 34. 
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(‘ilal), and this is correct.78 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that whoever places a turban on his head, 
shoes on his feet, Kohl on their eyes and rubbish in the bin has certainly placed them in their 
correct places and in no way has this person oppressed the shoes or the bin since this is its 
correct place.79 Contrary to this, a foolish and oppressive person is he who places things in other 
than their correct place.  
 God’s divine names and attributes reflect His divine Justice as divine names and 
attributes entail that things are placed in their correct place. Hence, He is the Acceptor of 
Repentance (al-Tawwāb) to those whom repent; thus repentance is positioned in its correct place. 
He creates man with the ability to act and holds him accountable for his actions; hence, ability 
and accountability are placed in their correct places. Consequently, God’s names and attributes 
reflect His divine Justice which, as a result, requires that He must be praised as it is simply 
placing thanks-giving in its correct place.  
 This also implies that all of God’s creation, from the divine perspective, is good; this 
includes both natural and moral evils. But the presence of evil - as man perceives it - is only 
considered evil from man’s perspective; this includes man’s acts but not divine acts. Since, God 
acts for a wise purpose and benefit as is indicated in His divine names and attributes and He 
places things where they are meant to be; thus, everything that God does is good.80   
 Similarly, what man perceives as evil is necessary for the manifestation of God’s names 
and attributes81- as Ibn al-Qayyim asks in rhetorical questions: 
 
 …and is the apparent effect of God’s names and attributes in the universe only but essential for 
God’s lordship and dominion?’ Can He be the Sustainer, the Forgiver, the Pardoner, the 
Compassionate, and the Forbearer without there being the person to sustain, forgive, pardon, be 
                                                          
78 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 984.  
79 Ibid. There are other examples given in Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 207.  
80 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 976.  
81 See, Jon Hoover, ‘God’s Wise Purposes in Creating Iblīs: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’s Theodicy of God’s 
Names and Attributes’, in A Scholar In The Shadow: Essays In The Legal and Theological Thought Of Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Caterina Bori & Livnat Holtzman (eds), Oriente Moderno, Rome, 1-2010, pp. 124, 
126. Also see William C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Cosmology, State 
University of New York Press, 1998, pp. 53-53; idem., A Sufī Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-ʿArabī’s 
Metaphysics of Imagination, State University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 3- 44, 289- 297.   
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compassionate to, and also forbear? Similarly, is His retaliation only but essential to His lordship 
and dominion?82  
 
In other words, who shall He retaliate against if He has no enemies to retaliate against? 
From Ibn al-Qayyim’s above rhetorical questions, one may conclude that perhaps any relative 
evil that exists is essential for the manifestation of God’s names and attributes.83  
 
God Wills Sins for a Greater Good 
So far we have learnt that all of God’s acts are good, hence, everything God commands is good 
and everything He prohibits is evil. So why then does God will the non-existence of His 
commands - specifically, why do some people not carry out God’s commands? Similarly, why 
does God also will the existence of His prohibitions, as some people sin by carrying out these 
prohibitions? These questions are critical when considering that God only wills that which is 
good.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that sins may entail something that is more beloved to God even 
while its non-existence is better than its existence.84 Ibn al-Qayyim does not indicate what ‘this 
more beloved thing’ is but rather concludes that he will deal with this matter in the chapter 
entitled ‘The Union of Divine Determining and Divine Legislation’ (bāb ijtimāʿ al-qadar wa al-
sharʿ). It must be noted that this chapter is nowhere to be found in Ibn al-Qayyim’s works; 
moreover, he makes reference to this chapter in two places in his book Shifāʾ. This may indicate 
that perhaps it is a missing chapter of the same book. However, gathering from Ibn al-Qayyim’s 
works holistically, one assumes that the ‘more beloved thing’ mentioned is none other than 
repentance, since, regarding sins, what could be more beloved to God than repentance?   
 
                                                          
82 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 212- 213. 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 985. Ibn Sīnā also states that God wills evil for a greater good; see, 
Avicenna, op. cit., pp. 342, 345; George F. Hourani, op. cit., pp. 235- 238. 
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Divine Names and Attributes are Free from Evil 
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God’s names are derived from both His attributes and acts, not by 
what He created (makhlūqātihi). Therefore, we cannot name Him ‘the mover’, ‘the stationary’, 
‘the tall’, ‘the short’, ‘the white’ or ‘the black’, even though He is the creator of these attributes. 
But rather, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, his names are derived from the acts and attributes that 
are intrinsic to Him (qāʾimun bi-hi). So, He is not to be described with what He created which is 
extrinsic to Him.85 Therefore, the natural conclusion is that God is not to be described with what 
is a part of man’s attributes - such as evil.   
 Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that evil is not a part of God’s attributes nor His acts; similarly 
it is not a part of His essence.86 His essence is complete perfection; there is no imperfection in it 
from any perspective. Such is the case with His attributes; it is complete perfection, no 
deficiencies nor imperfections whatsoever. Also, the same applies to His actions, which are all 
purely good and free from evil. Had God have acted evilly, there would have been a name 
derived from it and hence, not all His names would have been beautiful. Further, the punishment 
of His slaves is just because they are deserving of it; in this regard, it is pure good because it is 
additionally pure justice and wise in purpose from the divine perspective.87 
 So, to give God negative attributes88, or extrinsic attributes89 is to in fact deny His 
attributes and their meanings. This would imply that He is named by all the acts and attributes 
that He created such as ‘the tall’, ‘the short’, ‘the evil’, etc., since we cannot choose some 
extrinsic attributes over others.90  
 Lastly, God is named ‘the Self-Sufficient’ (al-Ghanī) and ‘the Praiseworthy’ (al-Ḥamīd). 
Contrary to this, the agent of evil does not do evil except to gain something which, in this case, 
contradicts the name ‘the Self-Sufficient’, which is free from all needs. Likewise, the agent of 
                                                          
85 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1328- 1329. 
86 Ibn al-ʿArabī also argues that evil is not from God and hence His divine names indicate that He is free 
from evil. See, Muḥī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 257.  
87 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, vol. 2, pp. 718- 719. 
88 Namely, to deny all His affirmed attributes mentioned in divine scripture. 
89 For example, He is named the Just, however, a justice that is created by Him and separate from His 
essence.  
90 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1329- 1330. 
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evil acts evilly; this is an imperfection and deficiency, both of which contradict the name ‘the 
Praiseworthy’, who is worthy of all thanks-giving due to the pure goodness of His actions. Thus, 
it is impossible for God ‘the Self-Sufficient’ and ‘the Praiseworthy’ to do evil, even though He is 
considered the creator of good and evil,91 bearing in mind, the two levels of perspectives, the 
divine and the human.  
 
Opposing Attributes 
On the question of apparently opposing attributes, Ibn al-Qayyim’s standpoint is that there is no 
contradiction between divine omnipotence (al-qudra) and divine wise purpose (al-ḥikma); the 
perfect divine omnipotence creates the opposites and the perfect divine wise purpose places them 
in their correct places. The true scholar, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, is he who does not 
‘conflict’ divine omnipotence with divine wise purpose. That is, if he believes in the divine 
omnipotence, then he should not criticise the divine wise purpose and thus deny it; such is the 
case of the Ashʿarites when it comes to sins.92 Equally, if he believes in the divine wise purpose, 
then he should not criticise the divine omnipotence and oppose it; such is the case of the 
Muʿtazilites with regard to sins. Rather, the true scholar, as Ibn al-Qayyim argues, is he who ties 
both the divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose together and knows that they encompass 
all which God has created and continues to create. Just as things come into existence by His 
divine will and omnipotence, equally things also come into existence by His divine wise 
purpose.93 Ibn al-Qayyim states: 
 
If man cannot comprehend this detail, then it is sufficient to believe in what he knows and what 
he witnesses of it. After which he can reason out the absent by the present94, [i.e. what he does not 
know by what he does know].  
                                                          
91 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Badāʾiʿ al-Fawāʾid, vol. 2, pp. 719- 720. 
92 See, Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1089- 1319; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Maʿālim Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Nizār 
Ḥamādī, Dār al-Ḍiyāʾ, Kuwait, 2012, p. 158; Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmadī, Ghāyat al-Marām fī ilm al-Kalām, ed. 
Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, Cairo, 1971, p. 224. 
93 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 221- 222. 
94 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 222. 
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Ibn al-Qayyim then cites a verse from the Quran which shows that God has created things for 
man which have numerous benefits and at the same time entails relative evil. It reads: 
 
He sends down water from the sky, and the valleys flow according to their measure, but the flood 
bears away the foam that mounts up to the surface, and from that which they heat in the fire in 
order to make ornaments or utensils, rises a foam like unto it, thus does God show forth truth and 
falsehood. Then, as for the foam it passes away as scum upon the banks, while that which is for 
the good of mankind remains in the earth. Thus God sets forth parables.95 
 
The Theodicy of Opposites 
Ibn al-Qayyim seemingly develops another way of dealing with evil: a theodicy of opposites.96 
This is apparent in various sections of his works. For example, when he deals with an objection 
as to why God did not make all hearts accept good and reject evil? Ibn al-Qayyim despises this 
question and states that it is akin to asking, why did God create opposites? Why did God not 
make everything one? Why did He create the night and the day, the above and the beneath, the 
hot and the cold, the disease and the cure, the angels and the devils, the pleasant and the 
unpleasant odour, the sweet and the sour, and the good and the evil?97 He states: 
Can the least of a rational person allow the likes of such questions, which indicates the insanity of 
the questioner and the defectiveness of his rationality? Indeed, this is from none other than the 
necessity of God’s Lordship, Deity, Dominion, Omnipotence, Will, and Wise Purpose. It is 
impossible for the necessity of His perfect attribute to abandon it [namely the creation of 
opposites].98  
                                                          
95 Quran 13: 17 
96 Jon Hoover, op. cit., p. 123. al-Ghazālī also discusses a similar theodicy of opposites in his writings; see, 
Eric L. Ormsby, op. cit., pp. 65- 68, 80, 223- 225.   
97 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 212. 
98 Ibid  
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Consequently, the creation of opposites in this world is a necessary facet of God’s divine wise 
purpose and divine omnipotence99 as God’s divine attributes are manifested. Ibn al-Qayyim 
argues that created things are only manifested by their opposite. Therefore it is a necessary 
creation within the world; without it, it would be another world.100  
 Ibn al-Qayyim views the creation of opposites in this world as an indication of God’s 
attributes. He states that the creation of opposites is one of the greatest signs of divine 
omnipotence and divine will, as God is the creator of the heavens and earth, light and darkness, 
Paradise and Hell, water and fire, metal and air101, good and evil, hot and cold, beautiful and 
ugly.102 Ibn al-Qayyim also argues for an epistemological necessity, in that: 
… The perfection of goodness in an opposite is manifested in the creation of its opposite. Indeed, 
the goodness of an opposite only becomes manifested by its opposite. If it were not for ugly, the 
virtue of beauty would not be known. If it were not for poverty, then the value of wealth would 
not be known.103  
Contrary to this, Ghazālī’s theodicy of opposites argues for a metaphysical necessity, in that, the 
existence of an opposite is a requisite for the existence of its opposite; without one, the other 
would not exist. This Stoic argument potentially confuses contraries with correlatives; the latter 
being mutually implicative, unlike the former.104     
 Ibn al-Qayyim also argues that the creation of opposites is necessary for the educational 
development of life. That is, the perfections of man are attained by sufferings and hardships, 
such as the attainment of knowledge and courage.105 Ibn al-Qayyim’s theory is that the best of 
pleasure is covered in pain and the worst of pain is covered in pleasure. This may be evident in 
the continuous application of obedience or disobedience. Hence why some rationalists say: 
‘blessing is not known (yudrak) by blessings, relaxation is not attained by relaxation and 
                                                          
99 Ibid, and also see Ibid, pp. 221- 222.  
100 Ibid., pp. 218- 217. 
101 Namely, the physical intensity of hard vs. soft. 
102 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1188- 1189. 
103 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1189; also cf. Jon Hoover, op. cit., p. 129. 
104 See, Eric L. Ormsby, op. cit., p. 66- 67.  
105 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 1234- 1235. 
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whosoever opts for pleasures misses pleasures’, as Ibn al-Qayyim states.106 In other words, 
relaxation is only understood after experiencing exhaustion and pleasure after the endurance of 
hardship.107 
 At times Ibn al-Qayyim explains that evil, or in this case suffering, is crucial for the 
development of man. This could be understood as a spiritual development and also an 
educational development of life in general. He states that suffering and its necessities (tawābiʿ) 
and causes (asbāb) are necessary for the development of man, who was not created extrinsic 
from it. Heat and cold, hunger and thirst, fatigue and exhaustion, grief and depression, weakness 
and inability: these sufferings form the necessities for the development of man and animals; if 
man were free from such sufferings then he would not be man but rather another creation.108 
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim simplifies his theodicy of opposites by explaining that there is no 
happiness for he who has not experienced sadness, nor is there pleasure for he who has not 
experienced patience.109 Additionally, there is no blessing for he who had no calamity and no 
relaxation for he who had no hardship.110 Thus, the attainment of goodness arrives via the 
necessary experience of evil opposites; namely, hardship and sufferings.   
 
The Theodicy of Divine Wise Purpose 
It may be construed that all the previous theodicies mentioned ultimately conclude to the 
theodicy of divine wise purpose, which again distinguishes Ibn al-Qayyim from Ibn Sīnā. In this 
theodicy, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that everything in creation has a wise purpose behind its 
existence as it was created by God who acts according to His intrinsic attribute which is reflected 
in His name the Wise (al-ḥakīm): He who places things correctly. This means that there is a wise 
purpose for what God wills and what He wills not, and what He creates and what He does not 
                                                          
106 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 1235. 
107 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ Dār al-Saʿāda wa Manshūr wilāyat al-ʿIlm wa al-Irāda, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
1998, vol. 2, p. 333. 
108 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 285. This theodicy is very similar to the Muʿtazilites’ theodicy of suﬀering; see, Ibn al-
Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 316. 
109 I think what is meant by patient here is in fact pain. 
110 Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, p. 333. 
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create; for what He commands and what He does not command.111 Furthermore, Ibn al-Qayyim 
deems it sufficient to prove one benefit or wisdom for any given accidental evil and, as a result, 
he has proven his optimistic theodicy of wise purpose. Nevertheless, divine wise purpose is not 
dependent on man’s grasp of a given wise purpose, since there is always a wise purpose behind 
everything, even if man fails to comprehend it. As a result, this perpetual wise purposefulness 
deserves perpetual praise; hence, the worship of God is encouraged.   
 Ibn al-Qayyim explains that God is characterised with magnified wise purpose, abundant 
grace and absolute thanks-giving for everything He created and commanded; everything that He 
did not create, had He willed, He would have created. Similarly, His tawfīq (divine facilitation) 
which necessitates His obedience and His khidhlān (desert), which necessitates His 
disobedience, are also the result of His wise purpose.112  
 In addition, God has a great wise purpose for whatever occurs to man, in terms of harm 
and grievance. Such wise purpose is realised through the creation of causality (asbāb). The 
existence of such causality is also the result of divine wise purpose.113  
 Moreover, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, divine knowledge and omnipotence which is free 
from wise purpose does not attain perfection and goodness, but rather divine knowledge and 
omnipotence only attains perfection and goodness by wise purpose. The divine name of the Wise 
(al-ḥakīm) encompasses His wise purpose in His creation, commands and His will, both 
universal and legislative.114 Thus, one may assume that God’s divine names and attributes, along 
with their necessary result of creation, ultimately concludes to the essential attribute of divine 
wise purpose. That is, God acts by a wise purpose which is a part of His essence and the 
fundamental aim is His praise.115 
 
                                                          
111 al-Ghazālī also argues that divine acts proceed from divine wisdom; See Eric L. Ormsby, op. cit., p. 
197. 
112 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 230. 
113 Ibid  
114 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 234.  
115 Jon Hoover, op. cit., p. 124. 
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Examples of Wise Purposes 
Ibn al-Qayyim states that the prerequisites of divine wise purpose mean that God must place 
things in their correct places.116 Ibn al-Qayyim supports this statement by a fortiori analogy, 
showing that humans who do not place things in their correct places are not considered wise. For 
example, to place rubbish and impurities in clean and good fragrant places is not considered 
wise. Likewise, to place punishment in the place of kindness and vice-versa is also not 
considered wise. Thus, He whose wise purpose dazzles the people of understanding and great 
minds; how is He then supposed to place things in other than their correct places?117      
 A similar fortiori analogy is presented concerning the placement of good and evil souls 
on different levels in the hereafter. Ibn al-Qayyim explains that he who wants the evil and lowest 
of souls to be on the same level as the pure and highest of souls, surely wants something that 
opposes divine wise purpose.118 For example, if a king were to place his closest relatives and 
attendants on the lowest and poorest ranks of society, people will consequently speak ill of his 
kingship and wisdom, as he is placing people in other than their correct places. Therefore, Ibn al-
Qayyim insists that the same applies to the good souls, whom are closest to the greatest of kings, 
the King of kings,119 namely God.   
 
A Survey of Wise Purpose 
Ibn al-Qayyim identifies four unspecified groups in relation to the attributes of divine 
omnipotence and divine wise purpose. The first are those who deny divine omnipotence and wise 
purpose, as they hold that God acts by essence and not choice.120 This group can easily be 
identified as the philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā.121 Secondly are those who affirm divine 
                                                          
116 This shows that divine justice and divine wise purpose both complement each other since they have 
the same definition according to Ibn al-Qayyim.  
117 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 207. 
118 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 219- 220 
119 Ibid 
120 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 234. 
121 See, Avicenna, op. cit., p. 339. Also see, Frank Griffel, op. cit., pp. 141- 143, 225- 226.  
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omnipotence and will but deny divine wise purpose;122 God, according to them, acts by pure will 
(al-mashīʾa al-maḥḍ). This group is a suitable description of the Ashʿarites. Then there are those 
who affirm divine wise purpose, causes and motives in God’s acts but they deny the perfection 
of divine omnipotence. That is to say, He has no power over the actions of Angels, Jinns, and 
Mankind; this also includes their acts of obedience.123 The reason being is that in order to 
preserve divine justice, man needs to be the sole agent of his deeds if he is to be held responsible. 
This description fits in well with the Muʿtazilites’ position. Lastly, there are those who affirm 
both divine omnipotence and wise purpose as is in accordance to divine scripture.124 Ibn al-
Qayyim belongs to this last group.125  
 Consequently, Ibn al-Qayyim derives three major principles126 regarding the debate on 
divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose. Firstly, he asserts that one must affirm the 
complete divine omnipotence, as is lacking in the position of the philosophers entirely and the 
Muʿtazilites partially. Secondly, one must affirm the divine wise purpose, as is lacking in the 
position of both the Ashʿarites and the philosophers. Lastly, one must also affirm all thanks-
giving to God, namely to worship Him as a result of His divine omnipotence and divine wise 
purpose. Ibn al-Qayyim claims that all the schools impliedly denied the perfection of thanks-
giving to God, since they either deny divine omnipotence or divine wise purpose, or both. God’s 
thanks-giving is a necessary result of both divine omnipotence and divine wise purpose.127 That 
is to say, how is one truly supposed to worship a god who has deficient powers and no wise 
purpose in his acts?  
 
Wise Purpose for the Creation of Iblīs 
Although Ibn al-Qayyim’s initial engagement with the purpose for the creation of Iblīs (Satan) 
seems to align with al-Rāzī, his optimistic arguments are very likely his own original 
                                                          
122 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 235. 
123 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 236. 
124 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 237. 
125 Ibid 
126 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 239. 
127 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 246- 250 
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development - given that none of his sources of reference in his Shifāʾ tackle the problem in an 
optimistic manner. As such, Ibn al-Qayyim admits that the source of all evil is Iblīs, with 
reference to al-Rāzī’s problematic questions128 vis-à-vis evil, such as: what is the good in 
enduring Iblīs until the end of time? What greater good is there in a creation that nine hundred 
and ninety-nine are deemed to Hell and only one will enter Paradise?129 What greater good is 
there in the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise and as a result the affliction of their 
children; had we stayed in paradise, would all evil cease to exist? And if God has created us for 
His worship then how is it that His wise purpose requires that most of the creations are deviated 
from His worship and only aids the fewer of them to it? What is the greater good in the creation 
of disbelief, sins, disobedience, oppression and transgression? What is the good in the suffering 
of those who are not religiously obliged (mukallaf) - such as children and animals?130 
 Ibn al-Qayyim replies that indeed the creation of Iblīs holds many wise purposes, benefits 
and good, which are all a direct result of his existence; no one knows the entirety of them except 
God.131 Ibn al-Qayyim speaks of fifteen wise purposes in the creation of Iblīs.132 Firstly, the 
creation of Iblīs allows for the completion of the levels of worship (marātib al-ʿubūdiyya) for 
God’s close servants.133 By this, the continuous struggle against the enemy of God, namely Iblīs 
and his party, is established. Thus, one can love and hate for the sake of God, seek His help and 
turn to Him. Secondly, the fall of Iblīs acts as a deterrent against sins, for the Angels and 
Mankind. As a result, their fear and vigilance will become much greater.134 Likewise, it is a 
lesson in order that one may see the end result of those who are disobedient and arrogant to the 
commands of God. Moreover, God tested the fathers of both Man and Jinn; the latter persisted 
                                                          
128 These questions are found in both: Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 999- 1000 and idem., Ṭarīq al-
Hijratayn, vol. 1, pp. 339- 340.  
129  He is talking about the Prophetic tradition in al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Dār Ṭūq al-Najāt, 1422AH, 
vol. 4, p. 138, no. 3348 and Muslim, Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim, Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī, Beirut, n.d., vol. 1, p. 201, 
no. 222; cf. Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 999. 
130 Ibid, vol. 3, pp. 999- 1000. 
131 Ibid, vol. 3, p. 998. Also see, Peter J. Awn, Satan’s Tragedy and Redemption: Iblīs in Sufī Psychology, 
Brill, 1983, pp. 86- 89. 
132 Cf. Jon Hoover, op. cit. 
133 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1186. 
134 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1186- 1187. 
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upon his disobedience, namely Iblīs, whereas the former – Adam - repented and turned to 
God.135 Also, the creation of Iblīs serves as a test for mankind in order that God may distinguish 
the pure from the evil amongst them.136 Similarly, God can manifest the perfection of His divine 
omnipotence in the creation of angels and devils since they are one of many opposites within His 
vast creation.137 As God loves to be praised, the existence of God’s enemy encourages and 
establishes countless thanks-giving to Him.138 Obedience and guidance become appreciated; 
especially when it is the result of divine facilitation. The existence of Iblīs also encourages self-
struggle (jihād) and sacrificing for the sake of God. Hence, this continuous struggle establishes 
various forms of worship that are beloved to God, such as love, seeking help (al-ināba), reliance 
(tawwakul), patience, contentment and so on.139 Besides, in the creation of Iblīs God can 
manifest His great signs and miracles, such as the ones mentioned in divine scripture,140 as these 
miracles were the result of resistance, disapproval and hostility towards the Prophets. Lastly, 
God can manifest His names and attributes, such as the ‘Abaser’ and the ‘Exalter’, the 
‘Honourer’ and the ‘Humiliator’. These names, like others, require consequences (mutaʿalliqāt) 
in which their excellence (iḥkām) becomes manifest.141  
  
Wise Purpose for the Creation of Moral Choice 
One may assume that God creates without a wise purpose when probing into questions such as: 
why was man not created to do only good? Seeing that He acts by divine wise purpose, if He saw 
His slaves killing, corrupting and oppressing each other, and is able to stop them, then His wise 
purpose would not let Him abandon them upon such evil behaviour.142 Therefore, Ibn al-Qayyim 
                                                          
135 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1187. 
136 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1187- 1188. 
137 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1188- 1190. al-Nasafī also states that Iblīs is the evil opposite of perfection; see, Ian R. 
Netton, op. cit., p. 237. Also see the Sufī discussions on the science of opposites in relation to Iblīs in 
Peter J. Awn, op. cit., pp. 106- 107, 122- 141.    
138 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1189. 
139 Ibid 
140 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1190. 
141 Ibid; Also see, Jon Hoover, op. cit., p. 130. 
142 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1228. 
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argues there are three possibilities: God is either unaware of man’s evil acts, He is unable to 
prevent man from doing evil or God does not act by motives and wise purposes. Ibn al-Qayyim 
states that the first two are impossible in the case of God; therefore, we are left with the third 
possibility. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that the third doubtful issue (subha) is based on a false 
principle which relies on comparing God’s acts to that of man’s; though at times Ibn al-Qayyim 
is also guilty of such practices.143 That is to say, whatever is considered good by man should also 
be considered good by God and whatever is considered evil by man should also be considered 
evil by God.144  
 For this reason, Ibn al-Qayyim states that to draw analogy of a divine act to that of man’s 
acts is the most false of analogies. Similarly, when one draws analogy between God’s wise 
purpose and man’s wise purpose and God’s attributes to that of man’s attributes.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim argues that God clearly knew that man would commit disbelief, 
oppression and sins; He was able to have abstained from creating humans as one nation who only 
do what is good. However, His wise purpose rejected such a form of creation and demanded that 
mankind be how they are, namely able to do both good and evil.145 
 Furthermore, God created different types of souls (nafūs): souls that only do good, such 
as the angels, and souls that only do evil, such as the devils; also, souls that are able to do both 
good and evil, namely man. So, whoever amongst man is predominately good becomes 
associated with the first type, namely the angels. Whoever is predominately evil becomes 
associated with the second type, namely the devils. As a result, if divine wise purpose demands 
the existence of the second type, namely the devils, then the first type has greater reason for 
existence. Divine omnipotence, honour and wise purpose require the existence of the opposites 
of essences, attributes and acts.146   
                                                          
143 See for example the fortiori analogies used by Ibn al-Qayyim when dealing with divine attributes in 
this chapter. 
144 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1228.  
145 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1229. 
146 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1229, 1188. 
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 Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim states that great ignorance and misguidance questions why the 
whole of creation was not of one type, namely pious, as this suggests false impressions that are 
not holistically possible.147 
 
Wise Purpose of Suffering 
Ibn al-Qayyim asserts an optimistic principle that all good is from God and all evil is from 
objects of His acts (mafʿulātihi), but this evil is subjective148, as the evil of suffering is good with 
regards to God but evil with regards to man. This principle is perhaps intended to encourage 
optimism in the theistic sufferer. Ibn al-Qayyim stresses that one should hold steadfast to this 
principle and never part from it, whether in minute or momentous suffering, and that one should 
judge according to it at all times.149  
 Nonetheless, everything that befalls the believer is good, even if it includes suffering, 
since suffering can lead to the believer’s spiritual development and hence come closer to God.150 
Ibn al-Qayyim discusses the wise purpose for trials and tribulations, claiming that they exist to 
promote man’s patience, thanks-giving, reliance (tawwkul) and self-struggling (jihād). Also, it 
extracts man’s perfection which is concealed within him, that is: his power, his action, his ability 
to prevent causes and destroy things by its opposites. As a result, man will become certain that 
there is only One Omnipotent and it is impossible for Him to have an equal, but rather 
omnipotence and divine unity are inseparable.151  
 Similarly, suffering or lost blessings may necessitate that the believer receives further 
blessings in the hereafter.152 This assertion is very similar to the Muʿtazilite concept of 
                                                          
147 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1230. 
148 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 288. 
149 Ibid 
150 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 292. 
151 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 301. I do not see how all of this answers the question on sufferings of children and 
animals? For more on the wise purpose for suffering cf. al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1234- 1238. 
152 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 292. 
212 
 
 
compensation (taʿwīḍ).153 So ultimately, whatever God decrees for man is good and a just 
decision; hence, He can be praised.154  
 Lastly, sufferings may deter man from sins, since one may apprehend that God’s 
punishment in the hereafter is far greater than any earthly sufferings. Ibn al-Qayyim’s theory is 
that God has placed in this world some of the effects (āthār) of His wrath, such as punishments, 
sufferings, trials and afflictions of individuals (aʿyān), in order that one may deduce the even 
greater discomforts in the ‘Abode of Misery’, Hell.155     
 
Wise Purpose for the Eternity of Hell 
On the wise purpose for the eternity of Hell, Ibn al-Qayyim presents a potential question as to 
what pleasure or good originates from the serving eternal punishment of Hell? But before Ibn al-
Qayyim sets out to answer the question, he starts off - as is his common practice - by discussing 
the positions on this issue at hand and then concludes with his opinion.  
 Firstly, the Ashʿarites uphold that the eternal punishment comes from the pure divine 
volition of God and there is no wise purpose or motive for it. As a result, they hold that God can 
punish the people of obedience (ahl ṭāʿa) and at the same time bless His enemies - those who 
associate partners with Him. Hence, everything is possible for God and to attribute such acts to 
God or their opposites, equate to the same thing. Furthermore, the Ashʿarites claim that there is 
no escape from this question, namely the eternity of Hell, except by adopting the principle that 
God acts by pure divine volition.156 Ibn al-Qayyim maintains that the Ashʿarites here are 
mistaken by not combining the evidences on the eternity of Hell and the evidences on divine 
justice and wise purpose, and also the contingence of things upon its causes. They have also 
                                                          
153 See, Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering In The Muʿtazilite Theology: ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Teaching on 
Pain and Divine Justice, Brill, 2000, pp. 157- 190. 
154 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ṭarīq al-Hijratayn, vol. 1, p. 294.   
155 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 298. 
156 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1240- 1241.  
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fallen into error regarding their understanding of the Quran; just as they are mistaken with their 
description of God doing acts that do not befit Him.157 
 In contrast, the Muʿtazilites claim that the only way to avoid the evil of this position, 
namely the eternal punishment of Hell, is by what they have affirmed of divine wise purpose and 
causation (al-taʿlīl). However, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, they have fallen into an even greater 
evil than the Ashʿarites because they obligate God to cast eternally into Hell those who have 
spent their entire life in the obedience of God but then die upon a grave sin without repentance. 
Whereas the Ashʿarites, on the other hand, hold that it is possible for God to cast His obedient 
slaves into Hell for eternity.158 Thus, the difference here is that one group hold that God is 
obliged to punish for eternity and the other say it is merely a possibility for God to do so.     
 Ibn al-Qayyim also discusses two other groups regarding the eternal punishment of Hell; 
he does not however mention them by name. The first are described as ‘the people of scrutiny 
and research’ (ahl al-naẓar wa al-baḥth) who say that the concept of eternal punishment in Hell 
is merely a deterrent that has no actual reality, given that the eternity of Hell opposes divine wise 
purpose, mercy, justice and benefit (maṣlaḥa).159 Ibn Sīnā upholds this position; he asserts that 
Hell is only a deterrent and the presumed punishment in the Hereafter will only be imagined by 
each individual.160 The second group are those who say there is no such thing as Hell, but rather 
all existence is one. Moreover, there is no such thing as obedience and disobedience, they are 
one and the same thing; to differentiate between the two is a false impression and delusion. So 
therefore, heaven and earth, this life and the hereafter, pre-eternity and eternity and good and 
evil, are all one and the same thing.161  
                                                          
157 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1241; also cf. Idem, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 456, 518- 519. 
158 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, pp. 1241- 1242; also cf. Idem, Miftāḥ, vol. 2, pp. 456, 519. 
159 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1242.  
160 I would like to thank Prof. Yahya Michot for pointing this out to me. See, Avicenna, op. cit., p. 356; 
George F. Hourani, op. cit., pp. 230, 238- 239; Ivry, op. cit., pp. 160, 169; Shams C. Inati, op. cit., pp. 162- 
164.   
161 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1243. It is possible that this position belongs to Ibn al-ʿArabī, since he 
believes in the doctrine of monism (waḥdat al-wujūd)- that all of existence is one thing- including 
Paradise and Hell. See, A. E. Afifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Muḥyiddīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, Cambridge, 1939 
and also see, Chittick, W.C., ‘Waḥdat al-Sh̲̲uhūd’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Brill Online, 
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 Ibn al-Qayyim claims that people have been brought up between these four groups and 
know of no other position or school except these.162 He then presents his position on the debate 
after seeking God’s help and divine facilitation (tawfīq). Ibn al-Qayyim argues that reason, 
divine scripture and the natural disposition (fiṭra), indicate that God is the All-Wise and the All-
Merciful; both His divine wise purpose and divine mercy reject the eternal punishment of souls 
in Hell. Meaning, these souls will not continue to receive punishment as long as God continues 
to live, namely for eternity.  Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim rejects the concept of eternal punishment 
because it contradicts God’s divine wise purpose, divine mercy163 and the notion that God 
created in man the natural disposition (fiṭra) of belief in Him. Similarly, God mentions in the 
Quran that the fiṭra can never perish completely; hence, an unbeliever will only be punished and 
purified in Hell until his fiṭrā is completely restored.164   
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim emphasises that no one can know the intricate details of God’s 
divine wise purpose.165 Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that if it were not for the creation 
of opposites, the impudent enemies of God and the testing of His close slaves (awliyāʾ) by way 
of these enemies, then the extraction of pure worship from His slaves would not be possible.166 
Additionally, if it were not for the empowerment of desires and anger, along with their urges 
(dawāʿī) in man, then there would be no achievement of patience, self-struggle (jihād al-nafs) 
and preventing one’s desires purely for the love of God.167 Thus, the praising of God is the cause 
                                                          
162 Ibn al-Qayyim, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 1243. 
163 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1247- 1248.  
164 Ayedh al-Dosari, Minhaj Ibn al-Qayyim fī Taqrīr Masāʾil al-Qaḍāʾ wa al-Qadar min Khilāl Kitābihi Shifāʾ 
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for creation and its motive. By praise, He brought it into existence and for praise it came into 
existence.168  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated how Ibn al-Qayyim engages with the theodicean writings of Ibn 
Sīnā and al-Rāzī, to the extent that he employs and adds to their categorisations of evil. 
Similarly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim clearly engages in philosophical inquiry when 
tracing the source of accidental evil and, as a result, he employs demonstrative arguments which 
form potentially original contributions to the debate at hand. Likewise, I have argued that this 
Qayyimian approach to theology clearly challenges the contemporary Traditionalist trends of 
theological disengagement, a utopian conception of theological sources and a puritan conception 
of Traditionalist theology; given the importance of Ibn al-Qayyim, amongst contemporary 
Traditionalists. Additionally, I have shown that Ibn al-Qayyim engaged with non-Traditionalist 
philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, and also that his conclusions were not entirely derived from 
scripture or the understanding of the Salaf; rather they were the result of his critical engagement 
which helped him develop a theology which contains elements that could be traced back to 
Aristotle and Plotinus; namely, evil as privation. Lastly, I have shown how Ibn al-Qayyim, as a 
result of his critical engagement, succeeds in developing a four-fold theodicy of optimism, 
namely, the theodicy of: relative evil, divine names and attributes, necessary opposites and 
divine wise purpose; which all ultimately argue for optimism in creation and thus, the worthiness 
of God’s praise.       
 
                                                          
168 Ibn al-Qayyim, Shifāʾ, vol. 3, p. 1239. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this research I have argued that Ibn al-Qayyim’s methodology of critical engagement contests 
the contemporary Traditionalist trend of theological disengagement; since Ibn al-Qayyim did 
actively engaged in intra-Muslim dialogue, whether Muslim theologians or philosophers. As 
such, Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagements – his efforts to harmonise, synthesise, develop, 
‘Traditionalise’ and systematise various kalām discussions - aided him in his project of 
theological development. 
  Ibn al-Qayyim’s attempts to harmonise and synthesise were apparent in his critical 
engagement with the conflicting views on the debate of human agency, by introducing terms 
such as ‘conditions’, ‘partially causative’ and ‘general will’ to the debate. Accordingly, man’s 
motive and power do not necessarily cause an act; rather they are conditions for the causation of 
an act. In this sense, man’s motive and power are merely partially causative in that they depend 
on God’s volition to preponderate the effect. This arguably middle way position is an attempt to 
harmonise and synthesise the Muʿtazilite view that man’s motive and power are independently 
causative and the opposing Ashʿarite view that man has no causative ability. The former view 
excludes God from the equation of cause and effect; whereas the latter excludes man. 
Conversely, Ibn al-Qayyim’s position allows scope for both God and man to operate in the 
equation of cause and effect.   
 This tendency to harmonise and synthesise conflicting views can be further appreciated in 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s argument that moral acts are attributed to both man’s causative ability and 
God’s general will. In this sense, God wills all that exists – including moral acts - by way of His 
general will, which is compatible with the fact that such moral acts are brought about by man’s 
causative ability. Thus, moral acts can be rationally attributed to both God and man, thus 
avoiding diminishing both God and man’s part in the causation of moral acts. The implication of 
Ibn al-Qayyim’s effort to harmonise and synthesise the opposing views in these debates may be 
seen as an endeavour to strike a balance between two divine attributes of omnipotence and 
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justice, whereby the Ashʿarites emphasise the former and the Muʿtazilites emphasise the latter. 
As a result, Ibn al-Qayyim believed that both the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites failed to 
reconcile the apparent inconsistency between divine omnipotence and the praiseworthiness of 
God. The Muʿtazilites deny that evil is within God’s dominion and hence they undermine God’s 
divine omnipotence. On the other hand, the Ashʿarites insist that God acts purely by His arbitrary 
volition and not for a wise purpose. Hence, the Ashʿarites implicitly deny the praiseworthiness of 
God, given that praise is only deserved when acting for a purpose rather than an arbitrary 
volition. 
 It is precisely this aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement that evidently attempts 
to harmonise and synthesise conflicting views in theological debates, which may be employed as 
an alternative to the contemporary Traditionalist methodology of theological disengagement and 
isolation. Given that the latter methodology inevitably leads to the opposition of intra-Muslim 
dialogue and intolerance – both of which feature distinctly in sectarian disputation and violence.          
 The developmental nature of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement is proven by his 
introduction of new concepts to various discussions, such as his position that the necessary 
consequence of accidental evil results from the laws of privation and necessity, which implies 
that some accidental evils are uncaused. Also, his argument that human acts occur according to 
God’s general will, so as to give man more freedom and responsibility than what results from 
God’s specific will. Similarly, in his discussion of divine determination transcending evil, Ibn al-
Qayyim makes the distinction between divine acts and the objects of divine acts, in order to 
preserve God’s omnipotence and justice. Divine acts entail that God creates and commands good 
by way of His legislative will, which necessitates divine love for the object of His legislative 
will. Additionally, God creates and commands the existence of evil by way of His universal will, 
which does not necessitate that God loves the object of His universal will. As such, God’s justice 
remains largely intact, because He does not love or legislatively will evil; rather the existence of 
evil occurs by way of the laws of cause and effect and the laws of privation and necessity - both 
of which are the objects of God’s universal will. Hence, divine omnipotence remains also intact. 
Moreover, it is within the domain of God’s universal will that the objects of divine acts – man’s 
acts – operate and thus sins exist exclusively within this domain.     
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 Ibn al-Qayyim’s four-fold theodicy of optimism is another example of the developmental 
aspect of his critical engagement. The Theodicy of Relative Evil argues that, on a macro-level, 
everything which exists entails some sort of good for its existence – this includes perceived evil. 
On a micro-level, man perceives evil things as evil because he specifically experiences harm or 
suffering as a result of their existence – regardless of the good it may entail. Therefore, evil is 
relative when one takes into consideration these two levels of perception.  
 The Theodicy of Divine Names and Attributes states that all of God’s names and 
attributes are beautiful and necessitate that He is free from evil and imperfection. But at the same 
time, God’s names and attributes ironically require the existence of evil in order to manifest. 
That is, how can God be the Pardoner without there being the person to pardon – namely, a 
sinner?  
 The Theodicy of Opposites argues that created things are only truly manifested by their 
opposites. If it were not for ugliness, the virtue of beauty would not be known and if it were not 
for poverty then the value of wealth would not be known. Therefore, this epistemic necessity is 
an essential aspect of creation within this world; without it, it would be another world.  
 Lastly, the Theodicy of Divine Wise Purpose argues that everything in creation has a 
wise purpose for its existence. This wise purpose is the criterion according to which God acts, 
since it is His intrinsic attribute which is reflected in His name, the Wise (al-hakim): He who 
places things correctly. Thus, there is a wise purpose for what God wills and what He wills not. 
As such, man may comprehend a given wise purpose or he may not. Nevertheless, if one does 
comprehend a particular benefit or wisdom for a specific accidental evil, then that is sufficient 
indication of an optimistic theodicy of wise purpose. Essentially, all of the aforementioned 
constructed theodicies ultimately argue for optimism in creation and thus encourage the 
worthiness of God’s praise.  
 Once again, it is this developmental nature of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement which 
clearly opposes the contemporary Traditionalist concept of a puritan theology which asserts that 
their theological positions have no human or foreign influences; rather they are solely the 
product of the divine as is found in scripture. The purity of source implies that there is no need 
for further development or contribution to religious knowledge, since human input will only 
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corrupt the pure. This kind of concept is perhaps one of the many factors responsible for the 
stagnation in the development of religious knowledge.           
 The ‘Traditionalising’ aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement can be seen in his 
adoption of a middle way position in the debates on meta-ethics and causation in divine acts, 
where he accepts some aspects of the Muʿtazilites’ position and some of the Ashʿarites’ position. 
He maintains that there are acts which consist essentially of either benefit or harm and can be 
known by reason and also by revelation. However, this does not mean that man is accountable 
based solely on reason, since punishment is only justified if revelation confirms the good or evil 
within an act. Essentially, Ibn al-Qayyim accepts whatever he believes to conform to his 
Traditionalist epistemological framework of scripture, consensus of the Salaf, sound reason and 
natural disposition.  
 Ibn al-Qayyim’s preference of scriptural terminologies over kalām or falsafa 
terminologies is another example of him ‘Traditionalising’ the debate on causation in divine acts. 
Ibn al-Qayyim opts to use scriptural terms such as ḥikma (wise purpose) to describe the nature of 
divine acts, instead of the term gharad (motive), as is commonly employed by the Muʿtazilites 
and Ashʿarites.  
 Once more, it is this ‘Traditionalising’ aspect of Ibn al-Qayyim’s critical engagement 
which cannot be easily reconciled with the contemporary Traditionalist concept of a monolithic 
utopian history of salvation – where salvation in only attained by means of uncritically imitating 
the early generations, the Salaf. Otherwise, Ibn al-Qayyim would have simply dismissed 
engaging in intra-Muslim dialogue and opted to uncritically adhere to the position of the Salaf in 
relation to these debates, if there ever existed such positions.       
 Lastly, Ibn al-Qayyim’s systematic approach to critical engagement is evident in the title 
of his books and chapters within, which are dedicated to specific topics of theology - such as his 
Shifāʾ - or in response to fellow theologians and philosophers, such as al-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā.   
 It is this calibre of multifaceted critical engagement which can serve as a model in the 
history of Traditionalism, where a scholar of authority undertook a project that was relevant to 
the challenges of his time, ‘Traditionalising’ kalām debates to form Traditionalist positions as a 
substitute to the widespread status quo Ashʿarite position. Contemporary Traditionalist scholars 
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may revive and operate in the framework of Ibn al-Qayyim’s lost legacy of critical engagement 
and development in order to harmonise the challenges of modernity with the medieval positions 
that are typically the object of uncritical religious imitation. Nonetheless, a separate study will be 
needed to examine how Ibn al-Qayyim’s methodology of critical engagement can be employed 
to tackle modern challenges which, again, will foreseeably require further debate and research. 
 In essence, the implication of this study alludes to two conflicting authoritative 
Traditionalist methodologies. Firstly, the contemporary Traditionalist methodology of 
theological disengagement and uncritical religious imitation, which was briefly mentioned in the 
introduction of this study as being vulnerable to exploitation for indoctrination, control, disunity, 
intolerance and sectarian violence. For this reason, I sought to challenge this methodology by 
expounding on a second Traditionalist methodology of critical engagement and development, as 
was employed by Ibn al-Qayyim in the debates related to the theological doctrine of qadar. 
Likewise, given Ibn al-Qayyim’s authority amongst contemporary Traditionalists – due to his 
knowledge and theological affiliation to Traditionalism – his methodology has the potential to 
serve as an alternative framework within which contemporary Traditionalist scholars can tackle 
the many challenges relevant to the modern Muslim. That is not to say that traditions should be 
divorced from our modern era, rather that traditions should be critically engaged with and 
developed in order to retain relevance in our many complex societies. And as such, the doors to 
intra-Muslim dialogue should be opened to competent contributions based on critical 
engagement rather than the repetitive and rigid contributions of taqlīd. In this sense, my thesis 
seeks to convey a very small point in relation to contemporary Muslims and Islam: to promote 
dialogue, in particular to call contemporary Traditionalists to come together in determining 
relevant debates and thus the future of Islam in the modern age.    
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